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Abstract 
This study aims to assist in developing a more effective framework for regulating 
auditor independence practice (AI) in Iran, a non-IFRS country with an Islamic legal 
system. It investigates the following general research question: In order to increase 
AI in a non-IFRS country with an Islamic legal system, what are the potential 
indicators of threats to auditor independence (AI), and how should a regulator 
prioritise addressing these threats? The study tests the following three propositions: 
1. Based on six potential indicators of AI threats in Iran identified from the 
literature, it is expected that the participants will agree with the nominated 
indicators as threats to AI in Iran.  
A) However, each participant’s perception of importance among the six will 
vary.  
B) However, the researcher also expects that each participant will nominate 
other indicators of AI threat not previously identified. 
2. In particular, the researcher expects that high level bribery will most often 
rank as most important to the participants. 
3. Based on professional standards that specifically refer to all indicators of 
threat to AI in Iran (except for non-existence of audit committee which was 
regulated by the Tehran Stock Exchange) the researcher expects that the 
participants with professional qualifications’ perceptions will be different 
from those participants without any professional qualification. 
The study is conducted in two stages. First, a mixed questionnaire using both closed-
ended questions and an open-ended question is administered to participants in the 
Iranian market. The participants’ responses are analysed using quantitative and 
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qualitative methods. Second, using thematic analysis, financial media articles are 
triangulated against the first stage results. 
Overall, the message to the regulator in Iran is as follows: The findings support the 
propositions 1A, 1B, and 2 of the study. However; they do not support the third 
proposition, such that qualifications and experience do not affect the participants’ 
perceptions. The consideration of bribery as the strongest indicator of AI threat may 
encourage implementation of advanced strategies to safeguard the country against it. 
Iran’s economic condition and non-audit-services are the most cited threats to AI in 
Iran. The nomination of Iran’s economic condition shows influence of the economic 
factors on business people’s behaviour and may suggest implementation of effective 
ways to improve the economic condition of the country. The nomination of non-
audit-services may suggest introduction of similar rules as those in IFRS countries to 
regulate the non-audit-services practices in Iran. These results show importance of 
regulatory attention to safeguard AI in the country. Accordingly, this research 
recommends enhancements to the current framework for regulating auditor 
independence practice in a non-IFRS country with an Islamic legal system. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to research 
Introduction   
This chapter describes the concept of auditor independence (AI). It provides a 
summary regarding the background of the accounting profession in Iran for the 
purpose of introducing the research topic. It indicates that the thesis aims to assist in 
developing a more effective framework for regulating auditor independence practice 
in a country that does not follow the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(non-IFRS) and has an Islamic legal system. It explains the researcher’s motivations 
to conduct this research. It shows the existing research gap and indicates how the 
thesis is expected to contribute to the body of knowledge and practice about auditing.  
 
Auditor independence (AI) 
Auditor independence (AI) is defined as non-existence of interests that generate an 
improper risk of material bias regarding reliability of the financial statements (Elliott 
& Jacobson, 1998). AI means that auditors should maintain a fair approach, while 
performing their tasks (Arens, Fiedler, Best, & Shailer, 2014). Both independence of 
mind and independence in appearance are required for auditors. According to IFAC 
(2008, p. 7) independence of mind is defined as “the state of mind that permits the 
expression of a conclusion without being affected by influences that compromise 
professional judgment, thereby allowing an individual to act with integrity, and 
exercise objectivity and professional scepticism”; while independence in appearance 
is defined as “the avoidance of facts and circumstances that are so significant that a 
reasonable and informed third party would be likely to conclude, weighing all the 
specific facts and circumstances, that a Firm’s, or a member of the Audit or 
Assurance Team’s, integrity, objectivity or professional scepticism has been 
compromised” (IFAC, 2008, p. 7). 
 2 
 
The independence of auditors aims to assure the entity’s investors regarding integrity 
of the entity’s financial reports, in order to improve the overall efficiency of the 
capital market (Campbell & Parker, 1993). The fundamental requirement is that 
organisations that provide professional services, owners, or partners of professional 
institutions, and all related managers and professionals should not have any benefit 
or interest which may impair their independence during preparation of their reports 
(IAO, 2014). The auditors are responsible for avoiding circumstances that create a 
conflict of interest. Their behaviours should not cause the external parties to assume 
that their independence is compromised, or that their decisions are biased (GAO, 
2003). The regulators are tasked with providing professional standards and guidance 
to assist auditors to achieve independence. They prevent faulty audit firms from 
accepting new clients, or they impose fines on violators to safeguard the wellbeing of 
the market (Jonathan, 2003). The introduction of different legislation such as 
revocation of fraudulent auditors’ right to practise, prohibition of external auditors’ 
engagement by the entity, limitation of non-audit-services (NAS), and mandatory 
auditor rotation, are enacted to regulate the auditors’ behaviours (Wallace, 2004). 
 
Background and aim of the thesis 
The goal of the accountancy profession is to attain the best principles and standards 
of professional conduct at the highest possible level in Iran (IAO, 2014). The 
profession has to provide credible information for society and recognisable 
stakeholders, deliver quality services to meet the users’ needs, and assure 
stakeholders that the profession is governed by a credible framework for professional 
conduct. The independent auditors are a cornerstone of the assurance function 
(Franzel, 2012). The independent auditors are more resistant to client’s pressure 
(DeFond, Wong, & Li, 1999). The separation of ownership from management 
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increases significance of auditor independence (AI), because managers may prioritise 
their own interests over shareholders (Salehi, Mansoury, & Azary, 2009). The aim of 
this research is to assist in developing a more effective framework for regulating 
auditor independence practice in Iran, a non-IFRS country with an Islamic legal 
system. It investigates the impact of 6 previously identified indicators of threat to AI 
as perceived by the accounting practitioners, and then attempts to explore further 
threats to AI. It investigates priorities to increase AI. Iran is the focus of study. As 
described in the next chapter, the Iranian audit profession and its standards are 
influenced by the Islamic laws. There is a lack of knowledge about the audit 
profession and the application of AI in this setting.  
Of relevance is the AI framework issued by the Iran Audit Organisation (IAO) in 
2014 that consists of 11 factors that may compromise AI (IAO, 2014):  
1. family, personal, or financial relationship between auditors and their clients; 
2. inclusion of auditors in their clients’ board of directors, senior officers, or 
partners;  
3. provision of non-audit services to clients;  
4. high management pressure on auditors; 
5. high audit fees;  
6. existence of contingent fees;  
7. purchasing and accepting gifts and hospitality;  
8. ownership of audit firms by those other than auditors;  
9. presence of former audit partners as clients;  
10. existence of lawsuits between auditors and their clients; and  
11. long-term association between auditors and their clients.  
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This research aligns with the IAO (2014) framework by addressing issues in relation 
to gifts and hospitality, long-term association and auditor switches and the provision 
of non-audit services. Distinct from IAO (2014), the research also focuses on the 
importance of the audit committee and the professional proficiency and care, and 
highlights the significance of bribery in compromising AI.  
 
Motivation 
This study is motivated by several factors. First, prior AI research in Iran is not 
comprehensive and fails to evaluate the major threats to AI. Indeed, there is not a 
clear view about independence issues in Iran (Salehi & Mansoury, 2009). An 
evaluation of the indicators to threat provides a clearer image regarding 
independence. 
Second, since privatisation is increasing in Iran, private investors as shareholders are 
more concerned about accuracy of financial statements (Mirshekary & Saudagaran, 
2005)1. The auditors are assumed to provide assurance to the financial information 
provided by managers and hence auditor independence in Iran is increasingly 
important given the reported lack of ethics and independence in the company 
management. 
Third, the corruption level is high in Iran. The Transparency International has ranked 
Iran as one of the most corrupt countries in its annual Corruption Perceptions Index 
for several years (Transparency International, 2014)2. The Iranian financial reporting 
                                                 
1 Though the Iranian constitution limits the private sector’s involvement in agriculture, livestock, 
trade, light industries, and services, the supreme leader used his extra-constitutional authority to 
enable the government’s privatisation plan in 2006. The plan led to the sale of major infrastructure 
such as refineries, banks, petrochemical, aluminium, steel, shipping, telecommunications, and 
insurance companies. For example, in 2009, Iran’s major telecommunication company was sold, 
while a consortium obtained half of it for $7.8 billion. Sixty percent of governmental companies, 
valued at $122 billion, were sold in 2012. The plan aims to sell the remaining companies by 2015 
(Bozorgmehr, 2012b). 
2 For example, an audio-recorded tape of conversation between the judiciary chief’s brother and an 
associate of the former president in the Iranian parliament revealed the intention of the chief’s brother 
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system has many loopholes, creating an environment for fraud3. The fraudsters are 
provided with an opportunity to misuse the assets of companies, because of gaps in 
the  judicial system and law enforcement agencies (Treisman, 2007). 
Fourth, the Iranian regulators and professional bodies have highlighted the AI issues 
for the profession. The Iranian Institute of Certified Accountants (IICA) considers 
the moral characteristics of auditors as the most important part of their profession 
and believes that audit principles should primarily address the ethical concerns 
(IICA, 1985). It requires auditors to continuously remain independent both in mind 
and in appearance. It indicates that independence is equally significant prior to and 
after acceptance of a job (IICA, 1985). Because of Iran’s recent aspiration to 
participate in the international community, IAO aims to modify the regulations and 
provide a better accounting system in order to meet its obligations (Ehteshami, 
2012). It requires the auditors to behave in a manner which is compatible with their 
professional reputation (IAO, 2014). A comprehensive understanding and evaluation 
to the indicators of threat to AI has been a current topic for both the academics and 
the profession. 
  
                                                                                                                                          
to misuse his brother’s influence for his own economic gains in 2013 (Al Jazeera Correspondents, 
2013) 
3 Appointing an independent management to privatised companies is a challenge in Iran: An 
independent management does not manage many of the privatised companies, as the Revolutionary 
Guards control them. The Guards highly influence the country’s black-market trades (Dehghanpisheh, 
2009). 
 6 
 
Research question 
Hence, this thesis poses the following research question: 
In order to increase AI in a non-IFRS country with an Islamic legal system, 
what are the potential indicators of threats to AI, and how should a regulator 
prioritise addressing these threats? 
In collecting the evidence to inform the research question, the study is conducted in 
two stages. First, a mixed questionnaire using both closed-ended questions and an 
open-ended question is administered to participants in the Iranian market. The 
participants’ responses are analysed using quantitative and qualitative methods. 
Second, using thematic analysis, financial media articles are triangulated against the 
first stage results. 
 
Contributions  
The study is expected to contribute in several ways. First, it provides a better 
understanding regarding the audit profession in Iran, a non-IFRS country with an 
Islamic legal system. Due to the opportunities created by the Islamic laws and non-
IFRS background of Iran, the study provides a lens of observation to the AI issue in 
Iran and beyond. Given the similarities in Iran with other regional nations, the 
evidence obtained in such a study can be instructive to other countries in the region 
and beyond (Mirshekary & Saudagaran, 2005). Second, given the current attention 
from the IAO as to AI issues, the study provides an avenue for the regulators and 
decision makers to take preventive and corrective actions to safeguard AI. Therefore, 
capacity to prevent and detect fraud and error increases and the financial statements 
may demonstrate a better picture regarding financial affairs of companies. More 
specifically, as the IAO (2014) recently identified 11 factors of AI, this study aligns 
with the IAO Code by investigating and comparing indicators identified from the 
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scholarly literature. It is notable that not all indicators in the literature align with IAO 
identified factors, so the variation of the perceptions from the participants in this 
study indicates dispersion of the understanding of AI in the profession. Third, it 
educates Iranian users of financial statements about the profession, increasing their 
knowledge of how to protect themselves from financial loss. 
 
Thesis outline 
The remaining chapters are organised as follows. Chapter 2 is the institutional 
background, providing a summary regarding Islam and its principles. It provides 
more details about the legal and financial system of Iran. Chapter 3 reviews the 
literature related to AI. It illustrates identified indicators of AI threat in Iran and in 
international literature that are not mentioned in the Iranian literature. Further, it 
indicates the propositions of the study. Chapter 4 describes the understanding to audit 
and agency theory. Chapter 5 explains the research design used to address the 
research question and propositions of the study, by detailing the two stages of the 
research design: stage 1 questionnaire and stage 2 financial media analysis. Chapter 6 
outlines the research methods and findings from the closed-ended questions of the 
questionnaire. Chapter 7 outlines the research methods and findings from the open-
ended question of the questionnaire. Chapter 8 describes the collection of financial 
media as data for the study and analyses of these data. Finally, Chapter 9 provides 
the concluding remarks of this study. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the concept of AI as relevant to this thesis. It provided a 
brief overview regarding the Iranian accounting profession. It mentioned the aims of 
conducting this research. It indicated motivational drivers of doing the research. It 
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indicated the research question of the study. It stated how the body of knowledge and 
practical matters may benefit from this research. 
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Chapter 2: Institutional background 
Introduction 
This chapter first provides a summary regarding the Iranian economy, privatisation 
trend in the country, foreign investments in Iran, and reported corruption and bribery 
cases. Then, it explains the role of audit profession in the Iranian capital market and 
introduces the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) and TSE listed companies. It also 
introduces Islamic economics and auditor independence (AI) in Iran and addresses 
the influence of Sharia on audit reports. Further, it explains the Iranian cultural 
perceptions, its political system, the development of accounting and auditing 
profession in the county, and the Iranian regulators, i.e., Supreme Audit Court (of 
Iran) (SAC), Iran Audit Organisation (IAO).  
 
The economy in Iran 
Brief introduction to Iranian economy 
Iran is a developing country with huge resources of oil and gas in an area of 1, 648, 
195 km (Haftlang, Lang, & Rajabi, 2003)2. The private sector does not have a major 
impact on the Iranian economy. Iranian governments unsuccessfully attempted to 
increase the private sector’s influence on the country’s economy (BBC, 2006a). 
Iranian Chamber of Commerce represents the private sector, whereas it reveals the 
interests of the capital market and protects the government. Minister of Commerce 
elects the Chamber’s director, who is often a conservative businessman of the bazaar. 
Various corruption cases of private businessmen have damaged the private sector’s 
image in the country. The cooperative sector is state-generated, and it receives its 
financial support from the Iranian government (Karbassian, 2000). 
The Iranian government aims to widen the country’s international trade activities, 
through development of special trade zones in the Persian Gulf throughout the post 
revolution (post 1979) era. It has transformed the Qeshm and Kish islands into an 
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industrial zone and a free-trade transit point accordingly to attract foreign investors 
and increase its non-oil exports (Ali, 1991). However, despite the fact that Iran is the 
fourth largest holder of proven oil reserves, Iranian economy is severely damaged 
because of international sanctions. The country loses up to $8 billion as a result of 
sanctions every month (Anonymous, 2014a).  
 
The trend of privatisation 
The Iranian Supreme Leader issued a privatisation decree consistent with the policies 
of Article 44 of the constitution on 2 July 2006. The executive order aims to privatise 
80% of shares of the state-owned companies. The Supreme Leader believes that 
privatisation will increase economic growth, enhance social justice, and lessen 
poverty within 20 years (BBC, 2006a). The privatisation plan has some problems and 
may not achieve its goals for several reasons. First, some managers of state-owned 
companies oppose it, as they consider privatisation a threat for their current position. 
Second, the state-owned companies may suggest some rules and regulations to 
undermine the private sector. Therefore, the private sector should be engaged during 
the rule-making process. Lastly, some of the privatisation methods used in the past 
have led to corruption, reducing confidence of investors regarding the government’s 
privatisation plans, possibly leading the private sector to bankruptcy (BBC, 2006a). 
The private sector suffers from the lack of financial support from banks. The 
economic instability resulted from the Islamic revolution has noticeably decreased 
growth in the banking industry. The government’s restrictions have reduced the 
Iranian banks’ lending activities. There has been a negative real rate of return on 
capital throughout the post-revolution era. The politically powerful agencies and 
governmental companies have taken many commercial banks’ loan portfolios (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit N.A., 2003). However, the private consumers pay much 
 11 
 
higher interest rates for their loans than the governmental agencies (Mashayekhi & 
Mashayekh, 2008). 
 
Foreign investments in Iran 
Iran has a capacity to attract foreign investments because of its strategic location, 
amount of oil and gas reserves, and the proper infrastructures (SyndiGate Media Inc, 
2014). However, foreign investors have limitations on their stock market activities, 
and direct foreign investments are low (Naceur, Ghazouani, & Omran, 2007)4.  
Although the country indicated that it is open for business and foreign investment, its 
foreign investment is restrained by not being a part of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and the political pressure of not trading with Iran (Anonymous, 2015). Many 
French and German business people have travelled to Iran to explore potential 
opportunities after its nuclear deal with world powers (Anonymous, 2014a). 
However, the business people have been warned by American officials that they 
should be cautious and avoid signing any contract with Iran, if they want to retain 
their access to the United States capital market. The United States pressure has 
reduced the desire of European business people to trade with Iran (Anonymous, 
2015). Iran needs more foreign investment to maintain its position as the second-
largest producer of petrochemicals in the Middle East (Anonymous, 1994)5. 
However, Iran is not still a part of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), although 
                                                 
4 The foreign investments are divided into direct investments and indirect investments. Both types 
should comply with specific regulations. The Organisation for Investment, Economic and Technical 
Assistance of Iran (OIETAI) regulates direct investments, whereas Paragraph C, Article 15 of the 
fourth Five-year Socio-Economic Development Plan governs indirect investments (Chatterjee, 
Mirshekary, Al Farooque, & Safari, 2010). 
5 The analysts have estimated that the country needs a direct foreign investment of up to $400 billion 
to achieve its desired economic growth of 8% (AsiaNet Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd, 2012). 
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the country indicates the necessity of joining the international community to attract 
more foreign investors to improve its economic condition (Mashayekhi, 2008)6.  
It is notable that the existence of solid accounting and audit systems is imperative to 
attract foreign sources of income for Iran (Mashayekhi & Mashayekh, 2008). 
Effective accounting standards enhance audit quality (Favere-Marchesi, 2000). The 
Anglo-American accounting systems influenced the Iranian practices prior to the 
Islamic revolution. The former “Big Eight” professional firms dominated the 
accounting profession, which comprised a large number of western trained Iranian 
accountants. The companies prepared an income statement, balance sheet, and a list 
of shareholders according to the tax law requirements. The Articles 232-242 of 
corporate law governed the disclosure requirements, addressing financial statement 
preparations, accounting methods disclosures, expenditures, and depreciations. The 
Official Accountants audited financial statements of public companies based on the 
TSE regulations (Mirshekary & Saudagaran, 2005).  
 
An environment of fraud, corruption and bribery in Iran 
Fraud in an accounting sense includes misallocation of resources or 
misrepresentation of financial statements, wherein improper revenue recognition, 
inappropriate expense deferral, or overstatement of assets take place in majority of 
the fraud cases (Rezaee, 2005). It damages operation of business and prevents 
achievement of its goals. It affects innocent people such as shareholders or insurance 
companies. Sharia has strictly banned the Muslims from stealing others’ properties 
                                                 
6 The head of Iran’s Expediency Council has indicated that the country’s presence at WTO is 
necessary, and Iran should make the necessary arrangements to join WTO. The head of Iran’s 
Customs Organisation has criticised the Iranian government, because of its failure to supply Customs 
Organisation with the required equipment to facilitate its participation in the international trade (BBC, 
2006b). The head of Iran’s Institute for Trade Studies and Research has mentioned that his ministry 
considers joining WTO as one of its major priorities (Rahim, 2014). 
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and rights. The faith indicates that all sins can be forgiven by God, whereas violation 
of others’ rights can only be forgiven by the damaged person. Some Islamic scholars 
believe that theft is the only sin in the world (BBC, 2012). 
Iran has suffered much-reported scandals involving fraud. In an international setting, 
Transparency International ranked Iran at the 136th place out of 175 nations 
(Transparency International, 2014)7. This data suggest that perception of Iran’s 
bribery and corruption is high. At the national level, Iran’s unemployment rate 
increased up to 30% in 2013. The oil export fell to a million barrels per day in 2013, 
declining by over 70% compared to prior years. The Iranian currency devalued by 
over 50% after the Islamic revolution (Melman, 2013). A member of Iranian 
Parliament indicated that financial corruption costs the country over $34 billion a 
year in 2011, leading to $31 billion of this amount to productivity decrease and $3 
billion to a decline in foreign investments (Milad, 2011a).   
For instance, the Iranian banking system experienced an embezzlement of 2.6 billion 
USD in 2011, which is the biggest embezzlement case in its history (Shushter, 2011). 
Khosravi, the owner of Amir Mansour Arya Investment Company, had used forged 
documents to obtain the loans from several banks, including Bank Saderat and Bank 
Melli, aiming to purchase state-owned companies. Khosravi, who owned 38 factories 
at the time, registered the company with $20 million and purchased large acres of 
land at a price of 0.16 cent per meter (Milad, 2011b). Mahmoud Reza Khavari, 
former managing director of Bank Melli of Iran, resigned and escaped to Canada 
because of this fraud case. According to the prosecutor general of Iran (Gholam-
Hossein Mohseni-Ejei) the scandal revealed the country’s lack of capability to deter 
                                                 
7 Transparency International’s “Corruption Perceptions Index” scores Iran at 27/100. The scores range 
from 0 to 100, where 100 is “very clean”. 
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fraud. It raised a concern over the government’s privatisation policy and proved how 
weak the country’s financial reporting system is (Torbati, 2012).  
Some well-reported instances of bribery and corruption include the following: NIOC 
cancelled the contracts of Halliburton and Oriental Oil Kish, because of their 
financial corruption and bribery cases in Iran in 2005 (BBC, 2005). The Iranian 
judiciary forces arrested seven people because of financial corruption in 2008. The 
primary fraudster had used falsified documents and fake companies to receive $25 
million in banking facilities from the Iranian Agriculture Bank. He had used the 
funds in irrelevant projects (BBC, 2008a). The Iranian intelligence forces arrested 15 
people, including the mayor of a small town in the west of Tehran and three 
members of its city council because of financial corruption in 2010. These people 
were involved in bribery, embezzlement of municipality’s funds, misappropriation of 
government’s assets, and falsification of documents (BBC, 2010).  
The Norwegian police accused an Iranian company because of its involvement in 
Statoil Company’s bribery in 2003. Statoil won a tender to develop South Pars, Iran’s 
largest natural gas project. The company is involved in major oil and gas projects of 
Iran. The accusation indicated that an Iranian consultant who is residing in Britain 
received $15 million to favour British Petroleum regarding the Iran’s tenders for 
development of its gas projects (BBC, 2003).  
The Turkish police arrested 50 high-ranking officials, including the son of Turkey’s 
finance minister, director of Turkey’s Halkbank (Suleiman Aslan), and a famous 
Turkish-Iranian businessman (Reza Zarrab) because of their financial corruption and 
receiving bribes in 2014. The accusation indicated that the mentioned people were 
involved in money laundering and smuggling gold to Turkey and Iran. They had 
helped the Iranian government to bypass international sanctions. The Turkish police 
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report indicated that the Iranian government had set up few fake companies to 
transfer its funds, through falsified documents into China and Turkey. The 
government used the funds to purchase gold through the intermediaries, aiming to 
circumvent the international restrictions regarding selling gold to Iran. Reza Zarrab 
was initially working in Al Nafees Exchange and Al Salam Centre Exchange in 
Dubai. He entered the Turkish market by establishing Royal Maritime Company in 
2008. The Safir Gold Company enabled Zarrab to enter the global gold market in 
2011. The investigation of the company’s records showed that it has exported more 
than six billion dollars of gold to Iran (BBC, 2014a)8. 
High frequency and profile corruptions have attracted regulatory emphases from the 
Iranian Supreme leader and other regulators9. For the time being, this background as 
to fraud, bribery and corruption in Iran motivates the proposition that bribery will 
most often rank as most important indicator of AI threat to the participants of the 
study. 
 
The role of audit profession in Iranian capital market 
Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) 
The importance of a stock exchange and capital market was recognised during the 
1930s in Iran (Mashayekhi & Mashayekh, 2008). A parliamentary act led to 
formation of the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) in Tehran in 1966. The TSE 
officially started its operation on 4 February 1967. The Iranian parliament passed 
                                                 
8 Chapter 7 documents and details many other instances of financial wrong doing in Iran as part of 
Stage 2 of the thesis, the qualitative data analysis. 
9 The Iranian Supreme Leader instructed the heads of government, judiciary system, and parliament to 
combat financial corruption in 2001. He re-emphasised his order to these three branches of power in 
another meeting, ordering them to continue their combat against corruption in 2008. He indicated that 
they should increase their efforts to find feasible methods to reduce breaches of law. The Supreme 
Leader stressed the importance of fighting against corruption, ordering the judiciary officials to 
consider serious punishments for financially corrupt people. He mentioned that the judges should 
bring justice to the society, and the judiciary system should be a “safe haven for the oppressed”. He 
indicated that the judicial process should be complete and fast, without any hue and cry (BBC, 
2008b). 
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Usury-Free Banking law after the Islamic revolution, and the Iranian banks stopped 
their trading in bonds in 1983. The TSE was a financially independent, non-
governmental company. It was funded by service charges and admission fees 
collected from the listed companies (Chatterjee et al., 2010). Eight years of Iran-Iraq 
war led to a severe reduction in the TSE activities. The TSE became a member of the 
International Federation of Stock Exchanges in 1992. Further, it joined Federation of 
Euro-Asian Stock Exchanges in 1995. It permitted the listed companies to issue 
corporate bonds in 2003. The Iranian parliament passed a new Securities Act, aiming 
to protect the rights of investors in 2005. The demutualisation of TSE occurred in 
2006 (TSE, 2006). 
The Securities and Exchange Organisation (SEO) and Securities and Exchange High 
Council (Council) govern Iranian capital market under the Securities Act of 2005. 
The Council is the ultimate power, and it is responsible for determining the market’s 
strategies and supervising it. The Minister of Economy & Finance is Chairman of the 
Council. Other members are Minister of Commerce, Governor of Central Bank of 
Iran, President of Chamber of Commerce, Attorney General, Chairman of SEO, the 
representatives of active market associations, three financial experts, and one 
representative from each exchange ("Legal structure," 2005). Figure 1 depicts the 
Iranian capital market. 
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Figure 1 The Iranian capital market 
 
Source: http://www.tse.ir/cms/default.aspx?tabid=57 
The Council elects board of directors of SEO. The SEO governs the affairs of TSE, 
Iranian Mercantile Exchange (IME), and Iran Farabourse (SME’s Exchange). The 
shareholders’ general assembly elects seven members of TSE’s board of directors, 
who to determine the TSE’s general policies. The board of directors elects a 
managing director for two years to manage operation of TSE. The TSE, IME, and 
SME’s Exchange govern TSE Brokers, IME Brokers, Iran Farabourse Brokers, 
Investment Banks, Mutual Funds, Securities and Exchange Brokers Association, and 
Iranian Institutional Investors Association ("Legal structure," 2005). 
 
Tehran Stock Exchange listed companies and their audit committees 
Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) has mandated the listed companies to have an audit 
committee since 2013. The TSE’s regulations require audit committees to assist the 
Board of Directors regarding internal control and risk management, financial 
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reporting, internal audit effectiveness, independent audit effectiveness, and 
compliance with the rules, provisions, and requirements (TSE, 2013a). This study 
provides some information regarding the audit committees of TSE listed companies 
in 2012 and 2013 to analyse influence of the TSE decision to mandate audit 
committee10. The researcher notes that the AI literature, as discussed in Chapter 3, on 
the role of audit committees in companies in Iran, pre-dates the mandatory audit 
committee rule. Accordingly, new analysis as to the uptake of audit committees is 
useful to inform the research themes in this thesis. Table 1 provides descriptive 
summary of the TSE listed companies and their audit committees in 2012 and 2013. 
  
                                                 
10 The required data are obtained from the comprehensive database of all listed companies, available 
from http://codal.ir/. 
 19 
 
Table 1 The composition of the audit committees of TSE listed companies in 2012 and 2013 
  2012 2013 
 
Composition of the audit 
committees Number % Number % 
1. Total number of 
listed companies  343  281  
2. No of companies 
with an audit 
committee  64 19% 191 68% 
2.1 No of audit 
committees with an 
independent chair  16 5% 
 
 
42 15% 
2.2 No of the audit 
committees with 3 
members 
 56 16% 171 61% 
(3 independent members) 11 3% 30 11% 
(3 dependent members) 1 0% 1 0% 
(2 independent members and 
1 dependent member) 44 13% 140 50% 
Total  56 16% 171 61% 
2.3 No of audit 
committees with 4 
members 
 3 1% 5 2% 
(4 independent members) 2 1% 3 1% 
(3 independent members and 
1 dependent member) 0 0% 1 0% 
(2 independent members, 1 
dependent member, 1 member 
with an unknown status) 1 0% 1 0% 
Total  3 1% 5 2% 
2.4 No of audit 
committees with 5 
members 
 
 5 1% 15 5% 
(5 independent members) 1 0% 3 1% 
(4 independent members and 
1 dependent member) 
 
1 0% 
 
3 1% 
(3 independent members and 
2 dependent members) 
 
3 1% 
 
9 3% 
Total  5 1% 15 5% 
 
 20 
 
There were 343 listed companies in TSE in 2012 (TSE, 2012), which was reduced to 
281 in 2013 (TSE, 2013b). Sixty-four listed companies (19%) in 2012 and 191 listed 
companies (68%) in 2013 had an audit committee, indicating an increase of more 
than 3 times in audit committee percentage from 2012 to 2013. This may show 
impact of TSE’s decision to mandate the listed companies to have an audit 
committee since 2013 (TSE, 2013a)11. 
Each audit committee had 3, 4, or 5 members in 2012 and 2013. Fifty-six listed 
companies (16%) had 3 committee members, 3 (1%) had 4 members, and 5 (1%) had 
5 members in 2012, whereas 171 (61%) had 3 committee members, 5 (2%) had 4 
members, and 15 (5%) had 5 members in 2013. The audit committees with 5 
members had 5 times percentage increase, followed by the audit committees with 3 
members by approximately 4 times percentage increase, and the audit committees 
with 4 members by 2 times percentage increase from 2012 to 2013 (Securities and 
Exchange Organisation, 2015). 
The majority of listed companies had 3 audit committee members in 2012 and 2013. 
Out of 56 listed companies with 3 committee members, 11 (3%) had all their 
members as independent members, a listed company had all its members as 
dependent members, and 44 (13%) had 2 independent members and 1 dependent 
member in 2012. Out of 171 listed companies with 3 committee members, 30 (11%) 
had all their members as independent members, the previously mentioned company 
had all its members as dependent members again, and 140 (50%) had 2 independent 
members and 1 dependent member in 2013. The full dependency of the audit 
committees with 3 members was minor, since only one company had all its members 
as dependent members in 2012 and 2013. The full independency of the audit 
                                                 
11 The study analyses the audit committees of TSE listed companies from 2012 to 2013. Data for 2014 
did not become available throughout the duration of this study. 
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committees and combination of 2 independent members and 1 dependent member for 
committees with 3 members increased by more than 3 times from 2012 to 2013 
(Securities and Exchange Organisation, 2015). 
Out of 3 listed companies with 4 audit committee members, 2 (1%) had all their 
committee members as independent members; and 1 had 2 independent members, 1 
dependent member, and 1 member with an unknown status in 2012. Out of 5 listed 
companies with 4 audit committee members, 3 (1%) had all their committee 
members as independent members; 1 had 3 independent members and 1 dependent 
member; and 1 had 2 independent members, 1 dependent member, and 1 member 
with an unknown status in 2013. A listed company with an audit committee 
composition of 4 members had 3 independent members and 1 dependent member in 
2013, whereas this composition did not exist in 2012 (Securities and Exchange 
Organisation, 2015). 
Out of 5 listed companies with 5 audit committee members, 1 had all its committee 
members as independent, another one had 4 independent members and 1 dependent 
member, and 3 (1%) had 3 independent members and 2 dependent members in 2012. 
Out of 15 listed companies with 5 audit committee members, 3 (1%) had all their 
members as independent, another 3 (1%) had 4 independent members and 1 
dependent member, and 9 (3%) had 3 independent members and 2 dependent 
members in 2013. The number of different audit committee compositions with 5 
members increased by 3 times from 2012 to 2013. Sixteen listed companies with an 
audit committee (25%) had an independent chair in 2012, whereas this number 
increased to 42 (approximately 22%) in 2013. This shows an increase in chair’s 
dependency among the listed companies with an audit committee since 2012 to 2013 
(Securities and Exchange Organisation, 2015). Table 2 provides the education and 
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qualification background of the audit committee members in TSE listed companies in 
2012 and 2013.  
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Table 2 The education and qualification background of audit committee members of TSE listed companies in 
2012 and 2013 
2012 2013 
 Number % Number % 
Total number of audit committee members 
 
205 
 
 608  
members with a college degree 1 0% 1 0% 
members with a bachelor’s degree 88 43% 240 39%
members with a master’s degree 89 43% 270 44%
members with a doctorate degree 27 13% 97 16%
members with a qualification in business or 
management 
 
44 21% 145 24%
members with a qualification in economy 12 6% 26 4% 
members with a qualification in accounting or 
finance 137 67% 393 65%
members with other types of qualification 12 6% 44 7% 
 
Total number of the audit committee members of listed companies of TSE was 205 
in 2012 and 608 in 2013. Among the listed companies with an audit committee 
where an audit committee member had a college degree, 88 committee members 
(43%) had a bachelor’s degree, 89 (43%) had a master’s degree, and 27 (13%) had a 
doctorate degree in 2012. Among the listed companies with an audit committee 
where an audit committee member had a college degree, 240 committee members 
(39%) had a bachelor’s degree, 270 (44%) had a master’s degree, and 97 (16%) had a 
doctorate degree in 2013. The figures suggest a slight increase in the qualification 
levels of audit committee members from 2012 to 2013 (Securities and Exchange 
Organisation, 2015). 
Among the listed companies with an audit committee 44 committee members (21%) 
had their qualifications in business or management, 12 members (6%) had their 
qualifications in economy, 137 (67%) had their qualifications in accounting or 
finance, and 12 (6%) had other types of qualifications in 2012. The figures indicated 
that the majority of audit committee members had their qualifications in accounting 
or finance in 2012, potentially increasing their ability to perform their duties. Among 
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the listed companies with an audit committee 145 committee members (24%) had 
their qualifications in business or management, 26 members (4%) had their 
qualifications in economy, 393 (65%) had their qualifications in accounting or 
finance, and 44 (7%) had other types of qualification in 2013. Similar to 2012, the 
majority of the audit committee members had their qualifications in accounting or 
finance, being followed by committee members with qualifications in business or 
management in 2013. There was not a major difference between the qualification 
types of committee members from 2012 to 2013 (Securities and Exchange 
Organisation, 2015).  
There was a triple increase in the percentage of companies with an audit committee 
and a tendency to have members with higher qualification levels from 2012 to 2013. 
This may suggest importance of audit committee in today’s Iranian businesses and 
show Iranian companies’ desire to improve their financial reporting system. 
 
Islamic economics and auditor independence in Iran  
Islam and Iran 
The word “Islam” means submitting to will of Allah. A Muslim is anybody who 
practices the Islamic beliefs. The Muslims believe that there is one God (Allah) and 
Muhammad is his messenger (Teece, 2004). Quran is the holy book of Muslims, and 
it contains the Islamic rules. The Muslims have to follow the rules of Allah which are 
given in Quran (Abram, 2004). A shared belief in Islam and concept of the ummah 
unite the Muslims (Black & Sadiq, 2011)12. Sharia refers to Islamic rules, and it 
regulates the behaviours of Muslims (Abram, 2004). It governs the relationships 
between Allah and individuals and among the individuals (Black & Sadiq, 2011). 
                                                 
12 The ummah refers to a brotherhood of Muslims governed by their common commitments to God. 
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The Islamic principles shape the Islamic countries’ finance. According to principles, 
for example, auditors have to serve the needs of ummat al-Islamiyah (the Islamic 
Nation), differing from the aims of non-Islamic countries. They should have 
sufficient knowledge regarding Sharia. They are responsible for checking their 
clients’ compliance with the Islamic principles and advising them; otherwise they 
have betrayed their Muslim society. The auditors should consider themselves as 
servants of Allah and continuously attempt to please Him. Their behaviours must 
comply with the religious teachings and its moral values. The Hisbah institutions and 
muhtasibs (judges) assess the companies’ compliance with Sharia and provide their 
reports for corrective actions (Kasim, 2010). 
Iran is an Islamic country. The article 56 of the Iranian constitution indicates that 
Allah has absolute sovereignty over world and man, and the people must exercise 
His divine right (Assembly of Experts, 1979). The Islamic revolutionists have 
supported the notion of a Sharia-based constitution throughout their Islamic 
movement prior to and after the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran. The article 4 of 
the Iranian constitution declares that Islamic standards must govern all the laws of 
the country, and any law which is not based on Islamic principles is null. Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini was leader of the 1979 Islamic revolution, and his legacy has 
changed the country’s legal structure. His manual of jurisprudence has significantly 
influenced the Iranian laws. The country has adopted the Islamic notion of 
Guardianship of the Jurist. The revolutionary Court of Iran has jurisdiction over 
political offences, operating alongside the regular courts. 
 
Sharia in Iran 
Islamic economics govern the Islamic banking and finance affairs (Seniawski, 2000). 
The Islamic law prohibits interest, uncertainty, gambling, dealing with forbidden 
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products13, monopoly, and misrepresentation (Black & Sadiq, 2011). Quran has 
strictly banned giving and receiving interest and declared it as war with God. It 
interprets interest as a major cause of widening the gap between poor and wealthy. 
The Qur’anic rules encourage general fairness and mercy in dire situations. They 
emphasise community-based provision of economic welfare, wherein contrast to 
individual-based systems (Seniawski, 2000).  
Iran adopted the following principle in its constitution after its revolution in 1979: 
The economy is not the main goal, whereas satisfying the material needs of man in 
the course of his overall growth and development is the main goal of the economy. 
The Islamic principles aim to provide whatever is required for development of 
people’s abilities. The Iranian government should provide the required means for its 
citizens to help them to find their desired jobs and satisfy their needs, while 
respecting the Islamic principles (Amin, 1989).  
The article 44 of the Iranian constitution calls for nationalisation of all large 
industries, mines, banks, power generation stations, insurance companies, dams, 
postal services, telephone and telegraph services, shipping, aviation, and roads and 
railroads (Karbassian, 2000). The article 45 indicates that ownership of anfal, or 
spoils, and public wealth such as mavat (barren lands without owners; abandoned 
lands, mines, lakes, seas, underground water, reed beds, natural groves, pastures, 
unclaimed properties, and properties obtained by usurpation) is retained by the State 
(Karbassian, 2000). The article 49 is clearly against private capital, indicating that 
government should take possession of all wealth that is obtained as a result of usury, 
usurpation, bribery, embezzlement, theft, gambling, misuse of religious endowments, 
                                                 
13 Pork and alcohol are two examples of forbidden products. 
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government contracts, transactions, and sale of original mavat and mubahat, meaning 
ownerless properties, centres of corruption, and illegitimate acts (Karbassian, 2000). 
 
The scope of audit report according to Sharia 
Islam has banned any risky or hazardous sale, since it may lead to argument among 
the related parties (Khan, 2011). Based on Sharia, the auditors need to report about 
particular transactions. They should determine whether a client has engaged in sale 
of al-gharar, indicating sale of a product which is not present, or its consequence is 
unknown (Ibrahim, Man, & Noor, 2013). They should discover the extent to which 
the client has practiced Israf, indicating existence of extravagance in auditee. The 
government determines the adequate level of expenditures, helping auditors to 
discover Israf (Khan, 1985). They should indicate to what extent their clients have 
practiced Bakhs, meaning voluntary attempts to reduce value of product before its 
sale. So, the auditors should investigate any possible change in the product’s 
ingredients or its production formulas (Khan, 1985). They should investigate 
potential instances of Khiyanah, indicating existence of treachery, infidelity, or 
disloyalty. They should look for the signals of any violation of trust regarding the 
financial matters, honour, power, or position (Ibrahim et al., 2013).  
Based on Sharia, the auditors should determine the amount of Tatfif practiced by 
their clients, indicating the harms in weights and measures caused to other parties. 
They measure their client’s adherence to Sharia’s injunction of Awful Mikyal 
Walmizan, indicating accuracy of weights and measures of packed materials (Khan, 
1985). The auditors investigate their auditee’s compliance with Uqud, indicating its 
fulfilment of its contracts. They search for the areas where the auditee has failed to 
meet its contractual obligations and report them (Khan, 1985). They should 
determine if there is any indication of dishonesty, fraud, or deceit in the auditee. 
 28 
 
They consider a broad range, from embezzlement and misappropriation to trade 
secrets or intellectual property to conflict of interest or commitment (Ibrahim et al., 
2013). Khan (2011) stated that falsehood damages the producers, traders, and 
customers. The auditors should determine existence of any falsehood or breach of 
pact or promise in their client’s organisation and report it (Ibrahim et al., 2013).  
 
Cultural perceptions in Iran 
The cultural values affect auditors’ judgement (Patel, Harrison, & McKinnon, 2002). 
The power distance is one of the cultural dimensions identified by Lonner, Berry, 
and Hofstede (1980). The auditors in countries with a high level of power distance 
are more likely to forgo their independence (Yamamura, Frakes, Sanders, & Ahn, 
1996). However, the auditors from countries with a high level of uncertainty 
avoidance are more prudent in their decision making, and they do not merely focus 
on audit plans and rules (Hughes, Sander, Higgs, & Cullinan, 2009). Iran has 
experienced the existence of powerful figures in its history, wherein the ruling 
religious leaders believe they have full authority to govern the country and nobody 
should question them. Many Iranians do not accept the governing rules as suitable 
ones, and they doubt the extent of their enforcement. The managers practice an 
autocratic leadership, and they do not respect the opinion of their subordinates. The 
participative leaderships are unusual in Iran. The managers are highly performance 
oriented, though they are not future oriented. The common expectation is that leaders 
develop the ideas and instruct people, without considering others’ opinions during 
their decision-makings (Javidan & Dastmalchian, 2003). 
Another important factor is the question of individualism versus collectivism. The 
auditors from collectivist cultures may easily succumb to the client pressures, 
whereas auditors from individualistic cultures better retain their ethical standards 
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regardless of the extent of pressure (McKinnon, 1984). Iran is a country with a high 
level of power distance and a low degree of uncertainty avoidance and individualism. 
The Iranian auditors have a greater tendency to sacrifice their independence 
(Hillmann, 1990). The Iranians sacrifice their own interests for their society. They 
are family and in-group oriented, wherein the people highly value their family and 
close friends and have strong expectations from them. The children can rely on their 
parents or relatives to manage their affairs, whereas they are cautious about their 
conversations and often use an indirect language as a result of intense group control. 
The males dominate females, and gender inequality is evident all over the country. 
The Iranian culture is to the detriment of economic prosperity, United Nations’ 
Human Development Index, and country competitiveness (Javidan & Dastmalchian, 
2003). 
 
Iran’s institutions 
Iran’s political system 
Iran has a complex political power structure, wherein elected and unelected branches 
of power control the country. The Supreme Leader controls the powerful unelected 
institutions, whereas the public play a role in election of president and parliament 
members. The disagreements between these institutions were evident throughout the 
last decade, as reformist leaders were attempting to reduce theocracy (BBC, 2008d). 
Figure 2 illustrates the Iranian political power structure. 
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Figure 2 The Iranian political power structure 
 
Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/ 
Khomeini, leader of the Iranian Islamic revolution, has brought the notion of 
Supreme Leader into the Iranian political system. The Supreme Leader is the 
ultimate power in the country, wherein he selects head of justice department, six 
members of the Guardian Council, the chief officers of armed forces, head of Iranian 
broadcasting channel, and the prayer leaders. Further, he decides on the country’s 
foreign policy, and he has authority to disapprove the president’s election. The 
country experienced a series of disagreements between the Supreme Leader, 
Khamenei, and former reformist president, Mohammad Khatami, during Khatami’s 
presidency (1997-2005) (BBC, 2008g). 
The president is the second most powerful person in Iran, wherein he has opportunity 
to serve in the presidential office for a maximum of two terms of four years. The 
Guardian Council vets all presidential candidates. The president is responsible for 
implementing the constitution in the country. However, the Supreme Leader and 
conservative clerics limit the president’s role, in reality. Ahmadinejat was the only 
non-cleric Iranian president since the Islamic revolution (BBC, 2008f). 
The public elect their parliament members every four years. The parliament has 
authority to introduce and pass law and question the president and its ministers. 
However, Guardian Council monitors the parliament’s activities. The reformist 
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members won the parliamentary election of 2000, whereas they lost in the 
subsequent terms. Gholamali Haddad-Adel, whose daughter is married to one of the 
Supreme Leader’s sons, became the first non-cleric speaker of parliament in 2004 
(BBC, 2008e). 
Iran does not have an independent judiciary system. The Iranian Supreme Court 
revoked all non-Islamic laws after the Islamic revolution. The judiciary is 
responsible for defining legal policy and enforcing Islamic laws. Further, it selects 
six lay members of Guardian Council. The conservative judges have crushed 
reformists throughout the post-revolution era (BBC, 2008c). 
Iran has three major supervisory bodies, namely Guardian Council, Assembly of 
Experts, and Expediency Council. The Guardian Council is responsible to ensure 
consistency of the proposed laws to the Islamic laws and constitution, vet suitability 
of the presidential and parliamentary candidates, and supervises national elections. 
The Assembly of Experts has authority to select, supervise, and dismiss the Supreme 
Leader. The Expediency Council is responsible to resolve the law-making disputes 
between parliament and Guardian Council and advises clerics regarding national 
policies (CIA, 2014). 
 
The development of accounting and auditing in Iran 
Each country’s legal system affects its accounting system (Berry, 1987). Iran is ruled 
by an Islamic State and Sharia constitutes the constitution of the country (Wright, 
2000). Quran and Sunnah govern independence, and actual independence is preferred 
over perceived independence. The apparent independence is not considered as a 
factor that could compromise real independence, and it is disregarded during 
evaluation of real independence (Zaid, 1993). The development of audit profession 
since 1979, following the Islamic revolution, was incredibly slow in Iran, and various 
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factors and events such as the country’s engagement in a war with Iraq and its 
political instability have prevented audit research (Salehi, Mansoury, & Pirayesh, 
2008). 
The non-existence of national standards after the Islamic revolution led to qualified 
auditors’ reports for many public companies listed in the TSE (Tabibi, 1993). The 
different audit enterprises such as Budget, Planning, and National Industries 
Organisation were established to manage the governmental entities. The Society of 
Certified Accountants of Iran was established by an Act of Parliament in 1993 and 
began its operation in 2002 (Moghaddam, Shadmehr, Mousavian, & Minab, 2012).  
Alternatively, adoption of a new set of standards affects auditors and their 
independence (DeFond et al., 1999). Since business and financial, legal, cultural, 
accounting and audit environments between IFRS countries and Iran are different, it 
is difficult to converge the international and Iranian accounting standards 
(Mohammadrezaei, Banimahd, & Saleh, 2013). The adoption of international 
standards is difficult in Iran, because of their complexity; translation problems; 
Iranian accountants’ lack of knowledge about them; their conflict with the Iranian 
legal system; and the problems associated with fair value measurement requirements 
(Mohammadrezaei et al., 2013). Iranian listed companies will have to prepare their 
financial statements under IFRS from 2016 onwards (Tornero, 2015). It may take 
some time for the country to reach an acceptable compliance level (Kambayashi, 
2015; Williams & Mostaghim, 2015). The country may not be able to implement the 
standards, even if it decides to adopt them (Mohammadrezaei et al., 2013). 
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Supreme Audit Court of Iran (SAC) 
The Supreme Audit Court of Iran (SAC) is an independent body, which is supervised 
by the Iranian Parliament. It is responsible for preparing the government’s Budget 
Liquidation Report and auditing the accounts of all ministries, institutes, and 
governmental companies (SAC, 2014). It has accused former President 
Ahmadinejat’s government of failing to deposit 11.2 billion dollars in surplus 
revenues of oil exports which were obtained between 2009 and 2010 to National 
Reserve Fund. The SAC has prepared a report regarding the government’s failure 
and sent it to Parliament and Judiciary System for further actions (BBC, 2011). 
Further, SAC has accused the government of illegally allocating 8,000 billion rials 
(Iranian currency) of the country’s surplus revenues which should have been 
allocated to defence and health sectors. The health minister has criticised the 
government, because of its failure to allocate the funding  (BBC, 2013).  
The SAC’s report to the Parliament indicated that a surplus of $1.058 billion of oil 
revenues has not been returned to treasury (Thai News Service Group, 2009a). In 
2009, the Iranian government purchased a huge amount of gasoline and gas oil, 
without the Parliament’s approval. The imported figure has reached $5 billion, 
whereas the Parliament had only approved a purchase of up to $3 billion. The 
National Iranian Oil Company failed to declare its $61 million of revenues to the tax 
authorities (Thai News Service Group, 2009b). Mohsen Rezaei, a presidential 
hopeful, criticised the country’s bureaucratic system. He indicated that there are 
many cases of financial fraud, and Iran needs to improve its electronic system to 
better defend against them. 
The Iranian government established the National Development Fund (NDF) based on 
Article 84 of the Fifth Five-year Socio-Economic Development Plan (2011-2015) in 
2011 to use its oil revenues for future investments. However, the government must 
 34 
 
have the Parliament’s approval for taking any fund out of NDF. The SAC issued a 
report in May 2014, indicating that the government had illegally taken $4.1 billion 
out of NDF without the Parliament’s approval (Fashtami, 2014). In another case 
SAC issued another report, indicating that Iran has not received its 4.1 million dollars 
revenue of selling crude oil to the UAE. The European oil refineries owe Iran 4 
million dollars, whereas its payment depends on progress of the nuclear negotiations 
with Iran (BBC, 2014b). 
 
Iran Audit Organisation (IAO) 
The Iran Audit Organisation (IAO) is the primary regulator of the accounting and 
audit profession in Iran (Mirshekary & Saudagaran, 2005). It was established by an 
act of Iranian Parliament in 1987. It is affiliated to the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Finance. Its main objectives are to address the needs of government regarding 
audit and specialised financial services, to set accounting and audit standards in 
accordance with Sharia, and to fulfil the country’s needs regarding accountancy. 
While considering the Iranian taxation rules and customs, it has modified the Iranian 
accounting standards based on the international standards since 1997. The 
Accounting Standards Setting Committee of IAO produces the Iranian accounting 
standards. The committee has nine members. Five of them are from Board of 
Executive of IAO, two from Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants, one 
from Security Exchange Agent Organisation, and one representative from industry 
(Chatterjee et al., 2010). 
The IAO introduced 33 audit guidelines in 1997, which after revision became 
standards in 1999. It revised some of them in later years (Gholamhossin & 
Abdolhamid, 2012). The IAO codified and published a revised set of audit standards 
using the International Accounting Standards (IAS). It released a comparative table 
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that compares the National Accounting Standards with IAS, and it introduced the 
national standards that are very similar to IAS (Mirshekary & Saudagaran, 2005). 
However, Iran is in the preliminary stages of IFRS adoption, and full adoption has 
not yet taken place. The national standards have to be followed by all companies in 
any sector (Simon Fraser University, 2011). The Iranian authorities do not recognise 
the financial statements of companies that do not follow the national standards. 
The failure to comply with the principles and criteria for professional competence 
and care, non-compliance with the provisions of Code of Professional Conduct, and 
any behaviour against the professional affairs may lead IAO to consider some 
disciplinary actions (IAO, 2014). The disciplinary actions can range from 
compulsory learnings; oral and written warnings; fines, restitution, and completing 
job through other members at expense of offender; prevention from the independent 
professional activities; suspension of membership; to expulsion from the professional 
bodies for any non-compliance (IAO, 2014). 
The IAO has audited many major institutions of the country such as the Iranian 
banks, National Iranian Oil Company, gas and petrochemical companies, National 
Water and Electricity Company, telecommunication companies, Iranian Tobacco 
Company, Tehran Stock Exchange, insurance companies, Iranian Retirement Fund, 
and the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs since its establishment (IAO, 
2013a). Figure 3 depicts the IAO’s auditee clients in 2013. 
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Figure 3 The IAO’s auditee clients in 2013 
 
Source: http://www.audit.org.ir/WFrmAuditActivity.aspx 
The IAO audited 906 institutions in 2013, comprising 491 ministries and 
governmental agencies, 218 public institutions, 73 banks, 11 insurance companies, 
30 presidential institutions, and 83 belonged to the private sector. Further, it provided 
additional audit services, namely: Special purpose audit and capital increase, 
governmental demands, review of internal controls, audit plans for acquisition of 
capital assets, overview of midterm financial statements, tax audit, operational audit, 
and examination of prospective financial information for its auditee clients in 2013 
(IAO, 2013a). The dual roles (regulator and auditor) of IAO have enabled this 
organisation to better understand the accounting needs of the country and address 
those needs. 
The majority of IAO employees are professionals, wherein there were 225 certified 
public accountants working in the organisation in 2013. Figure 4 depicts the 
qualification levels of IAO employees in 2013. 
 
 37 
 
Figure 4 The qualification levels of IAO employees in 2013 
 
Source: http://www.audit.org.ir/WFrmOrgIntroduce.aspx 
Twelve employees of IAO had a PhD qualification, 231 had a master’s qualification, 
1139 had a bachelor degree, 23 had a diploma, and 156 had other types of 
qualification in 2013. The IAO’s employees have a variety of job responsibilities 
such as member of board of directors, senior manager, audit manager, senior 
supervisor, supervisor, senior auditor, and auditor (IAO, 2013b). 
The high professional level of the IAO’s employees encouraged this study to propose 
that the level of the professional qualifications of participants will affect their 
perceptions regarding the indicators of AI threat in Iran. For the time being, this 
background motivates this proposition as developed in Chapter 3. 
 
Conclusion 
The chapter provided some information regarding the Iranian economy, privatisation 
trend of the country, foreign investments in the country, and Iranian corrupt business 
activities. It described TSE and TSE listed companies and their audit committees. 
The chapter provided some information regarding Islam and the influence of Islamic 
legal system in Iran and Iranian audit profession. It described the Iranian culture, its 
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political system, the development of accounting and auditing in the country, SAC, 
and IAO. The next chapter reviews the relevant existing literature to provide a better 
understanding regarding this study.  
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Chapter 3: Literature review 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews regulations and literature regarding AI in Iran. It illustrates 
identified indicators of AI threat in the country, namely: gifts and presents, non-audit 
services, high level bribery, audit partner tenure, prospects of reappointment, non-
existence of audit committee, and auditors’ lack of skill. It describes the identified 
indicator of AI threat in the international literature that is not mentioned in the 
Iranian literature, namely: audit partner rotation. Further, it indicates the propositions 
of this study. 
 
IFRS countries and Iran   
Iran’s accounting standards are not fully consistent with IFRS in concepts of 
understandability, relevance, reliability, and comparability (Darabi & Salmani, 
2012). There are differences between IFRS countries and Iran as to the level of 
management’s responsibility to maintain accounting records, enforce effectiveness of 
internal control on audit quality, detect illegal acts of management, detect any 
deliberate distortion of financial information, report all detected frauds and thefts to 
the relevant authorities, follow the necessary procedures before authenticating the 
financial statements, and certify accuracy of the financial reports (Mahadevaswamy 
& Salehi, 2008). 
Differences also exist with regard to the auditor’s legal liability. In an IFRS country 
the auditors may lose their licence, if they do not maintain their independence 
(Beattie, Brandt, & Fearnley, 1999). However, under Trade Law in Iran, the main 
legal exposure of the auditors is prosecution under the criminal provisions, although 
prosecution does not take place in practice frequently (Azizkhani, Shailer, & 
Monroe, 2012). The audit firms who breach the regulations of Iranian Association of 
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Certified Public Accountants (IACPA) may face two potential risks. First, they may 
incur a penalty from the quality control committee of IACPA, which would not be 
severe. Second, they may lose their licence by peer review audit committee of 
Securities and Exchange Organisation (Azizkhani et al., 2012). However, since a 
civil action against the audit firms to recover damages is not provided by law 
auditors do not have a substantial duty of care towards their clients (Azizkhani et al., 
2012).  
 
Audit‐related studies in Iran 
Existing auditing literature in Iran is insufficient in understanding the audit market 
and AI in the country. The expectation gap between auditors and investors with 
regard to AI in Iranian setting was investigated by Salehi et al. (2009). The results 
indicated that there was a major difference between the auditors and investors’ 
perceptions regarding actual level of AI. The investors considered internal factors 
(i.e. prospects of reappointment) as serious threats to AI, whereas the auditors 
considered external factors (i.e. the regularity framework, and corporate governance) 
as serious threats. There was a significant difference between the auditors and 
investors’ perceptions regarding gifts and presents. The perceptions regarding the 
prospects of reappointment were considerably different too (Salehi et al., 2009). The 
outcomes of Salehi et al. (2009) indicated at least some common grounds in the 
perceptions between the auditors and investors regarding expected level of AI, albeit 
at different levels. Both groups considered gifts and presents and prospects of 
reappointment as threats to AI. However, their views regarding the levels of 
significance were different (Salehi et al., 2009). 
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The effect of a long-term relationship between auditors and their clients on AI was 
investigated by KarbasiYazdi and ChenariYukat (2012). The study found this 
relationship a major threat to AI. The long-term relationship encourages auditors to 
incorporate their clients’ requests, preventing them from working objectively. In 
contrast, a mandatory rotation increases auditors’ resistance against management 
pressure (KarbasiYazdi & ChenariYukat, 2012). The effects of two influential 
factors (audit partner’s firm size and type of auditor’s report) in audit partner 
rotation’s decisions were investigated by Abdoli, Mahmoudzadeh, and Darvishan 
(2014) in another Iranian study. The outcomes of study showed that the concerned 
factors do not affect rotation decisions in the Iranian setting. The study emphasised 
importance of rotation to maintain AI. The authors of study supported TSE’s 
decision to mandate auditor rotation for the listed firms.  
Prior research regarding audit committees of Iranian companies has acknowledged 
their significance. For example, Salehi and Abedini (2008) found that existence of an 
audit committee may enhance AI. The findings of Salehi and Azary (2008) indicated 
that the audit committee ensure objectivity of the financial reports, increasing their 
credibility for users. In another example, Salehi and Nanjegowda (2006) found that 
the audit committee may contribute in decisions regarding auditors’ selection, 
determination of their revenues, and their retention or dismissal.  
Although importance of audit committees is acknowledged by prior studies, they do 
not play an important role in Iranian companies (Salehi, 2011)14. The barriers to an 
effective audit committee in Iranian companies were examined by Salehi (2011). The 
results of study revealed that individualism culture among Iranian audit practitioners, 
                                                 
14 However, it should be noted that audit committees started to play a more important role in the 
Iranian market after 2013, when the TSE required the listed companies to have an audit committee, as 
it was mentioned in Chapter 2. 
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centralisation trend of Iranian managers, and lack of an effective legal force are the 
major causes of audit committees’ ineffectiveness in the country (Salehi, 2011). 
 
Identified indicators of AI threat in Iran   
The existing studies regarding AI have provided dissimilar results on the threats to 
AI in Iran, though this matter has not been a focus of research in this country (Salehi 
et al., 2009). According to the IFAC the threats fall into one or more of the following 
categories: Self-interest threat, self-review threat, advocacy threat, familiarity threat, 
and intimidation threat (IFAC, 2013). The internationally accepted framework of AI 
threats is provided in the following Table 3. 
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Table 3 The internationally accepted framework of AI threats 
a. Self-interest threat The threat that a financial or other interest will inappropriately 
influence the professional accountant’s judgment or behaviour. 
 
b. Self-review threat The threat that a professional accountant will not appropriately evaluate 
the results of a previous judgment made or service performed by the 
professional accountant, or by another individual within the 
professional accountant’s firm or employing organisation, on which the 
accountant will rely when forming a judgment as part of providing a 
current service. 
 
c. Advocacy threat The threat that a professional accountant will promote a client’s or 
employer’s position to the point that the professional accountant’s 
objectivity is compromised. 
 
d. Familiarity threat The threat that due to a long or close relationship with a client or 
employer, a professional accountant will be too sympathetic to their 
interests or too accepting of their work. 
 
e. Intimidation threat The threat that a professional accountant will be deterred from acting 
objectively because of actual or perceived pressures, including attempts 
to exercise undue influence over the professional accountant. 
Source: IFAC (2013) 
Various circumstances create self-interest threat. For example, auditors with a major 
financial interest in their clients, auditors with a close business relationship with their 
auditees, auditors that initiate an employment contract with their clients, auditors that 
are highly dependent on their clients, auditors that are afraid to lose their clients, and 
auditors that initiate a contingent fee arrangement are more likely to change their 
professional judgement or behaviour (IFAC, 2013). The circumstances that create 
self-review threat are when auditors prepare the records based on original data that 
they have prepared, or when auditors provide a service for their clients that can affect 
their primary role, or when auditors are directors or officers of their auditees, or 
when auditors issue an assurance report for the financial systems that they have 
designed, or when clients employ their auditors in an important position (IFAC, 
2013). 
The audit firms that promote shares for their auditees or auditors that support their 
auditees in their disputes with the third parties are prone to advocacy threat (IFAC, 
2013). Several circumstances may lead to familiarity threat. For example, the family 
 44 
 
members of auditors are officers, directors, or influential employees of their auditees, 
auditors have a long-term relationship with their clients, or auditors accept gifts or 
presents from their clients (IFAC, 2013). The clients that threaten to dismiss their 
audit firms, clients that threaten to stop offering future promotions or non-audit 
services (NAS) to their auditors if they do not accept their accounting treatments, 
clients that threaten to make a legal action against their audit firms, clients that 
unfairly pressure their auditors to reduce workload in order to reduce the audit fees, 
and clients that pressure their auditors to accept their judgements since they have 
more professional expertise create intimidation threat (IFAC, 2013).  
A comparison between identified indicators of AI threat between IFRS countries and 
Iran, as allocated to international threat framework is provided in Table 4. 
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Table 4 The identified indicators of AI threat in IFRS countries and Iran, as allocated to international threat 
framework 
IFRS countries Reference 
Allocation to the 
international 
threat 
framework Iran Reference 
Allocation to the 
international 
threat 
framework 
Non-audit 
services (NAS) 
 
Audit partner 
rotation 
 
 
 
 
Bribery 
 
 
 
 
 
Audit partner 
tenure 
Wines (1994) 
 
 
Ruiz-Barbadillo, 
Gomez-Aguilar, 
and Carrera 
(2009) 
 
 
Kosmala (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
Ye, Carson, and 
Simnett (2006) 
a & b 
 
 
a & e 
 
 
 
 
 
a 
 
 
 
 
 
a, b & e 
Non-audit services 
 
 
 
 
Receiving gifts 
and presents from 
management 
 
High level bribery 
 
 
 
Audit partner 
tenure 
 
Prospects of 
reappointment 
IAO 
Framework 
 
 
 
Salehi et al. 
(2009) 
 
 
Ramazani 
and Atani 
(2010) 
 
Abdoli et 
al. (2014) 
 
Salehi et al. 
(2009) 
a & b 
 
 
 
 
a & d 
 
 
 
a, c, d & e 
 
 
 
a, b & e 
 
 
a 
 
 
Non-existence 
of audit 
committee  
Nur Barizah Abu, 
Abdul Rahim 
Abdul, and Hafiz 
Majdi Abdul 
(2005) 
a, c & d Non-existence of 
audit committee 
Salehi 
(2011) 
Indirectly 
related to: a, b, 
c, d & e 
      
Auditors’ lack 
of competence 
T. Lee and Stone 
(1995) 
a & e Auditors’ lack of 
competence 
Salehi and 
Husini 
(2011) 
Indirectly 
related to: c & e 
Note. a = self-interest threat, b = self-review threat, c = advocacy threat, d = 
familiarity threat, e = intimidation threat. 
 
Gifts and presents 
According to the term 21.13 of Iran Audit Organisation Code of Professional 
Conduct purchase of goods or services with specific conditions, acceptance of 
irrelevant gifts, and receiving more than the reasonable amount of gifts are serious 
threats to the independence of professional accountants. The term 15.2.E indicates 
that the accounting professionals must refrain from accepting or giving gifts that may 
reasonably lead to a belief that their professional judgement or those who deal with 
them is affected. What is known as unusual gifts can be different in various 
situations. But, overall, the professional accountants shall abstain from being placed 
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in the situations that damage their professional reputation (IAO, 2014). The term 
21.7 of Iranian Institute of Certified Accountants Code of Professional Conduct 
indicates that auditors, their employees, and their agents are banned from accepting 
any type of gifts. All trades with any client shall be reasonable and in a similar 
condition with other clients, without any irrelevant discount and special privilege 
(IICA, 1985). 
Despite the professional regulations regarding gifts and presents, the reality of doing 
business means that business people cannot survive on their own and should have 
some external connections to get advice or solve problems (Kao, 1993). The social 
philosophy of relationships indicates the business partners’ boundaries, 
demonstrating their rights and responsibilities (Gargan, 1994). In some cultures, such 
as Chinese, it is acceptable to offer gifts and presents to management (Hwang & 
Staley, 2005). The gift giving is a ritual act and is a sign of respect in China (Levy, 
1995). It enhances personal relationships, increasing loyalty, trust, and kindness 
between the business partners. The Chinese, through their moral constraints, can 
distinguish between gifts and bribes. For example, they know what type of gift, how, 
and when they should offer in order to prevent bribery (Steidlmeier, 1999).  
Similarly, Iran has deeply embedded traditions regarding gifts. The former king of 
Iran, Fath Ali Shah, sent his portraits abroad as gifts to show Persian royal power 
(Anonymous, 2011). Another king, Shah Muhammad Khudabanda, sent 34 camels 
piled high with treasure to the former Turkish king, Ottoman Sultan Selim II, as a 
sign of respect in 1567. The large animals such as horses and elephants were 
considered favourable gifts of the Islamic courts throughout the 16th and 17th century. 
They were used to express respect, award rendered services, or celebrate annual 
events like the New Year (Ybarra, 2011). Formal gifts are widely accepted in Iran. 
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Some occasions require particular gifts. These gifts merely symbolise the existing 
relationships (Betteridge, 1985). 
The gifts often result in illegal payments, corruption, and bribery (Snell, 1999). Gifts 
increase the likelihood of violating the laws, auditing standards, and Codes of 
Professional Conduct (Hwang & Staley, 2005). They lead to hidden trades, power 
dependence, and bureaucratic privileges (Fan, 2002). The managers of private 
companies are more involved in unethical behaviours. They are more likely to give 
unreciprocated gifts (Xin & Pearce, 1996). Managers use the gifts to maintain the 
required resources. For example, gifts are used as a tool to retain their preferred 
suppliers (Millington, Eberhardt, & Wilkinson, 2005). The likelihood that managers 
of the private firms receive unreasonable gifts is higher, jeopardising the future of 
their firms. 
An act of offering gifts, aiming to bribe is condemned in various cultures (Guoyou, 
1994). If commissions damage the related parties’ freedom or consciousness then it 
is a type of bribery, since selfishness and expediency replace fairness and equity. 
They are the easiest type of bribery, since they are legally covered (Clinard, 1990). 
The gratuities are an indication of kindness, aiming to stimulate the workers. 
However, they may become a type of bribe, if the receiver considers them as a 
prerequisite for a favourable service. The tips are an indication of a giver’s 
thankfulness for the received services. However, excessive tipping may move the 
related parties towards bribery (Steidlmeier, 1999). 
The gifts damage the fiduciary duties of auditors, benefiting them at costs that are 
borne by others. They lessen social wealth, demolishing any country’s infrastructure 
(Dunfee & Warren, 2001). Prior research has indicated that offering gifts affects 
perceived independence, wherein even small gifts are threats to independence (Pany 
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& Reckers, 1980). Further, offering gifts leads to bias in auditors’ decisions and 
prevents them from precisely checking the areas of concern (Fern, 1985). The gifts 
negatively affect auditors’ decisions in conflict of interest situations, leading to 
unethical behaviours (Au & Wong, 2000). The acceptance of gifts encourages 
auditors to change their behaviour and easily accept the management’s proposals. 
The act of offering discounts to auditors may lead them to ignore their standards, 
especially when their level of income is insufficient. The higher levels of discounts 
have higher implications for auditors (Pany & Reckers, 1980). The ethical auditors 
are more concerned to avoid any corrupt behaviour, and they do not consider the 
gifts as a part of their business. They aim to practice their duties, while preventing 
any possible threat to their independence (Au & Wong, 2000).  
 
Non‐audit services (NAS) 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants suggested that auditors 
should not engage in supplementary activities that produce a significant level of 
income (AISG, 1976). The International Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants 
indicates that provision of NAS may result in self-review, self-interest and advocacy 
threats. It does not provide a comprehensive list of all potential NAS. However, it 
emphasises the importance of conceptual framework to evaluate the circumstances of 
different NAS. The Code instructs auditors to evaluate potential threats of NAS prior 
to any engagement. Some NAS may produce significant threats, preventing any 
safeguard to reduce their effects. However, provision of these NAS may not threaten 
independence, if another audit firm audits the accounts or re-performs NAS, aiming 
to reduce their threats to an acceptable level. The auditors should preclude to provide 
any NAS, if they are unable to reduce their threats to the acceptable level (IFAC, 
2014).  
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The management offer NAS to its auditors as a gift, aiming to increase the extent of 
their relationship. The NAS may help companies to enhance their accounting 
systems, because of consultancy roles of auditors. Some company-specific factors 
such as mergers, new accounting system, and restructuring encourage firms to 
purchase more of them. The auditors’ familiarity with their clients’ accounting 
systems enables them to provide valuable suggestions to their clients, helping to 
reduce the existing deficiencies (Sharma & Sidhu, 2001). The NAS may increase the 
quality of financial reporting for several reasons. First, they may increase quality of 
financial reports because of knowledge spill over. For example, client’s tax 
accounting knowledge may spill over, improving financial reporting quality 
(Simunic, 1984). Second, they may increase auditors’ reputational capital regarding 
high-quality clients, if material misstatement risk is low ex-ante. They encourage 
auditors to be more precise, increasing financial reporting quality (Dopuch, King, & 
Schwartz, 2003). Third, high-quality clients may search for more audit-related 
services. They choose their auditors to perform NAS because of quality or cost of 
their services (Kinney, Palmrose, & Scholz, 2004). 
The audit reports for a sample of publicly listed companies over the period 1980 to 
1989 were analysed by Wines (1994) to determine whether there is a potential for an 
appearance of AI impairment when higher levels of NAS are provided to audit 
clients. The results of analysis indicated that the auditors of companies that are not 
receiving an audit qualification of any type over the period derived a significantly 
higher proportion of their remuneration from the NAS fees than the auditors of 
companies receiving at least one audit qualification. These results were driven by the 
non-Top 100 companies in the research sample. These findings could suggest that 
auditors are less likely to qualify a given company’s financial statements when 
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higher levels of NAS fees are derived. This could convey the view that independence 
of auditors of these companies may have been compromised. 
The auditors are likely to pay more time and attention to firms that purchase NAS 
from them (Davis, Ricchiute, & Trompeter, 1993). The NAS may compromise AI for 
two reasons: First, they increase auditors’ financial dependency to their clients, 
reducing their desire to disagree with their clients’ requirements. The high amount of 
NAS creates significant revenues for auditors, making it more harmful to lose their 
clients. It outweighs its potential costs (litigation risk and reputation loss), making it 
worthy to compromise AI (DeFond, Raghunandan, & Subramanyam, 2002). Second, 
managerial role resulted from consultancy nature of NAS brings bias into auditors’ 
judgement, endangering their independence (SEC, 2000). The consultancy services 
provide internal information for auditors, generating them economics rent by 
decreasing audit costs (Simunic, 1984). 
The NAS is highly associated with independence in appearance. It is a signal of 
compromising AI, reducing users’ trust in financial statements (Beck, Frecka, & 
Solomon, 1988b). They increase likelihood of a self-selection bias (Abdel-Khalik, 
1990). The independent auditors are more likely to lose their job as a consequence of 
their disputes with their clients (Simunic, 1984). High NAS compromise AI, 
reducing auditors’ desire to dispute with their clients. This increases auditors’ tenure 
with their clients (Beck, Frecka, & Solomon, 1988a). It reduces the likelihood that 
auditors will modify their audit opinion. It encourages them to maintain their 
relationship with their clients to continue receiving their income, regardless of the 
possible harm to their independence (Hay, Knechel, & Li, 2006).  
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High level bribery 
Transparency International indicates that the governments should take the required 
actions to combat with bribery at both national and international levels through 
different groups such UN, European Union, G20, and Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). It indicates that the national legislations 
should ban bribery among the firms in private sector. It requests the governments to 
adopt and implement laws to prosecute foreign bribery and outlaw off book accounts 
(Transparency International, 2015). Chartered Accountants Australia and New 
Zealand indicates that the management of firms should identify the risky areas and 
establish appropriate controls to lessen and manage the exposures to bribery. It asks 
the firms to put appropriate systems, processes, controls and governance frameworks 
in place to manage the bribery risks. The companies should develop effective anti-
bribery/anti-corruption programmes and educate their employees regarding the 
relevant processes and policies to detect and respond to the bribery concerns (ICAA, 
2011). 
The article 49 of the Iranian Constitution (Confiscation) indicates that government is 
responsible to confiscate all wealth accumulated through usury, usurpation, bribery, 
embezzlement, theft, gambling, misuse of endowments, misuse of government 
contracts and transactions, sale of uncultivated lands and other resources subject to 
public ownership, operation of centres of corruption, and other illicit means and 
sources, and restoring it to its legitimate owner; and if no such owner can be 
identified, it must be entrusted to public treasury. This rule must be executed by the 
government with due care, after the investigation and provision of necessary 
evidence in accordance with the Islamic laws (Assembly of Experts, 1979). The term 
6 of the Iranian Institute of Certified Accountants Code of Professional Conduct 
indicates that since moral characteristics of auditors are the most important part of 
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their profession, the audit principles shall satisfy them. The ignorance of the 
following principles compromises auditors’ competence based on Iranian Institute of 
Certified Accountants’ opinion: Independence and objectivity, sufficient knowledge 
and experience, precision, and privacy (IICA, 1985). However, the Iranian 
professional accounting bodies do not have a specific rule with regard to bribery. 
Kosmala (2007) investigated how culture impacts upon the construction of AI within 
the Central and Eastern Europe region, illustrated with the examples of the two new 
EU members: Poland and the Czech Republic. What emerged from this study was 
heterogeneity of AI, a construct of differences which appears rather resistant to a 
norm and principles-based summary, as in the IFAC code. In Poland and the Czech 
Republic an emphasis on the different interpretations of more general notions of 
independence, such as the ideas of individual freedom, political and economic 
liberalism, as well as economic reality, informed a construct of AI locally. The 
participants of the study considered bribery as a strong threat. 
Bribery is to encourage someone to do something illegal or influence its sense of 
justice, due process, and discretion in favour of the giver through provision or 
promise of something instead (Arowosaiye, 2008). It is a significant threat for 
today’s business, remaining a great concern for various organisations. It may happen 
in any department at any level. It affects the overall effectiveness of the market on 
top of the processes and individuals. The bribers prioritise their own interests over 
others, damaging trust between the business partners and destabilising lawfulness of 
the social institutions (Turow, 1985). The public in any country do not accept bribery 
and request their authorities to combat against fraud.  
Ignorance of bribery is a significant ethical failure for a society. It was a major 
concern involving many international companies during the Watergate investigations 
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in 1973 (Lyon & Maher, 2005). It is more common in developing countries, 
encouraging their governments to identify the potential solutions to confront it (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit N.A., 2002). Many countries are engaged to find some 
solutions to overcome the bribery concerns: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 
the US, United Kingdom Bribery Act in the UK, and Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials Act in Australia aim to overcome bribery concerns. According to these 
Acts, bribery may lead to increased regulatory intervention, increased cost of 
compliance through specific or overall exercise of regulatory power, criminal 
investigation, heavy fine, expulsion from work, restriction in foreign investment, loss 
of public confidence, reputational cost at various levels, and higher insurance cost 
(ICAA, 2011). For example, according to FCPA it is an illegal act for American 
companies to bribe foreign companies’ officials, even though local law does not 
consider it as an illegal act (Maher, 1981).  
The companies should implement the required controls to identify the bribery cases 
and execute effective processes to respond to them. An anti-bribery programme aims 
to detect and respond to the bribery instances. The organisational assessment, 
prevention, detection and response are the primary components of the anti-bribery 
programmes. During organisational assessment management identify the risky areas 
of its organisation and implement the necessary controls for them. The prevention 
requires a comprehensive internal risk assessment of the organisation and 
implementation of a consistent framework to deter bribery. The detection and 
response lead to identification of the bribery cases and taking the necessary measures 
to respond to them (ICAA, 2011). 
The existence of bribery in business affects auditors’ role for several reasons. The 
auditors are likely to increase their efforts or fees in order to prevent the potential 
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future litigations or reputation losses (Simunic, 1984). The bribery increases the 
likelihood of regulatory intervention. It lessens credibility of the faulty companies, 
reducing their share values (Smith, Stettler, & Beedles, 1984). It leads to price and 
volume variability, destabilising the financial market (Lyon & Maher, 2005). The 
management’s turnover because of loss of reputation, the costs of avoiding any 
potential investment in the highly corrupted countries, the costs involved to build an 
effective internal control infrastructure to deter bribery, the costs of hiring external 
bodies to investigate fraud, and the spill over effects on perceived audit quality as a 
result of fraud are the additional costs associated with the bribery (Lyon & Maher, 
2005). 
The reputable auditors are more concerned about maintaining their reputation. They 
aim to expand their operation in the market, reducing others’ ability to build their 
name (McLennan & Park, 2004). The companies are more likely to obtain their 
desired loans from the banks, if they are audited by the reputable audit firms. The 
auditors’ reputation enables them to increase their audit fees, reducing their desire to 
succumb to management’s pressure. The likelihood of bribing the well-known 
auditors is lower, increasing the reliability of their reports (McLennan & Park, 2003). 
However, the high audit fees are detrimental for two reasons. First, they may create 
doubt for the stakeholders according to theory of rational expectations. Second, they 
increase liability of the client’s creditors in case of bankruptcy, leaving them in an 
undesirable situation (McLennan & Park, 2003). 
 
Audit partner tenure 
The International Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants indicates that a long-
term relationship between audit firms and their clients may lead to familiarity and 
self-interest threats. The structure of audit firm, nature of engagement, and 
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complexity of client’s accounting system influence the significance of threats. The 
auditors should apply the relevant safeguards to eliminate the threats or reduce them 
to an acceptable level. The safeguards can range from audit firm’s senior personnel 
rotation to revision of auditor’s work by the external professional accountants to 
frequent revision of engagement quality (IFAC, 2014).  
The Code indicates that an audit firm should not remain a key audit partner of a 
company for more than seven years. The audit firm should not participate in audit-
related activities, provide consultation services, or influence outcomes of 
engagement for a minimum period of two years after completion of its seven years 
engagement period. The Code permits an additional year of engagement upon 
completion of seven years engagement period, because of unforeseen circumstances 
such as serious sickness of a new audit partner. However, it indicates that the audit 
partner should consider the required safeguards to minimise the threats during this 
period. Further, it indicates that audit partner rotation may not be a relevant 
safeguard, if only a few people have the required knowledge and expertise to serve as 
principal audit partner for a company. In such circumstances regulators of the related 
jurisdictions may permit audit engagements of more than seven years, considering 
the required safeguards such as frequent external quality revisions (IFAC, 2014). 
The term 21.17 of Iran Audit Organisation Code of Professional Conduct indicates 
that a long-term relationship between the auditors and their clients may threaten AI. 
In such circumstances, the auditors shall take the necessary measures to safeguard 
their independence (IAO, 2014). The paragraph 2 of clause 10 of the TSE 
requirements obligated all the companies listed in TSE to rotate their audit partners 
every four years in 2007. This requirement does not permit the listed companies to 
reassign their former audit partners in future (Abdoli et al., 2014). 
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Ye et al. (2006) examined whether and how AI is affected by NAS, audit firm tenure, 
audit partner tenure, and existence of audit firm alumni employees using going 
concern audit opinion as a proxy. The results considered NAS and audit partner 
tenure as the potential threats to AI, while audit firm tenure and alumni affiliation 
were not found to have a negative effect on AI. Further, no joint effect was 
documented between the economic bonds (NAS) and the relationship bonds (audit 
firm tenure, audit partner tenure, alumni affiliation). As such, this study provided 
some evidence in support of the mandatory audit partner rotation and restrictions on 
auditor’s provided NAS.  
An auditor’s report should provide an accurate image regarding a company’s health. 
The duration of an auditor and its auditee’s relationship is a controversial factor, 
wherein mandatory rotation of audit firms can enhance auditor’s report quality 
(Wolf, Tackett, & Claypool, 1999). A long-term relationship encourages the auditors 
to easily accept their auditee’s accounting and reporting choices. It lowers absolute 
and positive values of discretionary accruals and earnings quality (Chen, Lin, & Lin, 
2008). It leads to a lower chance of just missing earnings’ benchmarks (Carey & 
Simnett, 2006). It is associated with incrementally higher conservatism in financial 
reporting and lower amount of unexpected accruals (Hamilton, Ruddock, Stokes, & 
Taylor, 2005). It reduces the cost of debt financing (Mansi, Maxwell, & Miller, 
2004).  
A long-term tenure creates a personal relationship between the auditors and their 
clients. It compromises their objectivity, since direct and indirect management’s 
pressures affect their attitude over time (Mautz & Sharaf, 1961). The auditors’ bias 
influences their behaviour during audit and reporting process, wherein in case of a 
conflict of interest the auditors favour their clients (Dopuch et al., 2003). The long-
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term tenure increases familiarity threat, limiting number of the effective audit-testing 
methods. It makes the audit plan routine, reducing the auditors’ desire to use 
creativity in their audit procedures (Hoyle, 1978). The extent of their reliance on the 
internal audit reports increases, discouraging them from using rigorous audit 
procedures. The auditors may tend to predict the outcomes prior to conduct of an 
audit, reducing the likelihood of discovering the mistakes and errors (Arrunada & 
Paz-Ares, 1997). 
A long-term relationship reduces auditors’ desire to issue a modified audit opinion, 
reducing the quality of their services (DeFond et al., 2002). The auditors develop a 
certain level of confidence regarding their client’s financial statements, reducing 
their desire to effectively check their financial reports over time (Shockley, 1981). 
Copley and Doucet (1993) showed a negative relationship between audit partner 
tenure and quality of services regarding the government audits. The likelihood that 
auditors issue a going-concern opinion for a client that is close to insolvency 
increases, as their relationship period increases (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002). The 
limitation of auditors’ future income as a consequence of mandatory rotation helps to 
maintain audit quality throughout the auditors’ engagement period (Johnson, 
Khurana, & Reynolds, 2002). 
A long-term relationship between auditors and management increases the amount of 
discretionary accruals, reducing auditor’s reports’ quality (Davis, Soo, & Trompeter, 
2002). The audit tenure discourages the audit firms to compete against each other, 
damaging the audit market. Further, it limits the scope of auditors, preventing them 
to become familiar with other industries. The auditors do not attempt to update their 
knowledge and skill so as to respond to the current requirements of audit market, 
reducing likelihood of audit market improvement (Carrera, Gómez-Aguilar, 
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Humphrey, & Ruiz-Barbadillo, 2007). The audit quality declines, and the potential 
investors lose their confidence in the market (Craswell, Stokes, & Laughton, 2002). 
 
Prospects of reappointment 
The term 8.7 of Iranian Institute of Certified Accountants Code of Professional 
Conduct indicates that an auditor shall not accept another auditor’s work, unless the 
other auditor’s right to practice is officially revoked or professional reasons 
regarding non-acceptance of job by the other auditor is not mentioned (professional 
reasons can be because of non-payment of audit fees, or client company’s pressure 
on auditors to disrupt or threaten their audit procedures, or similar reasons). An 
auditor shall request the name of the former auditor from the client company in 
writing upon receipt of a new job offer and in case the former auditor is confirmed or 
with permission of the client company contact the former auditor via registered post 
and obtain receipt and investigate existence of professional reasons. In the case of 
existence of professional reasons or refusal of the client company to give permission 
to contact, the auditor is banned to accept the job offer. The former auditor shall 
respond to the enquiry within five days of its receipt. If within fifteen days of enquiry 
submission the former auditor does not respond to the auditor, existence of 
professional reasons is considered to be void, and there is no prohibition for the new 
auditor to accept the offer (IICA, 1985). 
A desire for reappointment influences auditors’ behaviour, wherein they tend to 
sacrifice their loss of reputation and litigation risks in order to continue receiving 
their audit fees. The auditors have a greater tendency to collude with management, as 
duration of their relationship increases. They may give in to management’s pressure 
to retain their clients, since likelihood of losing their clients influences their decision 
making (Raghunathan, Lewis, & Evans III, 1994). Further, the expected higher fees 
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that are derived from audit tenure increase auditors’ dependency to management 
(Brody & Moscove, 1998). A switch threat increases their desire to succumb to 
management’s pressure. They may engage in a low-balling, aiming to offset an initial 
loss by gaining in the succeeding periods (Simon & Francis, 1988). The companies 
that receive a qualified audit report are more likely to change their auditors (Ottaway, 
2012). This change leads them to receive a less qualified report, indicating that their 
management was successful in opinion-shopping (Park, 1990). 
The internal control deficiencies cause increased audit fees (Raghunandan & Rama, 
2006), negative stock market reactions (Cheng, Ho, & Tian, 2006), poor estimation 
of accruals (Doyle, Ge, & McVay, 2007), higher lenders’ assessment of credit risk 
(Schneider & Church, 2008), higher cost of equity (Ashbaugh‐Skaife, Collins, & 
Lafond, 2009), and self-fulfilling prophecies, leading to a client’s bankruptcy 
(Louwers, Messina, & Richard, 1999). The existence of significant weaknesses in 
internal control of a company affects shareholders’ opinion regarding auditors’ 
reappointment (Hermanson, Krishnan, & Zhongxia, 2009). Some companies have 
voluntarily permitted their shareholders to vote regarding auditors’ selection, 
increasing likelihood of an adverse vote regarding their reappointment (Krishnan & 
Ye, 2005). The likelihood that auditors accept their clients’ aggressive accounting 
practices decreases as outside investors exercise control over their selection (Moore, 
Tetlock, Tanlu, & Bazerman, 2006).  
Some factors affect the shareholders’ votes regarding auditors’ selection. The 
accounting restatements (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972), and a high tax fee ratio 
(Mishra, Raghunandan, & Rama, 2005) reduce shareholders’ desire to vote for 
auditors’ reappointment. The auditors that have a long-term tenure (Dao, Mishra, & 
Raghunandan, 2008), provide NAS (Raghunandan, 2003), and issue a going concern 
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opinion (Sainty, Taylor, & Williams, 2002) are more likely to receive a negative vote 
from the shareholders. The shareholders are often more dissatisfied with the auditors 
than what their votes indicate for some reasons (Sainty et al., 2002). First, small 
shareholders do not actively participate, since they need majority shareholders’ 
support for the important decisions (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Second, shareholders’ 
votes are not binding (Hermanson et al., 2009). Third, board of directors often 
support auditors’ reappointment (Hermanson et al., 2009).  
The existence of an independent audit committee is critical in order to safeguard AI 
(Zhang, Zhou, & Zhou, 2007). The social and professional ties such as friendship or 
prior employment relationship between management and audit committee increase 
management’s ability to influence the committee’s decisions (Westphal & Stern, 
2006). The professional bodies consider the internal control deficiencies as an 
indication of a poor accounting practice, recommending voting against the audit 
committee members. They consider the existing weaknesses in internal control to be 
an indirect consequence of audit committee’s failure (Sullivan & Cromwell, 2007). 
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board has emphasised the importance of 
each company’s governance structure and its audit committee’s independence to 
ensure AI (PCAOB, 2012).  
The financial expertise of audit committee members encourages shareholders to 
support auditors’ reappointment, since it increases their trust in auditors (Hermanson 
et al., 2009). The existence of an audit committee with only independent members 
(Raghunandan & Rama, 2003), and a high audit-related fee ratio (Mishra et al., 2005) 
increase the likelihood that the shareholders support auditors’ reappointment. The 
audit committee’s independence plays a significant role in the investors’ 
reappointment decisions, since committee choose the auditors. The management 
 61 
 
prefer to exercise control over the committee. The audit committee’s dependency on 
management reduces its ability to objectively monitor financial reporting (Murphy, 
Jako, & Anhalt, 1993). The management’s influence over the audit committee 
increases the likelihood that shareholders vote against the auditors, since the 
committee may attempt to please the management (Gold, Klynsmit, Wallage, & 
Wright, 2014). 
 
Non‐existence of audit committee 
The TSE’s requirements indicate that the purpose of audit committee formation is to 
help the boards of directors regarding their supervisory responsibility and their 
improvement in order to obtain reasonable confidence regarding effectiveness of 
governance processes, risk managements, and internal controls; financial reporting 
health; internal audits effectiveness; independent auditors independence and 
independent audits effectiveness; and observance of rules, provisions, and 
requirements (TSE, 2013a). 
Nur Barizah Abu et al. (2005) studied to provide further understanding of the factors 
influencing AI from the perspective of commercial loan officers. The loan officers 
formed the sample as they are relatively sophisticated financial statement users who 
would understand the importance of audit report and the issues related to AI in the 
Malaysian-owned commercial banks. Eighty-six officers responded to the self-
administered questionnaire. The study found non-existence of audit committee a 
threat to AI. 
An audit committee’s principal duty is to monitor the financial reporting processes of 
a company. It examines the financial statements, audit processes, and internal 
accounting controls of the company. It meets frequently with the external auditors 
and financial managers to monitor its company’s audit process. Its role is to work as 
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an arbiter between the management and auditors to create a fair and precise report 
and reduce the amount of the positive and negative accruals (Nelson, Elliott, & 
Tarpley, 2000). The audit committee may intervene on different matters, such as 
management judgments, accounting estimates and audit adjustments, disagreements 
between management and auditors, and transactions between the company and its 
officers or employees. It may also assess the legal issues and risk profile of the 
company (Klein, 2002). 
An independent audit committee encourages auditors to prioritise the interests of 
shareholders and express the realities. It reduces necessity of a legal intervention to 
protect the shareholders (Levine & Kornish, 2000). An independent committee may 
demand a wider extent of external audit, increasing likelihood of a misstatement 
detection (Abbott, Parker, Peters, & Raghunandan, 2003). Its members do not have 
any financial tie to management and freely question their behaviours (Carcello & 
Neal, 2003). The audit committee’s independence reduces auditors’ desire to please 
management in order to be reappointed in case of tendering, reducing investors’ 
information risk. Further, it increases AI in case of mandatory rotation, since 
auditors’ reappointment is prohibited by law in many countries such as the US (Gold 
et al., 2014). However, non-independency of audit committee reduces shareholders’ 
desire to invest, even though auditor’s rotation and tendering are practiced (Gold et 
al., 2014). The audit committee’s independence increases effectiveness of internal 
audit function, since the internal auditors can independently question the suspicious 
activities (Wallace & Kreutzfeldt, 1991).  
The financial expertise of audit committee members increases their performance, as 
they use their expertise to show that they understand the significance of decision 
control, and they are capable of working with it (Beasley, 1996). Their skill reduces 
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the likelihood of financial restatement, since they better understand the internal audit 
system and governance structure of their company (Raghunandan, Rama, & Read, 
2001). The expert members better realise any factor that creates dispute between 
management and auditors and introduce some solutions to overcome it (DeZoort & 
Salterio, 2001). Further, they are more likely to prevent auditors’ dismissal in case of 
a disagreement with management (Carcello & Neal, 2003). 
The size of audit committee influences the internal auditors, wherein the larger 
committees can improve internal audit function more effectively (Kalbers & Fogarty, 
1993). Further, they release management from the cost control pressures, providing 
an opportunity to implement further internal controls (Quarles, 1994). The larger 
committees can better use their resources to address the financial reporting concerns, 
since their diversity of expertise helps to effectively check the financial activities 
(Bedard, Chtourou, & Courteau, 2004). The existence of large committees reduces 
the likelihood of suspicious auditor switches (Archambeault & DeZoort, 2001). 
Further, the probability of an adverse ruling by Financial Reporting Review Panel is 
lesser for firms with the larger audit committees (Song & Windram, 2004). 
The board of director’s independency increases its company’s performance 
(Weisbach, 1988). It is more likely to be independent, if a majority of its members 
are outsiders (Beasley, 1996). However, existence of few outside directors in a board 
signals earnings management, since it increases the values of the adjusted abnormal 
accruals (Klein, 2002). The independency may be compromised, if the CEO sits on 
the board’s nominating or executive compensation committee (Shivdasani & 
Yermack, 1999). The type of CEO’s compensation influences its company’s 
discretionary disclosure, wherein a positive relationship between the CEO’s 
shareholdings and earnings management will be the consequence of using earnings 
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management to increase compensation (Nagar, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2001). The 
managerial stockholding as a disciplinary mechanism reduces the amount of the 
abnormal accruals (Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995). The issuance of stock option 
downwardly influences the investors’ expectations regarding the earnings, before it 
awards CEOs (Yermack, 1997).  
 
Auditors’ lack of competence   
The International Federation of Accountants requires auditors to be competent to 
perform their tasks. They should have a comprehensive understanding regarding their 
client and its industry (IFAC, 2010). IFAC (2010) instructs auditors to further 
concentrate on clients that are operating with the specialised industries such as 
banking, real estate, or government sector enterprises; clients that are involved with 
off-shore transactions; clients that are a public interest entity; complexity of their 
client entity’s structure, transactions, or transactions that involve complex accounting 
treatments; and complex tax arrangements.  
The International Federation of Accountants requires auditors to gain enough 
knowledge about their client’s industry; consider the potential high risk areas; make 
the necessary communications with the former auditors; and follow the necessary 
steps to sign an engagement letter before accepting their clients (IFAC, 2010). IFAC 
(2010) requires auditors to consider their experience level in their client’s industry; 
partner rotation requirements; their client’s operation in risky industries or portfolios, 
their client’s activity level in acquisition accounting, reorganisation, restructuring 
charges, self-insurance, use of derivatives, and debt covenants; relevance of using 
experts; any concern regarding availability of professional staff to complete their 
tasks; and any concern regarding professional staff members’ knowledge and 
experience prior to their clients’ acceptance. 
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The term 17.1 of Iran Audit Organisation Code of Professional Conduct divides 
concept of professional competence into two fundamental aspects of professional 
competence achievement and professional competence preservation. The 
professional competence achievement indicates that achievement of professional 
competence requires enjoyment of higher education, which can be completed 
through relevant professional organisations with special education, training, exams, 
and professional experience. The professional competence preservation indicates that 
preservation of professional competence requires consistent knowledge of 
profession’s developments (including new comments about the principles and criteria 
of accounting and audit and the relevant rules and regulations) especially 
employment of a programme, which can provide confidence that professional 
services (using a proper quality control system) are offered with desirable quality and 
according to the professional principles and criteria (IAO, 2014). 
The term 11.C of Iran Audit Organisation Code of Professional Conduct indicates 
that the accounting professionals shall perform their professional services with 
accuracy, competence, and perseverance. They shall consistently maintain their 
professional knowledge and skill at a level, wherein confidence can be obtained that 
their services are acceptable and offered according to the latest developments in 
profession, rules, and regulations (IAO, 2014). The term 22 indicates that the 
accounting professionals shall refrain from accepting the professional services that 
they do not have competency to perform. The term allows the accounting 
professionals to use the expert services while accepting a job, if they need them to 
perform some of their professional services (IAO, 2014). 
The competence means that auditors have the required knowledge and skills to 
execute their duties (Lee, 1972). There are five stages associated with skill 
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acquisition (Dreyfus, Drey-fus, & Zadeh, 1987). The first stage involves 
identification of facts, establishment of rules, and judgement of performance. In the 
second stage auditors are unable to select the appropriate rules. However, they are 
gaining the required experience to conduct an audit. The auditors have the required 
experience to perform their duties in the third stage. They are able to make the 
necessary decisions with a minimal reliance on rules and procedures. In the fourth 
stage auditors are able to relate the existing situations to former ones, aiming to make 
the appropriate decisions and to take the correct actions. In the final stage auditors 
are able to rationalise their decisions and actions. They act based on their 
understanding about different situations and personal experience (Lee & Stone, 
1995). 
A successful audit requires both auditor competence and AI. The auditor’s 
competence and independence are two mutually inclusive characteristics of an audit, 
wherein goal of independence is unachievable unless the auditors have the required 
skill and experience (Lee & Stone, 1995). The relationship between auditor 
competence and AI was investigated by Lee and Stone (1995). The findings 
indicated that assuming no other conflicting interests, the greater the probability of 
auditor competence (in the sense of his or her position on the expertise continuum of 
novice to expert), the greater the probability of AI (in the sense of an audit opinion 
consistent with evidence of the facts). Alternatively, again assuming no other 
conflicting interests, the greater the probability of auditor incompetence, the greater 
the probability of auditor dependence. The paper found auditor competence as a prior 
condition for AI. That is, the auditor’s decision to be dependent or independent can 
be only made if he is competent to satisfactorily complete the designated audit tasks. 
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The AI is associated with objectivity and competence. The auditors need to deal with 
audit-related matters objectively, while being qualified to complete their tasks in 
order to provide an independent opinion (Schandl, 1978). Similarly, the auditors 
should be able to discover the material misstatements in their client’s financial 
reports and report them (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). The auditors’ incompetence 
causes them to fail to detect the irregularities, whereas their dependence prevents 
them from reporting the identified irregularities. The respondents’ identification of a 
company as a going concern is an indication of auditor’s competence, whereas their 
identification of the company as a failing concern is an indication of independence 
(Libby & Lewis, 1982). A higher extent of competence increases the chance of 
independence. Similarly, lack of competence reduces the auditors’ ability to maintain 
their independence (Lee & Stone, 1995). The incompetent auditors are unable to 
search for the relevant materials, and they are unskilled to ask the required questions. 
They are more likely to rely on the management’s assertions, increasing 
management’s influence over them. The management’s influence imperils AI, 
leading to a potential audit failure (Lee & Stone, 1995). 
The auditors should have enough training and knowledge regarding the legal and 
contractual terms and ability to apply professional reasoning. The auditors’ 
proficiency reduces audit risk, since sufficient knowledge about a client company 
and its environment helps them regarding their client’s acceptance decisions (Hayes 
& Schilder, 2005). Their expertise helps them to reduce the risks associated with an 
audit environment. It enables them to provide appropriate extra substantive 
procedures to increase insurance level, considering necessary budget, labour, and 
time (Ajzen, 1991). The experienced auditors use appropriate processing strategies, 
leading to better decisions (Shelton, 1999).  
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The technical knowledge of auditors enables them to detect a company’s aggressive 
accounting practices, providing an opportunity to provide their reports fairly (Beattie, 
Fearnley, & Brandt, 2004). The auditors’ skill enables them to identify the 
misleading prospectuses, protecting the potential investors’ funds. It increases 
control system’s efficiency to detect and prevent fraud (Hayes & Schilder, 2005). 
The experienced auditors act more thoroughly regarding the doubtful areas. Their 
familiarity with their industry helps them to discover the insufficient managerial 
answers, providing an opportunity to further investigate them (Kenley, 1969). They 
perform the necessary verification steps regarding inventory valuation, without 
considering the managements’ representations (Godsell, 1993). The unskilled 
auditors do not recognise the effects of the omitted liabilities. Further, they do not 
follow the necessary procedures to recognise the omissions, increasing their reliance 
on the company’s accounts (Dicksee & Waldron, 1969).  
The auditors’ competence enables them to evaluate the management control systems 
and their cost policies. The competent auditors are able to assess a company’s 
success to achieve its goals (Johnsen, Robertsen, & Äsland, 2004). They can make 
the necessary preparations to address the complex situations, enabling them to 
produce a credible audit report without any need to rely on internal reports 
(Mironiuc, Chersan, & Robu, 2013). The internal auditors’ competence is an 
indication of their individual characteristics, such as experience regarding their 
industry, specific knowledge regarding their company, and the required skill to 
address the potential concerns. The existence of highly competent internal auditors 
motivates external auditors to increase their reliance on them, reducing the planned 
audit hours (Margheim, 1986). However, reliance of external auditors on the internal 
audit departments may lead to some undesirable outcomes, since internal auditors 
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may have incorrectly prepared the financial reports to satisfy management (Brown, 
1983). 
The auditors often rely on prior year’s risk assessment to plan a new assessment, 
wherein the difficult tasks encourage more reliance on the prior works (Monroe & 
Ng, 2000). The auditors’ skill reduces their need to rely on the former assessments, 
increasing their ability to create an independent assessment (Joyce & Biddle, 1981). 
The less skilled auditors are unable to fully determine the effects of a faulty 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system, increasing their reliance on outcomes of 
the prior risk assessments (Bedard, Graham, & Jackson, 2005). This increases 
likelihood of a failure, since the previous years’ results may not be applicable for the 
current year. The incompetent auditors do not critically evaluate the outcomes of risk 
assessments, because of their lack of understanding regarding them (Bagranoff & 
Vendrzyk, 2000). Their lack of understanding regarding the required procedures 
prevents them from making the necessary actions to address the potential risk 
assessment concerns (Ajzen, 1991). 
The auditors need to use few computer assurance specialists (CASs) to design and 
test appropriate system controls for the highly computerised clients (AICPA, 2001). 
They should increase their knowledge about accounting information system (AIS) in 
order to align with the technological changes (Kinney Jr, 2001). The AIS expertise 
reduces the differences between various CAS structures, providing an opportunity to 
address their deficiencies. The qualified auditors can better determine the existing 
ERP flaws, and they are more skilled to detect the areas that current CAS fails to 
cover (Hunton, Wright, & Wright, 2004). The auditors’ AIS expertise adjusts their 
decision makings to respond to different risk levels. Their knowledge of AIS 
provides them with a better understanding regarding their client’s control systems, 
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affecting their risk assessments (Brazel & Agoglia, 2007). It helps them to detect the 
deficiencies and provides some solutions to overcome them (Hunton et al., 2004).  
There are various court cases to prove that auditors’ incompetence threatens their 
independence. For example, an incompetent auditor disregarded the effects of 
omitted liabilities on the balance sheet and failed to enquire about them, leading to 
merely rely on the management’s figures in Westminster Road Construction and 
Engineering Co. Ltd. (1932, 86 Acct. L.R. 38) (Dicksee, 1945). Further, the 
incompetent auditors conducted bookkeeping rather than audit procedure in Kina 
Holdings Ltd. case in 1981. They were unable to detect the irregularities because of 
the complexity of their client’s company and easily relied on the company’s reports 
(Boys, 1986). 
The existence of academic literature and professional standards regarding gifts and 
presents, bribery, audit partner tenure, prospects of reappointment, non-existence of 
audit committee, and auditors’ lack of competence as indicators of AI threat in Iran 
encouraged this study to propose that the participants of the study will consider these 
indicators as threats to AI in Iran15. However, since IAO or Iranian professional 
accounting bodies have not categorised the mentioned indicators, the study expects 
that each participants’ perception of importance among the six indicators will vary. 
Further, since there are many circumstances that may lead to self-interest, self-
review, advocacy, familiarity, or intimidation threats, the study expects that each 
participant will nominate other indicators of AI threat not previously identified. 
 
                                                 
15 The mentioned 6 indicators are indicators that are most frequently seen in the Iranian literature. 
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Identified indicators of AI threat in international literature  
The international literature identifies an indicator of AI threat that is not mentioned 
in the Iranian literature, namely: audit partner rotation (refer to Table 4). This section 
provides some information regarding this indicator. 
 
Audit partner rotation 
The regulatory view indicates that because of mandatory rotation auditors are more 
likely to raise their concerns regarding financial statements of their clients, reducing 
likelihood of an audit failure (Petty & Cuganesan, 1996). The auditors are more 
willing to raise their specific concerns, since subsequent auditors may detect them 
(Imhoff, 2003). The mandatory rotation reduces the extent of auditors’ cooperation 
with their clients (Wang & Tuttle, 2009). It reduces the risk that managers affect 
auditors’ decision. It reduces auditors’ willingness to issue a biased report (Dopuch, 
King, & Schwartz, 2001). The mandatory rotation of auditors increases the 
confidence of shareholders regarding the financial statements. It increases bank loan 
officers’ trust in the financial statements of their client company, increasing the 
client’s chance to obtain the required funds (Daniels & Booker, 2011). 
Several countries such as Italy or Spain practice mandatory rotation, encouraging 
others to adopt it (Vanasco, Skousen, & Santagato, 1997). The audit partner should 
be rotated every seven years in the United States and Japan and every five years in 
the United Kingdom (Chen et al., 2008). The proponents of rotation claim that a 
long-term tenure compromises independence, affecting quality of financial reports. 
The mandatory rotation brings a new angle, reducing client’s ability to influence 
auditors as a result of restricting value of incumbency (Brody & Moscove, 1998). 
The auditors are more sceptical, while checking the financial statements as a result of 
mandatory rotation (Nagy, 2005). 
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The regulatory bodies often emphasise the significance of independence in 
appearance. However, the auditors’ economic bindings to their clients is a significant 
threat for their perceived independence (Ghosh, Kallapur, & Moon, 2005). The 
economic view suggests that the important clients are more likely to influence their 
auditors. The auditors may compromise their independence to satisfy the clients that 
are highly beneficial for them (DeAngelo, 1981). They are more likely to overlook 
the suspicious activities in their important clients’ financial reports. They check their 
accounts less vigorously, reducing the quality of their auditor’s report. Although the 
audit failures in the larger clients are easier to detect, a client’s size affects their 
auditors’ decisions, increasing the likelihood of collusion (Chung & Kallapur, 2003). 
The economic view indicates that managers of a new auditee client are more likely to 
influence the auditors, questioning effectiveness of the mandatory rotation (Elitzur & 
Falk, 1996). The auditors are more likely to forgo their objectivity in the initial 
stages of their engagement with their clients. The high start-up costs of engagement 
lead newly hired auditors to earn quasi-rents, making them more vulnerable to the 
dismissal threats (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002). A desire to increase quasi-rents of 
incumbency encourages the auditors to satisfy their new auditees, endangering their 
independence (Elitzur & Falk, 1996). Further, the auditors dislike the perception that 
their auditee dismissed them right after hiring them, since the external parties may 
consider it as an indication of an auditor’s deficiency (Geiger & Raghunandan, 
2002).  
The impact of audit partner rotation on AI was investigated by Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. 
(2009). Spain has practiced mandatory rotation from 1988 to 1995. The audit reports 
for a sample of Spanish financially stressed companies from 1991 to 2000 were 
examined to investigate the changes in issuing a going-concern opinion during the 
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mandatory rotation period of 1991–1994 and post-mandatory rotation period of 
1995–2000. The study found that auditors’ desire to maintain their existing clients 
did not influence their decision to issue a going-concern opinion during both periods. 
The findings indicated that mandatory rotation did not increase auditors’ incentive to 
issue the going-concern opinions, supporting the arguments against mandatory 
rotation (Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2009). 
A long-term relationship between auditors and their clients can be beneficial, since it 
increases auditors’ knowledge regarding their operations and systems (Petty & 
Cuganesan, 1996). The auditors need to conduct various substandard audits on their 
new clients to gain enough knowledge regarding their operation (Berton, 1991). The 
mandatory rotation compulsorily finishes the developed effective relationships 
between auditors and their clients, reducing ability to take preventative actions 
against the potential threats to auditees (Petty & Cuganesan, 1996). Further, 
undiscovered irregularities are more common in the new auditees than the existing 
ones (Loebbecke, Eining, & Willingham, 1989). The auditors may not detect 
irregularities during the initial engagement years because of their lack of familiarity, 
reducing audit quality (Petty & Cuganesan, 1996). They do not have sufficient 
knowledge to establish the relevant quality controls to detect irregularities in the 
initial stages. They need to have enough time to familiarise themselves with their 
clients’ audit methodology and databases (Carey & Simnett, 2006). They face a 
higher risk of litigation in the initial stages of their audit because of their lack of 
knowledge about their client’s specific risks (Palmrose, 1989). 
The client-specific knowledge is essential for the work of auditors, though other 
types of knowledge such as general and industry knowledge help them to complete 
their tasks (Knapp, 1991). The auditors may not detect the material misstatements 
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during the initial years of their engagements, because of a lack of client-specific 
knowledge (Beck et al., 1988b). The lack of client-specific knowledge may cause 
auditors to easily accept their client’s explanations (Kinney Jr & McDaniel, 1996). 
The auditors’ extra efforts cannot mitigate their lack of knowledge about their 
clients’ specific threats. Further, immediate replacement of the client-specific assets 
is impractical (Arrunada & Paz-Ares, 1997). The auditors aim to maintain and 
benefit from their relationship with their clients (Citron & Taffler, 1992), enhance 
their reputation in the market (Melumad & Thoman, 1990), and protect themselves 
from the potential lawsuits (Narayanan, 1994). 
A long-term tenure leads to less extreme income-increasing and income-decreasing 
accruals, restricting earnings management (Myers, Myers, & Omer, 2003). The 
likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting is higher during the initial engagement 
years (Carcello & Nagy, 2004). The investors obtain a better view regarding earnings 
quality shown by the earnings response coefficients from returns as duration of 
relationship between the auditors and their clients increases (Ghosh & Moon, 2005). 
The long-term tenure increases the influence of the reported earnings on stock 
rankings (Ghosh & Moon, 2005). It reduces costs of corporate bonds (Mansi et al., 
2004). The auditors require a lesser time to perform their duties because of long-term 
tenure, reducing their clients’ audit fees (Kwon, Lim, & Simnett, 2010). 
The auditors cannot gain the required knowledge because of mandatory rotation, 
since it spreads the initial engagement costs over a shorter period of time and 
increases audit costs (Petty & Cuganesan, 1996). The costs associated with 
mandatory rotation may outweigh its benefits, causing harm to clients (Carey & 
Simnett, 2006). The mandatory rotation reduces clients’ ability to get access to the 
skilled auditors in their particular industry, since sufficient skilled auditors may not 
 75 
 
be available in every industry in each occasion. The clients may need to hire the 
audit firms with a lesser amount of knowledge about their industry, reducing audit 
quality (Petty & Cuganesan, 1996). 
 
Justification of the propositions 
The analysis of previous relevant research has identified six potential indicators of 
AI threats in a non-IFRS country with an Islamic legal system. The prior research on 
AI threats in Iran, using survey method, indicates that some variation in participants’ 
perceptions is desirable from a research point of view and is to be expected in this 
context. Apart from Abdoli et al. (2014), prior studies relied on in Table 4 were 
published approximately four to five years ago. Chapter 2 of this thesis provided 
detailed discussion regarding the institutional background in Iran, indicating several 
economic and regulatory developments affecting the financial reporting and audit 
environment in Iran. In this study, the researcher anticipates that these recent 
developments may affect participants’ current perceptions of AI in Iran. Further, 
significant recent attention has been paid to bribery and corruption in Iran, as 
discussed in Chapter 2 and Abdoli et al. (2014). Accordingly, this study investigates 
the following two propositions: 
1. Based on six potential indicators of AI threats in Iran identified from the 
literature, it is expected that the participants will agree with the nominated 
indicators as threats to AI in Iran.  
A) However, each participant’s perception of importance among the six will 
vary.  
B) However, the researcher also expects that each participant will nominate 
other indicators of AI threat not previously identified. 
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2. In particular, the researcher expects that high level bribery will most often 
rank as most important to the participants. 
Further, Chapters 1 and 2 discussed the role of the Iran Audit Organisation (IAO) in 
developing professional standards in AI, and Chapter 2 examined the educational 
qualification profile of the staff at IAO. These relatively recent developments in the 
profile of the Iranian audit profession prompted the researcher to consider that 
professional and educational qualifications of participants (and hence familiarity with 
professional standards) may affect their perceptions of the indicators of threats to AI 
in Iran. Accordingly, the third proposition is presented: 
3. Based on professional standards that specifically refer to all indicators of 
threat to AI in Iran (except for non-existence of audit committee which was 
regulated by the Tehran Stock Exchange) the researcher expects that the 
participants with professional qualifications’ perceptions will be different 
from those participants without any professional qualification. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed and provided some examples regarding current audit-related 
studies in Iran. It explained the identified indicators of AI threat in the country, 
namely: gifts and presents, non-audit services, high level bribery, audit partner 
tenure, prospects of reappointment, non-existence of audit committee, and auditors’ 
lack of competence. It discussed the identified indicator of AI threat in the 
international literature that is not mentioned in the Iranian literature, namely: audit 
partner rotation. It indicated the justifications of the propositions of this study. The 
next chapter will explain how the research is designed to be conducted. 
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Chapter 4: Audit and agency theory 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the understanding to audit and agency theory. It indicates how 
agency theory relates to audit profession and AI, particular in the context of Iran. 
 
The value of audit 
The word “audit” means to listen or to question (Domingues, Sampaio, & Arezes, 
2011). The Oxford dictionary online defines audit as “an official inspection of an 
organisation’s account, typically by an independent body” (Oxford University Press, 
2015, p. 1). ISO 9000 defines it as “a systematic, independent, and documented 
process, for obtaining audit evidence and evaluating it objectively to determine the 
extent to which audit criteria are fulfilled” (ISO, 2009, p. 3). The American 
Accounting Association defines auditing as “a systematic process of objectively 
obtaining and evaluating evidence regarding assertions about economic actions and 
events to ascertain the degree of correspondence between those assertions and 
established criteria and communicating the results to interested users” (American 
Accounting Association, 1973, p. 2). 
An audit has five primary concepts, namely: Evidence, due audit care, fair 
presentation, independence, and ethical conduct (Gupta, 2004). The evidence takes 
anything that influences an auditor’s judgement regarding trustfulness of the 
submitted propositions into account. The due audit care considers the extent of the 
required evidence in any audit subject. The fair presentation includes three concepts, 
namely: Propriety, adequate disclosure, and audit obligation. The propriety indicates 
that financial reports are produced in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles to reveal the realities regarding the financial position of a company. The 
adequate disclosure is concerned regarding the requirements of the users of financial 
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statements. The audit obligation considers an auditor’s obligation to show the extent 
of his examination or nature of his opinion. The concept of independence indicates 
that the auditor should not be under management influence and should stay free from 
bias and prejudice. The concept of ethical conduct indicates that the auditor should 
follow the professional code of conducts (Gupta, 2004). 
An audit delivers value and creates an economic or social benefit (Gray & Manson, 
2007). It enhances the efficiency of a financial market and increases credibility of its 
information for decision makers. In an independent financial audit an auditor may 
review the financial reports of a company to determine whether or not they provide a 
true and fair view regarding its financial position. The accountability is the primary 
condition of audit and is one of the principles of independent auditing. There is a 
need to prove accountability of those who are responsible for producing the financial 
statements. The accountability cannot be achieved without audit, and auditors have to 
examine the financial reports of different companies to ensure accountability of their 
management. The standards of accountability are created for the responsible parties, 
and their compliance is measured through special skills and judgements. Different 
jurisdictions indicate their requirements to produce the financial reports, wherein 
many of them are influenced by generally accepted accounting standards such as 
IFRSs (Gray & Manson, 2007). 
 
Audit and the agency problem 
The audit profession is built up upon agency theory. An agency relationship occurs 
when one party (principal) hires another party (agent) and gives decision making 
authority to it (Ross, 1973). The agency theory recognises the predominant problem 
associated with the agency relationship: The goals of principals (shareholders) and 
agents (managers) are different. The shareholders cannot determine the truthfulness 
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of agents’ behaviours. The appropriateness of agents’ behaviour is not verifiable for 
principals (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The adverse selection and moral hazard are two problems surrounding shareholders-
managers relationship (Wilson, 1983). The adverse selection means that managers 
(agents) have better information regarding their companies’ assets than the principals 
(shareholders). A lack of information disadvantages shareholders, encouraging them 
to seek verification of the assets’ values (Wilson, 1983). The moral hazard means 
that managers’ activities affect the assets, while shareholders cannot directly monitor 
them. For example, shareholders are not aware in what conditions managers have 
maintained their assets, or whether they have misappropriated them. The 
shareholders need to have some knowledge regarding the assets. The auditors can 
improve shareholders’ knowledge, giving them a better opportunity to make their 
decisions (Wilson, 1983). The auditors perform their duties at various stages using 
different methods, aiming to discover any potential misuse of assets. They change 
their audit technology based on the existing standards and regulatory processes 
(Manson, McCartney, Sherer, & Wallace, 1998). However, the introduction of 
auditors creates a new agency problem, forcing the principals to look for new 
solutions to mitigate it (Gjesdal, 1981). 
The relationship between shareholders and auditors is different from a typical 
principal-agent relationship in some aspects (Brown, 2007). First, efforts are not 
completely known, and results are partly observable. Second, unlike the implications 
of a typical principal-agent relationship, shareholders cannot directly enter into a 
contract with their auditors. Theoretically, a board of directors represents the 
interests of shareholders, but recall, introduction of board of directors creates the 
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original agency problem in practice. Management play a significant role in decisions 
regarding auditors, reducing shareholders’ influence on them (Brown, 2007). 
The agency theory indicates that auditors are responsible regarding their auditees. A 
company hires them to audit their accounts. This raises questions about trust and 
confidentiality and results in a new agency problem: Who is auditing the auditors 
(ICAEW, 2005)? The auditors may act in good faith, and they may not need to be 
monitored. However, agency theory suggests that auditors as agents of a company 
have their own interests, and they may want to pursue their own benefits. For 
example, they may be risk-averse and propose some risk management processes that 
limit their work, or they may introduce caveats that are annoying for principals 
(ICAEW, 2005). 
 
There are a number of avenues for mitigating the agency problem: An ideal legal 
system, a robust liability regime, and existence of liability insurance for agents 
(auditors) (Feess & Nell, 2002). An ideal legal system protects shareholders against 
wrongdoing and negligence of auditors. A robust liability regime makes faulty 
auditors responsible for harm to shareholders. A liability insurance coverage 
increases auditors’ confidence, improving their behaviour. However, implementation 
of these mentioned opportunities is impractical for a number of reasons. First, legal 
systems are imperfect, disadvantaging innocent parties. Second, many legal regimes 
demand that plaintiffs present a large body of evidence to prove their claims. The 
plaintiffs should prove auditors’ negligence, recklessness, or actual knowing 
participation. Third, provision of insurance for auditors is not always possible 
(Brown, 2007). 
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While keeping relationships, professionals should prevent auditors and 
management’s informal engagement (Ring & Van de Ven, 1989). Trust is an 
important feature of audit, arising from both the personal and professional 
relationship between auditors and management. The personal relationships increase 
personal trust between auditors and management (Larzelere & Huston, 1980). The 
professional relationships create trust between the related parties, in which their 
actions benefit each other, yet they are based on standards (Gambetta, 2000).  
 
An audit is a social mechanism of trust, aiming to provide a reliable picture of a 
company to produce trust among stakeholders (Armstrong, 1991). Further, it is a 
mechanism of social control. It is a judgemental tool, aiming to govern the 
relationship between auditors and management (Richard, 2006). The audit has both 
economic and social characteristics. It reduces agency cost from an economic 
perspective, through reducing the shareholders’ monitoring costs and managers’ 
bonding costs (Richard, 2006). The audit has various social characteristics. First, 
auditors and management share their professional and cultural standards, affecting 
their tasks and relationships (Dore, 1983). Second, frequency of their contacts 
expresses strength of their relationship. A frequent relationship between them 
enables them to strengthen their relationship (Granovetter, 1973). Third, a variety of 
links between auditors and management demonstrates the complexity of their 
relationship (Richard, 2006). 
 
AI and audit expectation gap 
The auditors are responsible to determine whether the financial statements present a 
true and fair view of the financial affairs of a company. The users and auditors have 
different views about audit profession, and there are different opinions about 
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auditors’ responsibility regarding accounting fraud (Mahadevaswamy & Salehi, 
2008). The existence of a gap between the users and auditors’ views about the roles 
and responsibilities of auditors has resulted in audit expectation gap. This is because 
of the existence of a time lag for auditors to identify and respond to the evolving 
public expectations (Tricker, 1980). Further, the inconsistencies in self-regulated 
audit systems can be a cause of this gap (Hopwood, 1990). The audit expectation gap 
is described by Liggio (1974) as dissimilarity between the levels of anticipated 
performance as proposed by independent accountants and by the users of financial 
statements. 
 
The  gap arises because of the difference between society’s expectation from auditors 
and what it receives from them, the difference is known as “the audit expectation 
performance gap” (Salehi et al., 2009). There are two major components associated 
with the gap: First, reasonableness gap, indicating a difference between society’s 
expectation from auditors and what they can reasonably be expected to accomplish. 
This is the gap between society’s expectation and auditors’ existing duties as defined 
by the laws and professional standards. Second, performance gap, that indicates a 
difference between society’s expectation and what auditors are perceived to achieve. 
The gap is between society’s expectation regarding the expected standard of 
performance of auditors and their perceived performance (Salehi et al., 2009). 
The different types of governmental and professional investigations have been 
established to clarify the auditors’ duties. Various attempts such as changing the 
standards and revising the audit reports have been made to reduce expectation gap 
and eliminate its negative consequences (Guy & Sullivan, 1988). AI is a key element 
and enables auditors to produce a fair report. The shareholders have more confidence 
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on the reports provided by independent auditors. AI helps to reduce the expectation 
gap, as there is a higher expectation from auditors (Salehi et al., 2009). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter explained the agency theory and described its relationship with audit 
profession and AI. It explained the relationships between AI and audit expectation 
gap.   
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Chapter 5: Research design 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the chosen design to conduct this study, aiming to answer the 
research question of in order to increase AI in a non-IFRS country with an Islamic 
legal system, what are the potential indicators of threats to AI, and how should a 
regulator prioritise addressing these threats? It indicates how the study is going to 
test its propositions of:  
1. Based on six potential indicators of AI threats in Iran identified from the 
literature, it is expected that the participants will agree with the nominated 
indicators as threats to AI in Iran.  
A) However, each participant’s perception of importance among the six will 
vary.  
B) However, the researcher also expects that each participant will nominate 
other indicators of AI threat not previously identified. 
2. In particular, the researcher expects that high level bribery will most often 
rank as most important to the participants. 
3. Based on professional standards that specifically refer to all indicators of 
threat to AI in Iran (except for non-existence of audit committee which was 
regulated by the Tehran Stock Exchange) the researcher expects that the 
participants with professional qualifications’ perceptions will be different 
from those participants without any professional qualification. 
The chapter details the two stages involved in the study. It indicates how the 
questionnaire and financial media produced the required data. It provides a brief 
overview regarding analysis of the data. This research has both quantitative and 
qualitative aspects. It was conducted in two stages. First, a mixed questionnaire was 
used, as the questionnaire used both closed-ended questions and an open-ended 
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question to collect the data. Hence, the collected data required both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis. Second, evidence was collected from financial media, searching 
for the case examples of financial corruption, financial scandal, audit failure, and 
accounting scandal in Iran. These data were analysed qualitatively.  
 
Stage 1: Questionnaire 
The general description and justification for questionnaire data collection 
A survey method is widely used in social science. It allows evaluation of a broad 
area with minimal effort. It enables researchers to survey respondents from a wide 
geographical distance, increasing reliability of their outcomes. It is a flexible method. 
The survey provides a cost-effective way to interact with the participants, 
empowering the researchers to gain from their knowledge (Singh, 2008). It helps to 
describe existing situations, through provision of some numerical values. It enables 
the researchers to exercise control over their topic of study. The survey informs the 
researchers regarding what currently exists, through examination of significant 
characteristics of the existing situation. The researchers may obtain what they are 
looking for, through analysis of the experts’ opinions. The survey makes it possible 
to achieve the study’s goals, through evaluation of the potential ways of achieving 
them (Singh, 2008). The technical enhancements of survey method techniques 
reduce prejudice in a population sample and provide comparable information 
regarding a chosen sample. They help to describe the characteristics of large 
populations. They enable provision of the descriptive assertions regarding population 
(Cargan, 2007).  
A questionnaire can obtain the required information from many respondents, 
facilitating qualitative analysis. The questionnaire provides a manageable set of data. 
The researchers may use various computer programmes to determine a quantitative 
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relationship between the variables and frequency of each occurrence, as a 
questionnaire provides uniform answers. The Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) and Minitab help the researchers to analyse their information from 
different angles (Davidson & Layder, 1994). The researchers may re-analyse the 
obtained information through different variables. Secondary analysis can be less 
expensive and faster, increasing its efficiency (Cargan, 2007). As the three 
propositions require data to be collected from participants situated remotely from the 
researcher, that is, in the Iranian audit market regarding their perceptions of AI, a 
direct questionnaire was constructed and administered.   
 
The general description of Iranian literature that uses questionnaire method 
Prior audit-related research in context of Iran has used questionnaire to collect data 
from the participants situated in Iranian market. However, it must be noted that the 
prior literature as described below does not universally provide a copy of the actual 
questionnaire instrument as part of the published papers. These studies were directly 
or indirectly influential in designing the questionnaire for this study.  
A questionnaire was administered by Yaftian, Wise, Cooper, and Mirshekary (2013) 
to investigate corporate social responsibility information needs, perceptions and 
preferences of Iranian users. The questionnaire comprised questions answerable in a 
range of styles including yes/no format, multiple-choice, Likert ranked scales and 
some open-ended, descriptive responses (Yaftian et al., 2013). Another questionnaire 
was administered by Mirshekary and Saudagaran (2005) to examine the perceptions 
and characteristics of users of corporate financial statements in Iran. The 
questionnaire comprised two parts. The first part contained eight questions, 
requesting responses on the level of annual report usage, degree of influence of 
different sources of information in users’ decision making, degree of influence of 
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different parts of corporate annual reports and users’ opinions about the problems 
that restrict their use of annual reports. The second part requested the respondents to 
rate importance of the financial reporting items on a 5-point Likert scale. 
A questionnaire was administered by Chatterjee et al. (2010) to a sample of Iranian 
financial analysts to gain insights into their information requirements from the 
narrative section of the Iranian companies’ annual reports. The authors used a 
checklist approach of availability/non-availability of the three top-ranked items: 
present, analytical and prospective information. A questionnaire was designed and 
developed by Salehi et al. (2009) to determine whether there is an expectation gap 
between auditors and investors regarding status of AI in Iran. The questionnaire 
contained two parts namely (A) bio-data and some questions about the importance of 
audit, importance of financial reports, importance of company profile and importance 
of directors’ profile, totalling 10 tables. Part (B) included nine questions regarding 
level of AI in Iran. This section of the questionnaire comprised two parts: The first 
part contained nine questions, which showed actual level of AI in Iran, and the 
second part contained the same questions which asserted investors’ expectations 
regarding AI in Iran. The instrument measured the statements using a Five-Point 
Likert type scale anchored “strongly disagree” (1) and “strongly agree” (5). 
A questionnaire was used by Abdoli et al. (2014) to investigate the effects of audit 
partner’s firm size and type of auditor’s opinion on audit partner’s rotation. The 
discrete variables of 0 and 1 were used to calculate the audit partner’s firm size. In 
other words, big audit partner’s firm size was considered 1 and 0 for small firm audit 
partners. The audit reports were studied in the preceding and following years of 
auditor rotation to evaluate the type of auditor’s opinion. The discrete variables of 0 
and 1 were employed to calculate the type of auditor’s opinion. A questionnaire was 
 88 
 
used by Salehi (2011) to identify the reason(s) for and barrier(s) to using audit 
committees in Iran. First, the important factors that may affect audit committees were 
detected by studying the technical contexts. Then, validity of the detected title was 
assessed by a Delphi group16. In the second step, Salehi (2011) procured the 
questionnaire by Delphi group’s viewpoint to indicate that the factors used in the 
research hypotheses were completely compatible to Iran’s environment. Then, the 
researcher documented the questionnaire and distributed it among the population 
sample.  
Based on the above literature the questionnaire has been successfully used in prior 
Iranian audit-related studies, which encouraged this study. These questionnaires used 
predominantly quantitative questions and open-ended questions were rarely used. 
Further, the demographic questions were not asked or it may be that such data were 
not reported in all studies. In this study, consistent with the other Iranian studies, a 
five-level Likert scale was used in the questionnaire to test the propositions 1A and 
2. Further, an open-ended question was used to provide the participants with an 
opportunity to nominate other indicators of AI threat to test the proposition 1B. 
Further, the demographic questions were used to obtain some background 
information from the participants to test the third proposition. 
 
The general description of non‐Iranian literature that uses questionnaire 
Given that none of the Iranian studies disclosed the actual instrument used, similar 
studies on AI in other markets, using questionnaires were also referred to. Nur 
Barizah Abu et al. (2005) and Best, Buckby, and Tan (2001) are two in particular.  
                                                 
16 The Delphi group consisted of the Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants (IACPA) 
members, financial managers, general managers, and financial experts. 
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A questionnaire was used by Nur Barizah Abu et al. (2005) to obtain further 
understanding of the factors influencing AI in Malaysia. The first question in part A 
asked the respondents to give a score on how important they think an audit report is 
in making their lending decisions. The level of importance was anchored at the end 
points with "1" indicating unimportant and "9" very important. The respondents 
could choose any point on the scale. The range of 1-9 was simply chosen for 
comparable purposes with the prior studies. The second question in part A asked the 
respondents whether each of the listed six factors has any influence on AI. The 
respondents just had to circle either "yes" or "no". Part B of the questionnaire asked 
the subjects to indicate whether they strongly agree ("1"), agree ("2"), slightly agree 
("3"), neutral ("4"), slightly disagree ("5"), disagree ("6") or strongly disagree ("7") 
with the given statements.  
A questionnaire was used by Best et al. (2001) to measure level and nature of audit 
expectation gap in Singapore in the mid-1990s and to compare the findings of this 
study with those of Ali (1991) following the introduction of long-form audit report in 
Australia. The questionnaire in that study used semantic differential belief statements 
to measure the messages communicated by short-form audit report in Singapore. It 
was sent to a range of users of audit reports in Singapore. A total of 300 subjects 
were randomly selected consisting of 100 subjects from each of three groups of 
auditors, bankers and investors. The questionnaire comprised two sections. The first 
section collected demographic data. The second section contained sixteen semantic 
differential belief statements. Three factors were measured by these belief 
statements: (1) responsibility, (2) reliability and (3) decision usefulness. The 
statements were designed as bipolar adjectival statements, which were separated by 
seven-point Likert scales, aiming that the respondents would choose a number from 
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the scale that identifies their level of agreement with one or the other of the 
statements. 
 
Data analysis 
The analysis of the data obtained from the questionnaires 
Data collected from both sections of the questionnaire of this study were analysed as 
follow: First, the closed-ended questions yielded quantitative results in five forms of 
Likert scale measures. The figures were compared against each other in order to 
determine the priorities for the regulator. This study used SPSS software to conduct 
the analyses. It conducted a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) and four 
separate single-factor MANOVAs to determine the effects of participants’ 
demographic characteristics as a whole and individually on their perceptions 
regarding the indicators of AI threat. This study compared mean differences between 
different indicators to determine the participants’ perceptions regarding them, 
following Best et al. (2001). Further, it conducted a Friedman test to prioritise the 
indicators of AI threat, following Salehi (2011).  
This study used open and axial coding to analyse the responses obtained from the 
open-ended question. First, it conducted a detailed analysis of the participants’ 
responses, aiming to discover their views regarding their own nominated indicators 
of AI threat in Iran. Second, it identified and explained the relationships between 
different categories. This study related each category to its subcategories. Further, it 
investigated the missing relationships, through searching for possible relationships 
among the categories (Wicks, 2010). The open-ended question provided the most 
cited threats that were nominated by the participants. The results from the analysis of 
these data are reported in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Stage 2: Financial media data collection 
Triangulation 
Triangulation is a process of verifying the data against each other (Hjelle & Dæhlen, 
2006). There are four types of triangulation, namely: Data triangulation, investigator 
triangulation, theory triangulation, and methodological triangulation. The 
methodological triangulation, the most common form of triangulation, uses various 
methods to examine a single problem. It enables comparison of the information 
collected through the qualitative methods with quantitative data. Some researchers 
consider it a necessary tool to produce corroborative evidence, whereas others 
emphasise its role to produce multiple lines of sight and contexts to enhance 
understanding of a research question. It is suitable for studies that require both 
quantitative and qualitative aspects (Salkind, 2010). The researchers use two or more 
independent measures to increase reliability of their findings during triangulation 
(Heale & Forbes, 2013). It often considers the information obtained from the 
questionnaires, interviews, written documents, or other relevant resources (Salkind, 
2010). 
The triangulation enables the researchers to capitalise strengths of each approach. It 
reduces existing bias in a single method. It helps to compensate weaknesses of a 
single approach. It enables the researchers to cross-check the outcomes, ensuring 
accuracy of the research findings (Salkind, 2010). It increases researchers’ 
confidence regarding their methods to collect and analyse the information and report 
their results. It ensures that trait rather than method produces variance. It enhances 
researchers’ confidence regarding the outcomes, ensuring that they are not a 
methodological artefact (Bouchard, 1976). The triangulation produces a more 
comprehensive picture regarding the subject of study. It can help to capture any 
likely variance which a single method may fail to detect. It effectively obtains the 
 92 
 
required information from the data and provides suggestions and conclusions (Jick, 
1979). 
The triangulation enhances strength of metric, since different measures support each 
other in case of their default. It widens outlook of the outcomes, helping to produce a 
more precise explanation of metric. It helps to obtain the viewpoints of different 
participants (Klubeck, 2011). It may lead to the invention of new data collection 
methods along with the conventional ones, helping to discover the abnormal 
elements of a phenomenon. The triangulation may produce conflicting results, 
providing enhanced justifications for a research problem. It results in integration of 
theories, wherein several theories attempt to answer the research problem. It works 
as an analytical test for the opposing theories (Jick, 1979). 
 
The analysis of the data obtained from the media articles 
Data collected from the financial media of this study were analysed as follows. The 
thematic (financial corruption, financial scandal, audit failure, and accounting 
scandal) analysis of the media articles was triangulated against the results in the first 
stage. To collect the relevant media article commentaries, this study used a wide 
filter by manually searching the Queensland University of Technology newspaper 
library database for news on Iran, using the following search keywords: “financial 
corruption, Iran”; “financial scandal, Iran”; “audit failure, Iran”; and “accounting 
scandal, Iran”. As a second part to the media search, a general search of Google, and 
Persian news sites (such as Tabnak) was undertaken to obtain additional media 
articles for this study. As to the media sources, the most reputable were selected with 
an emphasis given to BBC, Tribune Content Agency LLC, and Financial Times 
Limited. The results of the analysis of these data are discussed in Chapter 8. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter described the chosen design to conduct this study, aiming to answer the 
research question of in order to increase AI in a non-IFRS country with an Islamic 
legal system, what are the potential indicators of threats to AI, and how should a 
regulator prioritise addressing these threats? It indicated how the study is going to 
investigate its three propositions. It discussed the role of questionnaire and financial 
media to conduct this research. It provided some general descriptions and 
justifications for using the questionnaire. It described the use of questionnaire in the 
Iranian and non-Iranian literatures. It described triangulation and justified its use in 
research. It produced an outline regarding analysis of the obtained data. The next 
chapters provide an in-depth analysis of different data and indicate their outcomes.
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Chapter 6: Survey method (closed‐ended questions) & Findings 
Introduction  
This chapter outlines the research methods and findings from the closed-ended 
questions of the questionnaire. It describes the participants’ perceptions regarding the 
indicators of AI threat in Iran that were identified by prior literature. It indicates how 
the participants prioritise the indicators. Further, it explains whether or not the 
participants’ demographic characteristics have influenced their perceptions regarding 
the indicators. This chapter helps to answer the research question of in order to 
increase AI in a non-IFRS country with an Islamic legal system, what are the 
potential indicators of threats to AI, and how should a regulator prioritise addressing 
these threats? This chapter analyses the data collected from the questionnaire, 
designed to test the propositions: 
The analysis of previous relevant research has identified six potential indicators of 
AI threat in a non-IFRS country with an Islamic legal system. This study investigates 
the following three propositions: 
1. Based on six potential indicators of AI threat in Iran identified from the 
literature, it is expected that the participants will agree to the nominated 
indicators as threats to AI in Iran.  
A) However, each participant’s perception of importance among the six will 
vary.  
B) However, the researcher also expects that each participant will nominate 
other indicators of AI threat not previously identified. 
2. In particular, the researcher expects that high level bribery will most often 
rank as most important to the participants. 
3. Based on professional standards that specifically refer to all indicators of 
threat to AI in Iran (except for non-existence of audit committee which was 
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regulated by the Tehran Stock Exchange) the researcher expects that the 
participants with professional qualifications’ perceptions will be different 
from those participants without any professional qualification. 
 
Research method 
Questionnaire design 
Chapter 5 provided a general overview to the research design used in this study. The 
following discussions will more specifically justify the questionnaire instrument used 
in this study. As the participants needed to answer some questions regarding their 
day-to-day life experience, they may have felt more comfortable with a self-
administered questionnaire than other methods that require direct contact with a 
researcher. The self-administered questionnaire ensured their privacy and provided 
them sufficient time to analyse the questions and provide their desired responses 
(Gregg, 2008). It prevented researcher’s influence over the participants, reducing 
bias in the study (Babbie, 2007). Further, the data have been collected in an efficient 
and inexpensive way (Lucas, 1974). 
The participants were expected to be proficient in English, because of their higher 
education studies. Therefore, the questionnaire was written in English, though Iran is 
not an English-speaking country1718. It was designed in three sections. Section I: 
Demographic information, which aimed to collect data to test the third proposition. 
Section II: Experience and perception on threats to AI, which aimed to test the 
propositions 1A and 2. Section III: Additional comments on threats to AI in Iran, 
which aimed to test the proposition 1B.  
                                                 
17 Learning a foreign language (which is mainly English) is compulsory from 7th grade onwards and 
there is allocated weekly hours to learn the foreign language in the Iranian education system. The 
students are taught the foreign language from their 7th grade throughout their higher education studies 
("Iran: Lower-Secondary (Gudiance Cycle) Education," 2004). 
18 Although, it should be noted that some prior Iranian studies such as Chatterjee et al. (2010) have 
translated their questionnaires into Persian prior to distribution. 
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The first section asked the participants to discuss their demographic information. 
They were requested to indicate their highest qualification level, their possible 
professional accounting qualification, their experience in the field of accounting, 
their actual occupation, and the duration of their involvement in their current 
occupation. The second section used six indicators of AI threat that were identified 
from previous literature and asked the participants to rank their perceptions of 
importance based on their experience and opinions about them. The measure 
instrument of the statements was a Five-Point Likert type scale anchored “strongly 
agree” (1) and “strongly disagree” (5), which was the method used in studies by 
Salehi and Azary (2008) and Salehi et al. (2009) in Iran. The last section, in an open-
ended question, asked the participants to nominate other indicators of AI threat in 
Iran based on their own opinion (please refer to Appendix 1). 
There are acknowledged difficulties in administering a questionnaire in a jurisdiction 
outside of the researcher’s location. The researcher did not collect the data by 
himself. He appointed an agent in Tehran to physically distribute the questionnaires. 
This added a further limitation to the results. It is not clear whether or not the audit 
firms who agree to participate had input into the participants selected in their firms. 
This could also bias the results. 
 
Population and sample 
The professionals working in audit firms in Tehran were chosen as relevant 
participants for the study. The accounting and audit professionals working in Tehran 
are suitable participants because of their familiarity with the processes of financial 
reporting and audit and context of Iran. The researcher used Yellow Pages to identify 
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audit firms, following Best et al. (2001) in Singapore1920. There was no coercion to 
participate in the project. The participants could answer as much or as little as they 
prefer. They showed their consent through submission of the questionnaire. 
The researcher obtained ethical approval from QUT to administer the questionnaire. 
The agent made a phone call to the identified audit firms with a brief overview of the 
research and asked them whether they were willing to participate21. He distributed 
the questionnaires among participants if audit firms indicated their willingness to 
participate2223. He mailed the obtained responses to the researcher after collection of 
data24. 
Since the agent approached only those participants who were already willing to 
participate, in that sense a response rate itself is difficult to assess.25 The responses of 
                                                 
19 The following link provides details of the audit firms that are operating in Tehran: 
http://www.tehran118.com/Browse.aspx?type=simple&p=1&city=%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%B1%D
8%A7%D9%86&k=%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C&o=-
1&st=and. 
20 The population size of this study consists of 183 audit firms that are operating in Tehran. 
21 The agent made the phone call according to following script:  
“Hello, 
I am calling you regarding a research project on auditor independence in Iran. I am assisting a 
research student, who is doing his masters in Queensland University of Technology in Australia to 
collect the required data on accountants’ perception of auditor independence in Iran. The project 
requires completing an anonymous questionnaire. I am wondering whether I can ask you to fill in the 
questionnaire.  
This study may assist the Iranian regulator in developing a more effective framework for regulating 
auditor practice in the country. Please note that the study has been approved by the Queensland 
University of Technology Human Research Ethics Committee. Your participation in this research 
project is entirely voluntary. All comments and responses will be treated confidentially, unless 
required by law. They may be used by the mentioned research student for future research. 
Are you willing to participate?  
Have a good day!” 
 
22 If the audit firms indicated their willingness to participate the agent asked them for a suitable time 
to distribute the questionnaires. However, if they needed to have time to respond to this query he 
asked for an appropriate time to call them back. Apparently, if they were unwilling to participate he 
apologised them for disturbance. 
 
23 The agent gave envelopes to the participants and asked them to place their responses in the provided 
envelopes and seal them in order to maintain their privacy. 
 
24 The agent kept the sealed envelopes with himself and sent them through a registered post to the 
researcher to maximise the security. 
 
25 In one sense a response rate of 100% was achieved, that is participants who said they were willing 
to participate submitted a questionnaire.  
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40 participants were obtained26. They had various qualification levels. Five of them 
had high-school diploma, 15 had bachelor’s degree, 13 had master’s degree, and 7 
had PhDs. Twenty-nine participants did not have any professional accounting 
qualification. However, 11 had a professional accounting qualification. Among the 
participants with a professional qualification 2 were members of the Iranian 
Accounting Association, 6 were members of the Iranian Association of Certified 
Public Accountants, and 3 were members of the Iranian Institute of Certified 
Accountants.  
One participant did not have any accounting experience, whereas the remaining had 
some experience. Two participants did not indicate their level of experience. Nine 
participants had between 1 to 3 years of experience, 3 had between 4 to 6 years of 
experience, 14 had between 7 to 9 years of experience, and 11 had over 10 years of 
experience. Eight participants were accountants, 14 were auditors, 2 were 
consultants, and 16 had other type of occupations. Eighteen participants were in their 
current occupations between 1 to 3 years, 12 were between 4 to 6 years, 9 were 
between 7 to 9 years, and 1 participant was in his current occupation for 12 years. 
Table 5 provides the participants’ demographic information, and thus data is used to 
test proposition 3. 
  
                                                                                                                                          
 
26 Salehi et al. (2009) obtained the responses of 441 respondents, Ramazani and Atani (2010) obtained 
178 responses, and Salehi (2011) obtained 150 responses in other similar Iranian studies. 
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Table 5 The description of the demographic characteristics of participants of the study  
Case Label 
Frequency 
(%) 
 
1. Highest qualification 
level 
High-school diploma 5 
(12.5%) 
Bachelor 15 
(37.5%) 
Master 13 
(32.5%) 
PhD 7 
(17.5%) 
Total 40 
 
2. Professional accounting 
qualification 
None 29 
(72.5%) 
Iranian Accounting Association 2 
(5%) 
Iranian Association of Certified Public 
Accountants 
6 
(15%) 
Iranian Institute of Certified Accountants 3 
(7.5%) 
Total 40 
 
3. Accounting experience 
None 1 
(2.63%) 
1 - 3 years 9 
(23.68%) 
4 - 6 years 3 
(7.89%) 
7 - 9 years 14 
(36.85%) 
Over 10 years 11 
(28.95%) 
Total 38 
 
4. Current occupation 
Accountant 8 
(20%) 
Auditor 1427 
(35%) 
Consultant 2 
(5%) 
Other 16 
(40%) 
Total 40 
 
5. Years of experience 
1 - 3 years 18 
(45%) 
4 - 6 years 12 
(30%) 
7 - 9 years 9 
(22.5%) 
Over 10 years 1 
(2.5%) 
Total 40 
                                                 
27 The majority of participants were auditors. However, as there are other professionals working in 
audit firms the responses of other professionals were obtained too, in order to obtain a wider view 
regarding the indicators of threats to AI in Iran. It should be noted that an audit firm may hire various 
kinds of professionals in order to improve the quality of its offered services. 
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The Tables 6 – 9 shows the mean comparisons of the demographic characteristics of 
participants of the study.  
 
Table 6 Mean comparison of the participants’ qualification level 
 High-school diploma Bachelor Master PhD 
Mean .13 .38 .33 .18 
 
Table 7 Mean comparison of the participants’ professional accounting qualification 
 None Iranian Accounting 
Association 
Iranian Association of Certified 
Public Accountants 
Iranian Institute of 
Certified Accountants 
Mean .73 .05 .15 .08 
 
Table 8 Mean comparison of the participants’ accounting experience 
 None 1 - 3 years 4 - 6 years 7 - 9 years Over 10 years 
Mean .03 .24 .08 .37 .29 
 
Table 9 Mean comparison of the participants’ current occupation 
 Accountant Auditor Consultant Other 
Mean .20 .35 .05 .40 
 
The majority of participants had a bachelor’s degree (37.5%), being followed by 
master’s degree (32.5%), being followed by PhD (17.5%), and lastly high-school 
diploma (12.5%). Most of participants did not have a professional accounting 
qualification. Fifteen percent of them were member of the Iranian Association of 
Certified Public Accountants, 7.5% were member of the Iranian Institute of Certified 
Accountants, and 5% were member of the Iranian Accounting Association. Thirty 
seven percent of participants had between 7 - 9 years of accounting experience, 29% 
had over 10 years of accounting experience, 24% of them had between 1 - 3 years of 
experience, and 8% had between 4 - 6 years of experience. Thirty five percent were 
auditor, 20% were accountant, 5% were consultant, and other 40% had other types of 
occupation. 
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Findings 
The participants’ responses to the Likert scale questions – Propositions 1A and 2 
Based on the 6 indicators of threat to AI identified from the prior literature (as 
discussed in Chapter 3); the questionnaire comprised 6 Likert scale questions: 
1. Gifts and presents: The gifts and presents are / are not indicators of threat to 
AI in Iran. 
2. Bribery: The bribery is / is not an indicator of threat to AI in Iran. 
3. Long-term relationship: The long-term relationship is / is not an indicator of 
threat to AI in Iran. 
4. Prospect of reappointment: The prospect of reappointment is / is not an 
indicator of threat to AI in Iran. 
5. Non-existence of audit committee: The non-existence of audit committee is / 
is not an indicator of threat to AI in Iran. 
6. Auditor lack of skill: The auditor lack of skill is / is not an indicator of threat 
to AI in Iran. 
Seven participants considered gifts and presents as strong indicators of AI threat in 
Iran, another 7 considered them as indicators of AI threat, 3 remained neutral, 14 
disagreed, and 9 strongly disagreed regarding gifts and presents. Sixteen participants 
considered bribery as a strong indicator of AI threat in Iran, 19 considered it as an 
indicator of threat, 2 remained neutral, another 2 disagreed, and 1 strongly disagreed 
regarding bribery. Four participants considered a long-term relationship as a strong 
indicator of AI threat in Iran, 19 considered it as an indicator of threat, 9 remained 
neutral, and 8 disagreed about long-term relationship.  
Six participants considered the prospects of reappointment as strong indicators of AI 
threat in Iran, 20 considered them as indicators of threat, 7 remained neutral, 5 
disagreed, and 2 strongly disagreed regarding the prospects of reappointment. Three 
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participants considered non-existence of audit committee as a strong indicator of AI 
threat in Iran, 18 considered it as an indicator of threat, 15 remained neutral, 3 
disagreed, and 1 strongly disagreed. Seven participants considered auditors’ lack of 
skill as a strong indicator of AI threat in Iran, 12 considered it as an indicator of 
threat, 7 remained neutral, 11 disagreed, and 3 strongly disagreed. Table 10 describes 
participants’ responses to the Likert scale questions. 
 
Table 10 The outcomes of Likert scale regarding participants’ perceptions about the nominated indicators of AI 
threat in Iran  
 
Strongly 
agree 
 
Agree 
 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
 
Disagree
 
Strongly 
disagree Total 
Gifts and 
presents 
7 
(17.5%) 
7 
(17.5%)
3 
(7.5%) 
14 
(35%) 
9 
(22.5%) 
40 
(100%)
Bribery 16 
(40%) 
19 
(47.5%)
2 
(5%) 
2 
(5%) 
1 
(2.5%) 
40 
(100%)
Long-term 
relationship 
4 
(10%) 
19 
(47.5%)
9 
(22.5%) 
8 
(20%) 
0 
(0%) 
40 
(100%)
The prospects of 
reappointment 
6 
(15%) 
20 
(50%) 
7 
(17.5%) 
5 
(12.5%) 
2 
(5%) 
40 
(100%)
Non-existence of 
audit committee 
3 
(7.5%) 
18 
(45%) 
15 
(37.5%) 
3 
(7.5%) 
1 
(2.5%) 
40 
(100%)
Auditors’ lack of 
skill 
7 
(17.5%) 
12 
(30%) 
7 
(17.5%) 
11 
(27.5%) 
3 
(7.5%) 
40 
(100%)
 
The analysis of the participants’ responses to the Likert scale questions – Propositions 
1A and 2 
The researcher used SPSS software to conduct the analyses. The participants’ 
perceptions regarding the indicators of AI threat in Iran were compared. The 
researcher assigned a value of 1 when the participants strongly agreed, a value of 2 
when they agreed, 3 when they neither agreed nor disagreed, 4 when they disagreed, 
and 5 when they strongly disagreed regarding the indicators. Table 11 shows the 
outcomes of SPSS software.  
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Table 11 A descriptive statistical comparisons between participants’ perceptions regarding the indicators of AI 
threat in Iran 
 
The indicators of AI threat in Iran 
The 
perceptions 
regarding 
gifts 
The 
perceptions 
regarding 
bribery 
The 
perceptions 
regarding 
long-term 
relationship
The 
perceptions 
regarding the 
prospects of 
reappointment
The 
perceptions 
regarding 
non-
existence of 
audit 
committee 
The 
perceptions 
regarding 
auditors' 
lack of skill
N       
Valid 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 3.28 1.83 2.53 2.43 2.53 2.78 
Median 4.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 
Mode 4.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Std. 
Deviation 1.45 .93 .93 1.06 .85 1.25 
 
The researcher compared mean differences between different indicators to determine 
the participants’ perceptions regarding them, following Best et al. (2001). The 
bribery obtained the lowest mean by 1.83, following by the prospects of 
reappointment by 2.43. The long-term relationship and non-existence of audit 
committee equally obtained a mean of 2.53, followed by auditors’ lack of skill by 
2.78. The gifts and presents obtained a mean greater than 3 by 3.28. Therefore, the 
participants considered bribery as the strongest indicator of AI threat in Iran. The 
prospects of reappointment were the second strongest indicators of AI threat. The 
long-term relationship and non-existence of audit committee equally ranked as the 
next strongest indicators, being followed by auditors’ lack of skill. The gifts and 
presents were the only indicators that the participants disregarded as threat to AI in 
Iran. 
All indicators except gifts and presents obtained a mode of 2, indicating that 
agreement regarding the mentioned factors as indicators of AI threat in Iran was the 
participants’ most frequent decision. The gifts and presents obtained a mode of 4, 
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indicating participants’ disagreement regarding gifts as indicators of threat to AI as 
their most frequent decision. All indicators had the same medians and modes except 
auditors’ lack of skill by a median of 3, justifying participants’ consideration of 
auditors’ lack of skill as the least significant indicator among the five indicators that 
they considered as a threat. 
The researcher conducted Friedman test to prioritise the five determined indicators of 
AI threat, following Salehi (2011). The following Figure 5 shows the outcomes of 
the test. 
 
Figure 5 Friedman mean rank of 5 determined indicators of AI threat in Iran 
 
The Friedman test considered bribery as the strongest indicator of AI threat in Iran 
by a mean of 2.10, followed by the prospects of reappointment by 2.96, followed by 
long-term relationship by 3.21, followed by non-existence of audit committee by 
3.33, and followed by auditors’ lack of skill by 3.40. The outcomes indicated that the 
participants have a reasonable knowledge and perception about the indicators of AI 
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threat in Iran. However, the results showed that all six indicators were not considered 
as threats to AI in Iran, as the participants overall agreed that gifts and presents are 
not threats to AI in Iran. Further, the outcomes showed that each participant’s 
perception of importance among the six indicators varies, supporting proposition 1A 
of the study. The participants considered bribery as the strongest indicator of AI 
threat in Iran, supporting the second proposition of the study. 
 
Gifts and presents – Proposition 1A 
Gift giving expresses relationships among people in a society. Each society’s 
perception regarding gifts defines the degree to which they represent social identity 
of the public (Betteridge, 1985). The gifts are often stereotyped. They are given 
under social obligations, though they are deemed to be voluntary (Mauss & 
Cunnison, 1970). The Iranians have considered gifts as a sign of respect throughout 
their history. They offer money or gold coins on religious holidays. They give gifts 
on various occasions to celebrate personal achievements such as wedding, successful 
business deal, or graduation (Iran Visitor, 2015). A host may offer his guest anything 
in his house that looks interesting as a gift. 
A gift’s value represents rank of its recipient and importance of event. The giver 
proposes a reasonable amount of gifts to prevent obliging the receiver by offering 
expensive gifts or insulting him by presenting valueless ones (Betteridge, 1985). The 
gifts reduce ambiguity in a formal relationship. They help business partners to get 
along with each other. An Iranian employee may bring some cakes to share with his 
colleagues, without aiming to get something in return (Kwintessential Ltd, 2014). 
The gifts can be offered from people in higher positions to the lower ones or vice 
versa in a business environment. An employer may offer a lump sum to an employee 
to appreciate his work. The failure to offer a gift to a superior at the required time 
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may be considered an immoral act and brings negative consequences (Betteridge, 
1985). 
The Iranian business people do not consider gift giving a threat, as it is a part of their 
culture. The gifts aim to enhance professional relationships in a business 
environment, rather than to influence the related parties. The clients may offer their 
auditors some gifts to appreciate their services, without an intention to influence their 
decision making. The practitioners do not perceive gifts as a tool that is aimed to 
persuade them. Interestingly, from the questionnaire data, 36 participants have never 
had any experience regarding gifts and presents in their professional life, whereas 4 
of them had such an experience. Seven participants considered $0, 6 of them 
considered $50 or less, 6 of them considered $100 or less, 11 of them considered 
$200 or less, and 10 of them considered higher amounts of a gift more than a 
reasonable amount. Among the participants who considered higher amounts of a gift 
more than a reasonable amount 2 of them considered $300 or less, 4 of them 
considered $400 or less, 1 of them considered $450 or less, and 3 of them considered 
$500 or less of a gift more than a reasonable amount. 
 
The ignorance of gifts as indicators of AI threat by the participants of the study may 
express influence of Iranian culture on their perceptions regarding the indicators. It 
may show the effect of cultural differences between Iran and countries that do not 
perceive the gifts in a similar way as Iranians do in the Iranian audit profession. It 
may show importance of culture on the working environment in each society. 
 
The analysis of the participants’ demographic characteristics – Proposition 3 
The researcher conducted a multivariate analysis of variance to determine the effects 
of participants’ demographic characteristics as a whole on their perceptions 
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regarding the indicators of AI threat. For this purpose he considered four different 
aspects of the participants’ demographic information, namely: The educational 
qualification level of participants (EduQualification), the professional accounting 
qualification level of participants (ProQualification), the accounting experience level 
of participants (AccExperience), and the occupational experience level of 
participants (Occupation).  
The questionnaire categorised the qualification levels of participants into diploma, 
bachelor, master, and PhD. They were coded from 1 to 4 in SPSS accordingly. The 
professional accounting qualification levels of participants were coded 0 (without 
any professional qualification) and 1 (with a professional qualification). The 
accounting experience level of participants were categorised between 1-3 years 
(coded as 1), 4-6 years (coded as 2), 7-9 years (coded as 3), and over 10 years (coded 
as 4). Similarly, the occupational experience level of participants were categorised 
between 1-3 years (coded as 1), 4-6 years (coded as 2), 7-9 years (coded as 3), and 
over 10 years (coded as 4). 
All samples included 40 participants, except AccExperience which had 37 
participants (the researcher disregarded the only participant whom did not have any 
accounting experience from this sample). Since all samples were of equal size and 
AccExperience size was close to others the assumption of homogeneity of 
covariances across groups was not violated. Therefore, Wilks’ Lambda test was used 
(Leech, Barrett, & Morgan, 2012). Further, the researcher checked the bivariate 
scatterplots for multivariate normality. He considered the outcomes of Levene’s Test 
of Equality of Error Variances to determine whether or not homogeneity of variances 
for different indicators of AI threat was violated. Table 12 indicates the outcomes of 
Levene’s Test. 
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Table 12 Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances for the indicators of AI threat in Iran 
Indicator F df1 df2 Sig 
The perceptions regarding gifts 1.90 29 8 .17 
The perceptions regarding bribery 3.75 29 8 .03 
The perceptions regarding long-term relationship .88 29 8 .63 
The perceptions regarding the prospects of reappointment 2.10 29 8 .14 
The perceptions regarding non-existence of audit 
committee 1.40 29 8 .32 
The perceptions regarding auditors' lack of skill 2.05 29 8 .15 
 
The perceptions regarding bribery produced a significant outcome (p = .03). 
Therefore, assumption of homogeneity of variances for bribery was violated (Ho, 
2013). Therefore, the researcher transformed this variable to equalise the variances 
(Leech et al., 2012)28. Table 13 shows the effects of participants’ demographic 
characteristics as a whole on their perceptions regarding the indicators of AI threat in 
Iran. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 The transformation is done through standardisation of bribery, using the following formula: Zi = (Xi  − X̅) / Sx 
 
Where: 
Zi  = Standardized value Z 
Xi = Original variable 
X̅ = Mean of the original variable 
Sx  = Standard deviation of the original variable 
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Table 13 The multivariate tests to determine the effects of participants’ demographic characteristics on their 
perceptions regarding the indicators of AI threat in Iran 
Variable                               Test Value F Sig Partial Eta Squared Observed Powerb 
Intercept Wilks' Lambda .00 135.18a .00 1.00 1.00 
EduQualification Wilks' Lambda .09 .66 .79 .55 .17 
ProQualification Wilks' Lambda .58 .37a .86 .42 .08 
AccExperience Wilks' Lambda .03 .89 .61 .60 .24 
Occupation Wilks' Lambda .10 1.10a .48 .69 .22 
Note. a. Exact statistic, b. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
The outcomes of Wilks’ Lambda test indicated that the main effects of none of the 
variables were statistically significant. For the educational qualification level of 
participants Wilks’ Λ = .09, p =.79, and multivariate η2 = .55. For the professional 
accounting qualification level of participants Wilks’ Λ = .58, p =.86, and multivariate 
η2 = .42. For the accounting experience level of participants Wilks’ Λ = .03, p =.61, 
and multivariate η2 = .60. Lastly, for the occupational experience level of participants 
Wilks’ Λ = .10, p =.48, and multivariate η2 = .69. Therefore, the participants’ 
demographic characteristics as a whole did not have a significant effect on their 
perceptions regarding the indicators of AI threat. 
Since the participants’ demographic characteristics as a whole did not have a 
significant effect on the participants’ perceptions regarding the indicators of AI threat 
the researcher decided to move a step forward and determine whether or not each 
individual demographic characteristic has a significant effect on the participants’ 
perceptions regarding the indicators of AI threats. So, he conducted four separate 
single-factor MANOVAs for each of EduQualification, ProQualification, 
AccExperience, and Occupation. The Tables 14 – 17 provide the outcomes of 
different MANOVAs.  
 
 110 
 
Table 14 The multivariate tests to determine the effects of participants’ educational qualification level on their 
perceptions regarding the indicators of AI threat in Iran 
Variable                               Test Value F Sig Partial Eta Squared Observed Powerb 
Intercept Wilks' Lambda .03 140.99a .00 .96 1.00 
EduQualification Wilks' Lambda .63 .88 .61 .14 .54 
Note. a. Exact statistic, b. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
Table 15 The multivariate tests to determine the effects of participants’ professional accounting qualification 
level on their perceptions regarding the indicators of AI threat in Iran 
Variable                               Test Value F Sig Partial Eta Squared Observed Powerb 
Intercept Wilks' Lambda .04 140.57a .00 .96 1.00 
ProQualification Wilks' Lambda .91 .57 .75 .09 .20 
Note. a. Exact statistic, b. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
Table 16 The multivariate tests to determine the effects of participants’ accounting experience level on their 
perceptions regarding the indicators of AI threat in Iran 
Variable                               Test Value F Sig Partial Eta Squared Observed Powerb 
Intercept Wilks' Lambda .04 101.62a .00 .96 1.00 
AccExperience Wilks' Lambda .35 1.44 .11 .23 .85 
Note. a. Exact statistic, b. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
Table 17 The multivariate tests to determine the effects of participants’ occupational experience level on their 
perceptions regarding the indicators of AI threat in Iran 
Variable                               Test Value F Sig Partial Eta Squared Observed Powerb 
Intercept Wilks' Lambda .08 57.41a .00 .92 1.00 
Occupation Wilks' Lambda .61 .94 .53 .15 .58 
Note. a. Exact statistic, b. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
The outcomes of Wilks’ Lambda tests indicated that the main effects of none of the 
variables were statistically significant. For the educational qualification level of 
participants Wilks’ Λ = .63, p =.61, and multivariate η2 = .14. For the professional 
accounting qualification level of participants Wilks’ Λ = .91, p = .75, and 
multivariate η2 = .09. For the accounting experience level of participants Wilks’ Λ = 
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.35, p = .11, and multivariate η2 = .23. Lastly, for the occupational experience level 
of participants Wilks’ Λ = .61, p = .53, and multivariate η2 = .15. Therefore, none of 
the individual participants’ demographic characteristics had a significant effect on 
their perceptions regarding the indicators of AI threats. The outcomes of 
ProQualification did not support the third proposition of the study, indicating that the 
perceptions of participants with a professional qualification are not different from 
those without any professional qualification. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter described participants’ views regarding the indicators of AI threat in 
Iran that were identified by prior literature. It described design of the questionnaire 
and how it was conducted. The participants of the study considered bribery, the 
prospects of reappointment, long-term relationship, non-existence of audit 
committee, and auditors’ lack of skill as the strongest indicators accordingly. Further, 
the outcomes showed that gifts and presents are perceived lesser threats, and the 
researcher justified why this may have occurred. Further, the participants’ 
demographic characteristics as a whole and individually did not have a significant 
effect on their perceptions regarding the indicators. The findings of the study 
supported the propositions 1A and 2. However, the third proposition was not 
supported on the available data. 
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Chapter 7: Survey method (open‐ended question) & Findings 
Introduction  
This chapter outlines research methods and findings from the open-ended question of 
the questionnaire. The open-ended question obtained the participants’ views 
regarding the topic of study, through asking them to nominate other indicators of AI 
threat based on their own experience or opinion. It helps to determine the indicators 
of AI threat in a non-IFRS country with an Islamic legal system. It tests the 
proposition 1B of the study, indicating that the researcher expects that each 
participant will nominate other indicators of AI threat not previously identified. 
 
Research method 
Open‐ended question 
In an open-ended question, the respondents have an opportunity to provide their own 
responses (Babbie, 2007). The open-ended questions provide several advantages to 
researchers (Brace, 2013). First, the respondents have the opportunity to express their 
opinions without any restriction and the open-ended questions prevent the 
researchers from guiding their respondents towards a particular direction. Second, 
the open-ended questions enable researchers to obtain an understanding of their 
respondents’ terminology. Third, the responses to open-ended questions may provide 
a particular tonal quality, so that researchers may quote some verbatim responses to 
show the respondents’ strength of feeling. Fourth, open-ended questions increase 
precision by allowing probing follow-up questions. In short, they can lead to 
provision of more accurate information. The lack of research regarding threats to AI 
in Iran necessitated inclusion of an open-ended question in the questionnaire to 
obtain the participants’ views regarding this matter in two respects: First, the 
participants may add further information to their understanding of threats already 
identified by the researcher in the literature, and second, the open-ended questions 
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asked them to nominate any other indicators that they consider to be a major threat to 
AI in Iran. 
 
Coding 
The researcher used open and axial coding to analyse the responses obtained. First, 
he conducted a detailed analysis of the participants’ responses, aiming to discover 
their views regarding their own nominated indicators of AI threat in Iran. The 
researcher attempted to develop as many as possible concepts, through attaching 
meaningful labels to similar words and phrases in order to interpret them. The 
development of various concepts provides an opportunity to categorise similar 
phenomena, aiming to reduce the data (Benaquisto, 2008). The researcher 
investigated frequency of each category to determine their importance. Second, he 
identified and explained the relationships between different categories. Further, he 
determined how variations may affect the relationships among the categories 
(Powers & Knapp, 2010). The researcher related each category to its subcategories. 
Further, he investigated the missing relationships, through searching for possible 
relationships among the categories (Wicks, 2010). 
 
Findings 
The analysis of the participants’ responses 
Twenty-nine participants responded to the final question in the questionnaire by 
nominating indicators of threat to AI in Iran other than those identified by the 
researcher, wherein six of them nominated multiple indicators. This led to 37 
instances of new information, nominating various new indicators of AI threat. The 
participants’ nomination of other indicators supports the proposition 1B of the study. 
Table 18 shows the participants’ responses to the open-ended question. 
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Table 18 The participants’ responses to the open-ended question 
Participant 
No Quote 
1 Economic instability is a threat. 
2 In my opinion poor economy of Iran is a threat. 
3 Management fraud 
4 The low income of auditors and excessive bureaucracy 
5 Bureaucracy and non-auditing services 
6 Not-audit-related-services may be indicators of threat to auditor 
independence. 
7 In my opinion auditor’s consulting services are indicators of threat to 
auditor independence in Iran. 
8 Auditors’ competition and their advisory services 
9 The high auditor’s fee and small size of audit firms 
10 Pressure from management is a threat to auditor independence in Iran. 
11 Auditors’ advisory and consulting services 
12 The auditor’s low income may be an indicator of threat to auditor 
independence in my opinion. 
13 The management’s wrongdoing 
14 Providing management advisory services by auditors may be a threat 
to auditor independence. 
15 I think competition among the auditors is another indicator. 
16 Poor infrastructure of the Iranian audit firms 
17 Large amount of audit fee 
18 The auditors’ low salary is another factor. 
19 The small size of the Iranian audit firms is another indicator of threat 
to auditor independence. 
20 High amount of auditor’s unemployment can be another threat to 
auditor independence in Iran in my opinion. 
21 Providing consulting and advisory services to managers 
22 The high unemployment rate of auditors 
23 Pressure from management 
24 If the auditors sincerely report they may lose their job. This is a threat 
for their independence. 
25 The fact that auditors have to do lots of work and their salary is not 
enough encourage them for wrongdoing. 
26 In my opinion high competition between the auditors and providing 
consulting services to management are indicators of threat to auditor 
independence in Iran. 
27 In my opinion the dependency of auditors to their major clients can be 
an indicator of threat for their independence in Iran. 
28 Bad financial condition of auditors 
29 when the auditors provide other services to their clients except their 
normal audit services 
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NVivo software was used to analyse the written responses. The researcher identified 
10 categories (lower level coding) and six main themes (higher level coding).  
The 10 identified themes are as listed below:  
1. Competition between audit firms, indicating high competition level among 
Iranian audit firms;  
2. High audit fees, indicating the clients’ provision of high audit fees to 
auditors;  
3. High unemployment rate of auditors, indicating high number of unemployed 
auditors in Iran;  
4. Low income of auditors, indicating low revenue of Iranian auditors; poor 
economy of Iran, indicating existing poor economic condition in Iran;  
5. Management’s fraud, indicating the fraudulent activities that are perpetrated 
by management;  
6. Management’s pressure, indicating pressure from management to guide 
auditors towards a particular direction;  
7. Management advisory services, indicating auditors’ provision of advisory 
services for management of client firms;  
8. Consultancy services, indicating auditors’ provision of different types of 
consultancy services for their client firms;  
9. Bureaucracy, indicating complicated system of Iranian audit firms; and  
10. Small size of audit firms, indicating small size of Iranian audit firms. 
 
 Accordingly, the main themes are as follows: Competition between audit firms, high 
audit fees, Iran’s economic condition, management’s wrongdoings, non-audit-
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services, and poor infrastructure of audit firms. Table 19 indicates the relationships 
among the identified categories and themes. 
 
Table 19 The identified categories and themes based on the participants’ responses to the open-ended question 
Themes Categories Definition Instances
Competition 
between audit firms 
Competition between 
audit firms 
High competition level among 
Iranian audit firms 
 
3 
 
High audit fees High audit fees The clients’ provision of high audit fees to auditors 
 
3 
 
Iran’s economic 
condition 
High unemployment 
rate of auditors 
High number of unemployed 
auditors in Iran 
 
2 
 
Low income of 
auditors, Poor economy 
of Iran 
Low revenue of Iranian auditors, 
Existing poor economic 
condition in Iran 
 
7 
 
Management’s 
wrongdoings 
Management’s fraud The fraudulent activities perpetrated by management 3 
Management’s pressure 
Pressure from management to 
guide auditors towards a 
particular direction 
 
 
3 
 
Non-audit-services 
Management advisory 
services 
Auditors’ provision of advisory 
services for management of 
client firms 
 
5 
 
Consultancy services 
Auditors’ provision of different 
types of consultancy services for 
their client firms 
 
6 
 
 
Poor infrastructure 
of audit firms 
Bureaucracy Complicated system of Iranian audit firms 2 
Small size of audit 
firms Small size of Iranian audit firms 3 
 
An important discovery from this part of the survey reveals that 11 participants 
identified non-audit-services, 9 participants identified Iran’s economic condition, 6 
participants management’s wrongdoings, 5 participants poor infrastructure of audit 
firms, 3 competition between audit firms, and 3 considered high audit fees as 
indicators of threat to AI in Iran. The highest number of responses regarded non-
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audit-services and Iran’s economic condition as other indicators of AI threat in Iran. 
The consideration of non-audit-services as indicators of AI threat is consistent with 
academic literature, though the Iranian studies referred to in the literature review 
disregarded them. The consideration of Iran’s economic condition as an indicator 
creates a groundwork to analyse media articles to provide more information 
regarding Iran’s economic conditions for those practitioners seeking to operate or 
practice in Iran. The next two sections explain the effects of NAS on AI and provide 
an overview regarding the economic condition in Iran. 
 
Non‐audit services (NAS) 
As identified in Chapter 3, NAS are considered a specific indicator of threat to AI in 
international literature. However, as was demonstrated in that chapter, NAS are not 
considered in the Iranian literature. The auditors request higher audit fees when they 
perform NAS for their clients for a number of reasons (Palmrose, 1986). First, larger 
companies may need a higher amount of audit and NAS (Simunic, 1984). Second, 
some organisational change requires additional audit efforts, encouraging firms to 
request NAS from their auditors (Palmrose, 1986). Third, lack of NAS and a high 
level of demand for them increase their price, since auditees should compete to 
obtain them (Solomon, 1990). Fourth, purchase of both audit and NAS make an 
arbitrary categorisation of fees possible. For example, auditors may use their audit 
time to explain their NAS to their clients (Hackenbrack & Knechel, 1997). They may 
misclassify NAS among their audit services, increasing audit fee prices (Solomon, 
1990). 
The NAS’s income for some auditors exceeds their income from audit services 
(Firth, 2002). The auditors are more flexible regarding management’s risky 
behaviours in order to retain their income from NAS. For example, they may issue a 
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clean audit report for financial statements of a company which do not comply with 
audit standards (Kinney et al., 2004). The auditors need to consider investors’ view 
regarding their independence as an essential part of their job, though they may have 
maintained it in fact and in appearance (Hylton, 1964). The companies that receive 
an excessive amount of NAS from their auditors lose their trustworthiness in the eyes 
of investors, increasing likelihood of losing their share value (Frankel, Johnson, & 
Nelson, 2002). 
The likelihood of collusion between auditors and their clients is unknown for 
investors without an external signal in most cases. The external signals do not 
commonly occur, making it difficult for investors to take the required preventive 
actions (Li, 2008). The companies may offer NAS contracts to their auditors as a 
means to bribe them. They may persuade their auditors to provide a clean report by 
threatening to stop offering them NAS, if they issue a qualified report (Coffee, 
2004). However, the investors can verify whether a company has hired any external 
auditor, and how much its audit fees were. They can determine whether auditors 
perform any NAS and any change in their fees. 
 
Iran’s economic condition 
Iran is one of the youngest countries in the world. Thirty-five percent of Iranians are 
aged between 15 and 29. Further, it has a rapid population growth, wherein its 
population is expected to reach 82.4m in 2018. The size of Iranian labour force is 
expected to grow on average by 2% during the period of 2014 to 2018 (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit N.A., 2014). Iran’s rapid population growth highlights 
its need for better employment. However, its unemployment rate is the 16th highest in 
the world, and the country faces an unemployment rate of over 12%. This rate is 
higher for women and university graduates. The university graduates struggle to find 
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jobs. Many educated Iranians work in fields that are unrelated to their specialisation. 
They may even need to have two or more jobs to survive (Bozorgmehr, 2012a). 
According to the Iranian Deputy Labour Minister, Abu-Hassan Firouz-Abadi, around 
200,000 Iranians were receiving unemployment benefits in 2014. He considers the 
high unemployment rate a major challenge for the Iranian government (Anonymous, 
2014b). Similarly, the head of the country’s Workers House warned of a potential 
workers’ crisis in 2012 (Bozorgmehr, 2012a). 
International sanctions have decreased the economic growth rate of the country, 
increasing its unemployment rate. This unemployment will remain a major concern 
for young Iranians, while the country is under sanction (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit N.A., 2014). According to a former representative of International Labour 
Organisation, wrong economic policies in Iran have increased its unemployment rate. 
The former Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejat, has focused on offering loans 
to jobseekers rather than funding infrastructure projects. A reduction in energy 
subsidies for households and industry has caused the economy to decline 
(Bozorgmehr, 2012a). The former government with the support of Supreme Leader 
and Revolutionary Guards was able to implement price subsidies reform in 2010 and 
reduce price subsidies on energy and fuel products (Habibi, 2015). The ease of 
international sanctions as a result of Iran’s agreement with world powers over its 
nuclear programmes along with a policy of reduction of energy subsidies of the new 
president, Hassan Rouhani, reduced the inflation rate in the country towards the end 
of 2014. The new government is scaling back the cash subsidies that were handed out 
by the former government, leading to a reduction of the inflation rate from 45% to 
15% in 2014 (Anonymous, 2014c). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the participants’ perceptions regarding their own nominated 
indicators of AI threat in Iran. It helped to identify indicators of AI threat in a non-
IFRS country with an Islamic legal system based on the participants’ personal 
experience or opinions. The researcher identified 10 categories and six main themes 
based on the participants’ responses to the open-ended question. The competition 
between audit firms, high audit fees, Iran’s economic condition, management’s 
wrongdoings, non-audit-services, and poor infrastructure of audit firms are the main 
themes. The most cited threats were non-audit-services and Iran’s economic 
condition. The outcomes indicated that the participants nominated other indicators of 
AI threat not previously identified, supporting the proposition 1B of the study. The 
chapter provided some information regarding non-audit-services and Iran’s economic 
condition. The next chapter will analyse media articles to provide more information 
regarding Iran’s economic condition. 
  
 121 
 
Chapter 8: Media articles & Findings 
Introduction  
The research was conducted in two stages. The first stage gathered data using a 
questionnaire to examine how the Iranian practitioners perceive the threats to AI in 
Iran. In the second stage described in this chapter, evidence was collected from a 
search of financial media, reports on financial corruption, financial or accounting 
scandals, and audit failure in Iran. This chapter describes the media articles and their 
analyses. It explains the ways that the researcher obtained the evidence, an analysis 
of their content and how this evidence contributes directly and indirectly to the 
research question. The chapter also describes the environment in which the survey 
participants work and presents the survey findings regarding Iran’s economic 
condition. This chapter helps to answer the research question of the study, which is 
in order to increase AI in a non-IFRS country with an Islamic legal system, what are 
the potential indicators of threats to AI and how should a regulator prioritise 
addressing these threats? It justifies consideration of the second proposition of the 
study by the researcher, indicating that the researcher expects that high level bribery 
will most often rank as most important to the participants. 
 
Media articles 
The media articles provide the relevant concepts and explanations. They help the 
researchers to determine adequacy of the prior concepts. Further, they provide a 
ground for the new concepts (Metz, 1983). The articles lead to consideration of the 
topic of study from different perspectives. They provide complementary information 
regarding the participants’ comments and scholarly literature, helping to explore the 
topic from a different angle. For example, Hammacott (2014) used media articles to 
triangulate against the survey outcomes of local finance professionals to examine the 
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ethics of income tax evasion in the UK. The media articles enable researchers to 
investigate their topics in different time periods to better understand the matters that 
are changed (Metz, 1983).  
Since the study obtained the required data from the practitioners that are currently 
working in the Iranian audit firms, an analysis of the media articles provides a better 
understanding regarding the business environment that they are working in. It shows 
the extent of fraud occurrence in the Iranian businesses and reveals how far they are 
involved with wrongdoing. The triangulation of thematic analysis of media articles 
against the questionnaire outcomes increases reliability of the findings. It shows how 
far the participants’ opinions are supported by various communication channels. It 
reveals the effects of high level bribery on the Iranian business environment. 
 
Research method 
Source 
To collect relevant media article commentary, the researcher used a wide filter by 
manually searching the Queensland University of Technology newspaper library 
database for news on Iran, using the following search keywords: “financial 
corruption, Iran”; “financial scandal, Iran”; “audit failure, Iran”; and “accounting 
scandal, Iran”. These keywords were chosen to obtain the required information 
regarding the wrongdoings in Iran. As a second part to the media search, a general 
search of Google, and Persian news sites (such as Tabnak) was undertaken to obtain 
additional media articles. 
The search terms are subjective in the sense that they were selected by the researcher 
based on the notion that evidence of accounting and reporting failures is necessary to 
see the “worst case” scenario facing the Iranian financial and capital markets. As to 
the media sources, the most reputable were selected with an emphasis given to BBC, 
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Tribune Content Agency LLC, and Financial Times Limited. The researcher 
disregarded the articles that came from sources where reliability was a concern. 
The BBC considers itself “the world’s most trusted news organisation: independent, 
impartial and honest”, (Tribune Publishing Company, 2015). It is considered as the 
most important source of news by over 50% of people in the UK. Fifty-three percent 
of the British use one of the BBC’s news outlets such as TV, radio or website as their 
primary source of news. BBC TV is the primary television news channel of 34% of 
the British. Its website is the primary destination of 52% of online news consumers 
(Hollander, 2013).  
Tribune Publishing Company has 435 digital agencies that partner with local 
businesses to execute its online strategies (Tribune Publishing Company, 2015). 
Tribune Media is the US’s largest independent broadcaster. It is comprised of 42 
owned or operated broadcast stations, national entertainment network WGN 
America, Tribune Studios, Grace note, WGN-Radio and a large number of iconic 
real estate properties (Tribune Media, 2015). Tribune 365 offers customised and 
innovative multi-market solutions across all media platforms (Tribune Publishing 
Company, 2015). The Financial Times has 1,226,000 of either in print or online 
weekly British readers (Hollander, 2013). It is ranked as 15th among the top 200 
newspapers around the world (4 International Media & Newspapers, 2015). It is 
ranked as 8th by circulation among the British newspapers (Turvill, 2015). 
 
Sample 
The researcher obtained 49 articles in total. A 20-years period (between 1994 and 
2014) was considered to obtain as much information as possible regarding Iran after 
its Islamic revolution. Each article was numbered consecutively, based on its 
publication date (i.e. “1” was assigned to the most recent article published on 08 
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December 2014 and “49” to the oldest article published on 20 July 1994). The 
researcher categorised the articles into three periods: 2011–2015 because of the 2011 
Iranian embezzlement scandal (Shushter, 2011); 2006–2010 because of the 2006 
Iranian Supreme Leader privatisation decree (BBC, 2006a); and earlier than 2006. 
Thirty-two articles were published between 2011 and 2015, 11 articles were 
published between 2006 and 2010, and six were published earlier than 2006.  
 
Findings 
The perspectives 
The researcher categorised the articles based on their contents into two broad 
categories of regulatory and economic perspectives. The regulatory perspective 
encompasses Iran’s aspiration to participate in the international community and the 
economic category captures the articles referring to economic losses as a result of 
wrongdoings at various levels. The regulatory and economic perspectives consisted 
of 18 and 31 articles respectively. The following two Tables 20 and 21 describe the 
entire sample of media articles examined.  
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Table 20 The description of the examined media articles considering their regulatory perspectives, titles, 
publication dates, and keywords and sources used to obtain them 
Article 
No Keyword Title Source Date 
Panel A Regulatory Perspectives 
1 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Rouhani confronts Iran’s 
hardliners on corruption 
The Financial Times 
Limited 
 
8/12/2014 
 
7 Fraud, Iran  
The Iranian government’s 
plan to prevent occurrence 
of fraud in future 
Tabnak 
 
1/05/2014 
 
8 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran president orders fight 
against financial 
corruption 
BBC 
 
2/02/2014 
 
9 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
BBC Monitoring quotes 
from Iranian press 01 Feb 
2014 
BBC 
 
1/02/2014 
 
10 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran intelligence minister 
opposes publicising 
financial corruption 
BBC 
 
14/01/2014
 
11 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran arrests business 
tycoon over corruption 
scandal 
Indo Asian News 
Service (IANS) 
 
5/01/2014 
 
14 
Audit 
failure, Iran 
 
Iran MP urges government 
to pay attention to tax 
revenues 
BBC 
 
31/12/2013
 
16 Fraud, Iran  
Keeping our eyes on Iran 
 The Jerusalem Post Ltd 
25/06/2013
 
17 Fraud, Iran  
Iran Islamic Republic of, 
United States: Treasury 
targets network attempting 
to evade Iran sanctions 
Albawaba (London) 
Ltd 
 
12/04/2013
 
19 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
 
Iran Speaker says 
“intelligence chiefs” 
involved in financial 
corruption 
BBC 
 
7/01/2013 
 
24 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Commentary terms 
embezzlement in Iran 
unforgivable act 
BBC 
 
3/07/2012 
 
25 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
‘ State’ bodies stymie Iran 
privatisations 
 
The Financial Times 
Limited 
 
30/05/2012
 
33 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran MPs urge Judiciary to 
follow up financial 
corruption network’s case 
BBC 
 
10/03/2010
 
35 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran’s creeping corruption 
 
IBT Media, Inc., The 
Newsweek/Daily Beast 
Company LLC 
30/11/2009
 
40 Financial Iran leader calls for BBC 25/06/2008
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corruption, 
Iran 
continuation of campaign 
against financial 
corruption 
  
42 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran’s new attempt to 
privatise state-owned 
enterprises 
BBC 
 
31/07/2006
 
43 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
 
Iran’s presence at World 
Trade Organisation 
inevitable – former 
president 
BBC 
 
25/01/2006
 
46 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Single forex rate to curb 
financial corruption in 
Iran: Official 
Middle East News 
Online 
 
4/03/2002 
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Table 21 The description of the examined media articles considering their economic perspectives, titles, 
publication dates, and keywords and sources used to obtain them 
Article 
No Keyword Title Source Date 
Panel B Economic Perspectives 
2 
Audit 
failure, Iran 
 
US watchdog fines 
Standard Chartered for 
second time: Money-
laundering failure costs 
bank further $300m: High-
risk dealings went 
undetected, says regulator 
Guardian News & 
Media Limited 
 
20/08/2014
 
3 
Audit 
failure, Iran 
 
Iran official dismisses 
Audit Court report on oil 
sale to UAE 
BBC 
 
23/07/2014
 
4 Fraud, Iran  
Supreme Audit Court of 
Iran confirms 
government’s taking $4.1 
billion out of NDF 
Tribune Content 
Agency LLC 
 
28/05/2014
 
5 
Accounting 
scandal, Iran 
 
Brief: Iran dismisses 
scandal of selling recorded 
phone talks 
Tribune Content 
Agency LLC 
 
20/05/2014
 
6 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Fugitive accused of 
financial corruption 
handed over to Iran 
Tribune Content 
Agency LLC 
 
7/05/2014 
 
12 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran daily discusses 
financial corruption in 
Turkey 
BBC 
 
3/01/2014 
 
13 
Audit 
failure, Iran 
 
Iran government neglects 
tax revenue due to high oil 
income – analyst 
BBC 
 
1/01/2014 
 
15 
Audit 
failure, Iran 
 
Iran Audit Court accuses 
president of misspending 
surplus revenues 
BBC 
 
25/06/2013
 
18 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran: Corruption case raises 
Iran domestic tensions 
Al Jazeera 
 
4/02/2013 
 
20 Accounting scandal, Iran 
Standard Chartered bank 
accused of scheming with 
Iran to hide transactions 
Guardian News & 
Media Limited 
7/08/2012 
 
21 
Accounting 
scandal, Iran 
 
Standard Chartered diving 
despite Iran scandal denial 
 
Evening Standard 
Limited, Solo 
Syndication, a division 
of Associated 
Newspapers Ltd 
7/08/2012 
 
22 Accounting scandal, Iran 
Death terms in Iran bank 
scandal 
Al Jazeera 
 
30/07/2012
 
23 Accounting scandal, Iran 
Iran bank fraud scandal: 4 
sentenced to death Yeganeh 30/07/2012
 128 
 
26 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Brief: MP: Corruption 
costs Iran $34 billion a 
year 
Tribune Content 
Agency LLC 
 
18/12/2011
 
27 
Audit 
failure, Iran 
 
Iran Audit Court sends 
report on government 
“violations” to judiciary 
BBC 
 
17/12/2011
 
28 Accounting scandal, Iran 
Iran arrests relative of 
president’s aid over 
embezzlement scandal 
Xinhua News Agency 8/11/2011  
29 Fraud, Iran  
Two other suspects 
arrested over Iran’s 
embezzlement case 
Tribune Content 
Agency LLC 
 
28/10/2011
 
30 
Accounting 
scandal, Iran 
 
Iran’s largest banks 
swindled out of $2.6 
Billion 
NPR 
 
27/10/2011
 
31 
Accounting 
scandal, Iran 
 
Quds Force linked to bank 
in Iran scandal 
 
The Globe & Mail 
division of Bell Globe 
media Publishing Inc. 
12/10/2011
 
32 Accounting scandal, Iran 
Israeli billionaire at heart 
of Iran trade scandal dies 
The Financial Times 
Limited 
3/06/2011 
 
34 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran arrests 15 members of 
“financial corruption 
network” 
BBC 
 
30/01/2010
 
36 Fraud, Iran  
Iran: “Iran’s missing oil 
money” 
Thai News Service 
Group 
8/05/2009 
 
37 Fraud, Iran  
Iran: In search of $1b 
missing oil money in Iran 
Thai News Service 
Group 
16/02/2009
 
38 Fraud, Iran  
Iran minister sacked over 
forgery 
BBC 
 
4/11/2008 
 
39 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran charges seven with 
financial corruption 
BBC 
 
14/07/2008
 
41 
Audit 
failure, Iran 
 
President orders dismissal 
of Iran Insurance’s board 
of directors 
BBC 
 
9/05/2007 
 
44 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Halliburton’s activities 
suspended in Iran 
 
BBC 
 
22/08/2005
 
45 
Accounting 
scandal, Iran 
 
Iran: Oil Ministry to 
complain against Norway 
over Statoil scandal 
BBC 
 
9/11/2003 
 
47 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
World: Middle East Tehran 
mayor sentence reduced 
BBC 
 
24/12/1998
 
48 Accounting scandal, Iran 
Tehran mayor is arrested, 
accused of embezzlement 
Deseret News 
 
5/04/1998 
 
49 
Financial 
corruption, 
Iran 
Iran needs foreign 
investment 
Chemical Week 
 
20/07/1994
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The keywords and publication sources  
The researcher used four different keywords to search for the media articles, namely: 
“financial corruption, Iran”, “accounting scandal, Iran”, “fraud, Iran”, and “audit 
failure, Iran”. The keyword “financial corruption, Iran” produced 23 desired articles 
which was more than any other keyword, followed by “accounting scandal, Iran” 
with 11 articles, “fraud, Iran” with 8, and lastly “audit failure, Iran” with 7.  
The researcher obtained the articles from publication sources that seemed to be 
trustworthy. BBC is a public service broadcaster that provides services including 10 
national TV channels plus regional programming, 10 national radio stations, 40 local 
radio stations and an extensive website. It provides news and information in 27 
languages around the world (BBC, 2015). Tribune Content Agency LLC is a news 
agency that provides comprehensive information on different matters such as politics 
and breaking news; lively lifestyle and entertainment reports; and sports and 
business. It extracts the relevant information from 70 reputable companies, such as 
Los Angeles Times; Chicago Tribune; and Miami Herald (Tribune Content Agency 
LLC, 2015). The Financial Times Limited is a business news organisation, providing 
news, comment, and analysis regarding various business matters. It has a combined 
paid print and digital circulation of 690, 000 (Limited, 2015). BBC led to 22 articles, 
Tribune Content Agency LLC resulted in five, the Financial Times Limited produced 
three, and other sources produced the remaining 19 articles. The following Table 22 
describes the relevant keywords and publication sources. 
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Table 22 The description of keywords and publication sources that the researcher used to obtain the media 
articles 
 
 
 
 
Article 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 
No 
 
 
 
 
Panel A keywords 
 Financial 
corruption, Iran 
 
Accounting 
scandal, Iran 
 
Fraud, 
Iran 
 
Audit 
failure, Iran 
 
 1, 6, 8, 9, 10, 
11, 12, 18, 19, 
24, 25, 26, 33, 
34, 35, 39, 40, 
42, 43, 44, 46, 
47, 49 
5, 20, 21, 22, 
23, 28, 30, 
31, 32, 45, 48
4, 7, 16, 
17, 29, 36, 
37, 38 
2, 3, 13, 14, 
15, 27,  
41 
Total 23  11  8 7 
Percentage 
to total 
articles 
46.94% 22.45% 16.33% 14.29% 
Panel B publication sources 
 
BBC 
 
Tribune 
Content 
Agency LLC 
The 
Financial 
Times 
Limited 
Other 
sources 
 3, 8, 9, 10, 12, 
13, 14, 15, 19, 
24, 27, 33, 34, 
38, 39, 40, 41, 
42, 43, 44, 45, 
47 
4, 5, 6, 26, 29 1, 25, 32 2, 7, 11, 16, 
17, 18, 20, 
21, 22, 23, 
28, 30, 31, 
35, 36, 37, 
46, 48, 49 
Total 22 5 3 19 
 Percentage 
to total 
articles 
44.9% 10.2% 6.12% 38.78% 
 
The scopes and subject matters  
The researcher categorised the articles based on their contents into domestic and 
international affairs. Thirty-two articles discussed a topic regarding Iranian affairs, 
whereas 17 articles discussed a topic about international affairs involving Iran. The 
analysis indicated that the wrongdoings happen more often in domestic matters. The 
articles discussed various subject matters. Twenty-three articles discussed the Iranian 
government, nine articles discussed the Iranian banks, four discussed the Iranian 
Parliament, and two discussed the Iranian Supreme Leader. The analysis showed that 
the Iranian government is highly involved in corrupt practices. The remaining 
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articles discussed other subject matters. The following Table 23 describes the scopes 
and subject matters of media articles. 
 
Table 23 The description of scopes and subject matters of the media articles  
 
Domestic 
affair 
 
International 
affair 
 
The 
Iranian 
Supreme 
Leader 
The Iranian 
government 
 
The 
Iranian 
Parliament 
 
The 
Iranian 
banks 
 
Article 
No 
1, 4, 5, 7, 
8, 9, 10, 
13, 14, 
15, 18, 
19, 22, 
23, 24, 
25, 27, 
28, 29, 
30, 33, 
34, 35, 
36, 37, 
39, 40, 
41, 42, 
46, 47, 48 
2, 3, 6, 11, 
12, 16, 17, 
20, 21, 26, 
31, 32, 38, 
43, 44, 45, 
49 
40, 42 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 
9, 10, 13, 
14, 15, 19, 
25, 27, 28, 
35, 36, 37, 
38, 41, 45, 
47, 48, 49 
9, 26, 33, 
46 
2, 6, 20, 
21, 22, 
23, 29, 
30, 31 
Total 32 17 2 23 4 9 
(%) to 
total 
articles 
65.31% 34.7% 4.1% 46.94% 8.16% 18.37%
 
The wrongdoings’ punishment types 
As to other outcomes from wrongdoing, the punishment of the perpetrator often 
becomes an important newsworthy event. The researcher categorised the 
wrongdoings’ punishment types into death sentence, imprisonment, fine, banned to 
leave the country, and dismissal from official position. Three articles mentioned 
dismissal. There were two instances of death sentence, imprisonment, and fine, 
wherein all were mentioned in article 23. Only article 13 mentioned banned to leave 
the country. Twenty-seven articles discussed other types of punishment such as lash, 
and the remaining 14 did not mention any punishment type. The analysis indicated 
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the existence of various punishment types for different wrongdoings in the country. 
The following Table 24 describes the wrongdoings’ punishment types. 
 
Table 24 The description of the wrongdoings’ punishment types as indicated in different media articles 
 Death 
Sentence 
 
Imprisonment
 
Fine 
 
Banned to leave the 
country 
Dismissal 
 
Article 
No 22, 23 23, 47 
2, 
23 13 
15, 38, 
41 
Total 2 2 2 1 3 
 
The audit institutions  
Since the aim of this research is to assist in developing a more effective framework 
for regulating auditor practice in a non-IFRS country with an Islamic legal system, 
the researcher identified the articles that were related to different Iranian audit 
institutions. These articles may provide a better understanding regarding Iran’s audit-
related affairs and directly relate to the research question and propositions of the 
study. Eight articles were identified in total. Five articles (3, 4, 9, 15, and 27) were 
related to the Supreme Audit Court of Iran, and four articles (9, 36, 37, and 41) were 
related to the Iran Audit organisation29. The analysis showed that these two major 
audit institutions of the country are criticised despite their importance. 
 
Auditor independence 
The researcher investigated the media articles to determine whether or not auditor 
independence is discussed in any of them, aiming to better achieve the goal of this 
study. However, none of the media articles directly related to auditor independence. 
 
                                                 
29 Article number 9 discussed both Supreme Audit Court of Iran and Iran Audit organisation. 
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Triangulation with the questionnaire data 
After successfully completing both stages of the research design, the researcher 
triangulated the thematic (financial corruption, financial scandal, audit failure, and 
accounting scandal) analysis of media articles against the results of the questionnaire 
data. Therefore, as the participants of the study considered bribery as the strongest 
indicator of AI threat, the researcher investigated the instances in the media articles 
where bribery has occurred30. This led to identification of 13 articles, namely: 6, 12, 
22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 41, 44, and 4531. It supported the proposition that the 
researcher expects that high level bribery will most often rank as most important to 
the participants. 
Since Iran’s economic condition was highly cited by the participants the researcher 
analysed the economic impacts of wrongdoings. He categorised them into thousands 
of US dollars, millions of US dollars, and billions of US dollars to show their 
magnitudes. The lowest economic impact among the discussed articles belonged to 
article 34 by 500, 000 US dollars, and the highest one belonged to article 16 by 400 
billion US dollars. Six articles had an economic impact of more than one million 
dollars, and 24 articles had an economic impact of more than a billion dollars. Six 
articles indicated other types of economic impacts such as inflation, and the 
remaining 12 articles did not show any type of economic impact. The following 
Table 25 describes the economic impacts of wrongdoings. 
 
Table 25 The description of the economic impacts of wrongdoings as indicated in different media articles 
 Thousands of 
$ 
Millions of $ 
 
Billions of $ 
 
Article 
No 34 
3, 12, 31, 39, 
45, 48 
1, 2, 4, 6, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 
28, 29, 30, 32, 36, 37, 49 
Total 1 6 24 
                                                 
30 The researcher analysed all 49 articles to identify the bribery cases. 
31 Thirteen out of 49 articles (26.5%) indicated the existence of bribery. This shows the extent of 
bribery in the country. 
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Since participants of the study did not consider gifts and presents as indicators of 
threat to AI in Iran, the media articles were investigated to determine whether or not 
they discuss any gift. However, none of the articles discussed the existence of gifts. 
The ignorance of gifts by the media articles supports the participants’ view regarding 
gifts as not being threats to AI in Iran. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided background information regarding the environment where the 
participants work and provided indirect evidence to answer the research question of 
the study. It analysed 49 articles in a 20-years period, mostly from the last five years. 
The majority of articles had an economic perspective. The analysis of the keywords 
and publication sources that the researcher used to obtain the articles indicated that 
financial corruption in the Iranian system was highly mentioned in various media 
sources such as the international channel of BBC. The analysis of scopes and subject 
matters of media articles indicated that a majority of them discussed Iran’s domestic 
affairs, wherein the Iranian government was the subject of most of them. The 
analysis of the wrongdoings’ punishment types indicated that wrongdoers faced 
different types of punishment, even death sentence. The analysis of the audit 
institutions indicated that the Supreme Audit Court and Iran Audit Organisation were 
both discussed in the media. This shows the significance of the two mentioned 
organisations in the Iranian audit profession, though they are yet to be criticised in 
their performance.  
The triangulation of financial media analysis against the questionnaire results 
indicated that bribery frequently occurs in Iran, justifying participants’ consideration 
of bribery as the strongest indicator of AI threat. This supported the second 
proposition of the study. The analysis of the economic impacts of wrongdoings 
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indicated that they severely damage the country, causing Iran to lose billions of 
dollars. This justifies participants’ nomination of Iran’s economic condition as a 
threat to AI. The analysis of gifts showed that they are not discussed by the media 
articles, supporting the participants’ view to disregard gifts as threats to AI in Iran. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion to the research 
Introduction 
This chapter indicates what this study aimed to achieve, and how the research was 
designed to achieve its objectives. It describes the main findings of the study and 
shows how they investigate its research question and propositions. It justifies why 
the outcomes of this study are interesting to the Iranian regulator. It provides some 
recommendations for the IAO. It mentions the limitations of the study and what 
future topics of research could be. Finally, it provides an overall conclusion for the 
study. 
 
Summary of the research 
The research aimed to assist in developing a more effective framework for regulating 
AI practice in a non-IFRS country with an Islamic legal system. It did this through 
investigation of the currently identifiable indicators that affect AI and also 
investigation of unexplored indicators threatening AI. It addressed the issues of 
priorities for the Iranian regulator to increase AI. Iran was the focus of the study, 
since its legal system is based on Islamic laws. There was a lack of knowledge about 
the audit profession and application of AI, due to small amount of audit-related 
research regarding this setting. The analysis of the evidence collected in this study 
enabled the researcher to answer the research question: In order to increase AI in a 
non-IFRS country with an Islamic legal system, what are the potential indicators of 
threats to AI, and how should a regulator prioritise addressing these threats? 
The thesis tested the following three propositions: 
1. Based on six potential indicators of AI threats in Iran identified from the 
literature, it is expected that the participants will agree with the nominated 
indicators as threats to AI in Iran.  
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A) However, each participant’s perception of importance among the six will 
vary.  
B) However, the researcher also expects that each participant will nominate 
other indicators of AI threat not previously identified. 
2. In particular, the researcher expects that high level bribery will most often 
rank as most important to the participants. 
3. Based on professional standards that specifically refer to all indicators of 
threat to AI in Iran (except for non-existence of audit committee which was 
regulated by the Tehran Stock Exchange) the researcher expects that the 
participants with professional qualifications’ perceptions will be different 
from those participants without any professional qualification. 
The thesis investigated its research question and propositions with a research design 
involving two stages: Stage 1 questionnaire and stage 2 financial media analysis. 
First, a self-administered questionnaire was used. The study of prior literature 
identified six indicators of AI threat in Iran, namely: Gifts and presents (Salehi et al., 
2009), high level bribery (Ramazani & Atani, 2010), audit partner tenure (Abdoli et 
al., 2014), the prospects of reappointment (Salehi et al., 2009), non-existence of audit 
committee (Salehi, 2011), and auditors’ lack of skill (Salehi & Husini, 2011). 
The questionnaire was designed in three sections. Section I: Demographic 
information, Section II: Experience and perception on threats to AI, and Section III: 
Additional comments on threats to AI in Iran. The first section asked the participants 
to discuss their demographic information. They were requested to indicate their 
highest qualification level, their possible professional accounting qualification, their 
experience in the field of accounting, their actual occupation, and the duration of 
their involvement in their current occupation. The second section used six indicators 
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of AI threat that were identified from previous literature and asked the participants to 
rank their perceptions of importance based on their experience and opinions about 
them. The measure instrument of the statements was a Five-Point Likert type scale 
anchored “strongly agree” (1) and “strongly disagree” (5), which was the method 
used in Salehi and Azary (2008) and Salehi et al. (2009) in Iran. The last section, in 
an open-ended question, asked the participants to nominate other indicators of AI 
threat in Iran based on their own opinion. 
The professionals working in audit firms in Tehran were chosen as the relevant 
participants of this study. The accounting and audit professionals working in Tehran 
were the suitable participants, because of their familiarity with the processes of 
financial reporting and audit and context of Iran. The researcher used the Yellow 
Pages to identify the audit firms, following Best et al. (2001) in Singapore. There 
was no coercion to participate in the project. The participants could answer as much 
or as little as they preferred. They showed their consent through submission of the 
questionnaire. 
There are acknowledged difficulties in administering a questionnaire in a jurisdiction 
outside of the researcher’s location. The researcher obtained ethical approval from 
QUT to administer the questionnaire. He appointed an agent in Tehran to physically 
distribute the questionnaires. The agent made a phone call to the identified audit 
firms with a brief overview of the research and asked them whether they were 
willing to participate. If the audit firms indicated their willingness to participate, the 
agent distributed the questionnaires among the participants at their preferred time32. 
The agent mailed the obtained responses to the researcher after the collection of data. 
In the second stage, the researcher collected evidence from financial media, reports 
                                                 
32 However, if they needed to have some time to respond to this query the agent asked for an 
appropriate time to call them back. Apparently, if they were unwilling to participate he apologised to 
them for the disturbance. 
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on financial corruption, financial or accounting scandals, and audit failure in Iran. 
The media articles provided background information regarding the environment 
where the participants work and provided indirect evidence to answer the research 
question and test the propositions of the study. The researcher used a wide filter by 
manually searching the Queensland University of Technology newspaper library 
database for news on Iran, using the following search keywords: “financial 
corruption, Iran”; “financial scandal, Iran”; “audit failure, Iran”; and “accounting 
scandal, Iran”. These keywords were chosen to obtain the required information 
regarding wrongdoings in Iran. As to the media sources, the most reputable were 
selected with an emphasis given to BBC, Tribune Content Agency LLC, and 
Financial Times Limited. The researcher disregarded the articles that came from the 
sources where reliability was a concern. Forty nine articles were obtained. BBC 
comprising 22 articles, 5 Tribune Content Agency LLC articles, 3 Financial Times 
Limited articles, and other sources produced the remaining 19 articles. 
After successfully completing both stages of the research design, the researcher 
triangulated the thematic (financial corruption, financial scandal, audit failure, and 
accounting scandal) analysis of media articles against the results of the questionnaire 
data. The instances in the media articles where bribery had occurred were 
investigated33, since the participants of the study considered bribery as the strongest 
indicator of AI threat. Further, the economic impacts of wrongdoings were analysed, 
since Iran’s economic condition was highly cited by the participants. The economic 
impacts were categorised into thousands of US dollars, millions of US dollars, and 
billions of US dollars to show their magnitudes. 
                                                 
33 This was done through reading and analysis of all 49 articles of the study. 
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Summary of the findings and analysis 
Stage 1 
The administration of the questionnaire yielded 40 responses. The outcomes 
indicated that participants have a reasonable knowledge and perception about the 
indicators of AI threat in Iran. However, the results showed that all six indicators 
were not considered as threats to AI in Iran, as overall the participants agreed that 
gifts and presents are not threats to AI in Iran. Further, the outcomes showed that 
each participant’s perception of importance among the six indicators varies, 
supporting the proposition 1A of the study. The participants considered bribery as the 
strongest indicator of AI threat in Iran, supporting the second proposition of the 
study. 
The researcher used SPSS software to conduct the analyses. The participants’ 
perceptions regarding the indicators of AI threat were compared through analysis of 
the mean differences, following Best et al. (2001). The participants considered 
bribery as the strongest indicator of AI threat in Iran. The prospects of reappointment 
were the second strongest indicators of AI threat. The long-term relationship and 
non-existence of audit committee equally ranked as the next strongest indicators, 
followed by auditors’ lack of skill. The gifts and presents were the only indicators 
that the participants disregarded as threats to AI in Iran. The researcher conducted 
Friedman test to prioritise the five determined indicators of AI threat in Iran, 
following Salehi (2011). The test considered bribery as the strongest indicator of AI 
threat, followed by the prospects of reappointment, long-term relationship, and non-
existence of audit committee. The participants considered auditors’ lack of skill as 
the least significant indicator. 
Twenty-nine participants responded to the final question in the questionnaire by 
nominating indicators of threat to AI in Iran other than those identified by the 
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researcher, wherein six of them nominated multiple indicators. This led to 37 
instances of new information, nominating various new indicators of AI threat. NVivo 
software was used to analyse their written responses. Ten categories and six main 
themes were identified. The 10 identified categories are as follow: Competition 
between audit firms; high audit fees; high unemployment rate of auditors; low 
income of auditors; management’s fraud; management’s pressure; management 
advisory services; consultancy services; bureaucracy; and small size of audit firms. 
Accordingly, the main themes are as follows: Competition between audit firms, high 
audit fees, Iran’s economic condition, management’s wrongdoings, non-audit-
services, and poor infrastructure of audit firms. 
The highest number of responses regarded non-audit-services and Iran’s economic 
condition as other indicators of AI threat in Iran. The consideration of non-audit-
services as indicators of AI threat was consistent with the international literature, 
though the Iranian studies referred to in the literature review disregarded them. The 
consideration of Iran’s economic condition as an indicator created a groundwork to 
analyse media articles to provide more information regarding the Iran’s economic 
conditions for those practitioners seeking to operate or practice in Iran. The outcomes 
indicated that the participants nominated other indicators of AI threat not previously 
identified, supporting the proposition 1B of the study. 
The researcher conducted a multivariate analysis of variance to determine the effects 
of participants’ demographic characteristics as a whole on their perceptions 
regarding the indicators of AI threat. For this purpose, four different aspects of the 
participants’ demographic information, namely: The educational qualification level 
of participants (EduQualification), the professional accounting qualification level of 
participants (ProQualification), the accounting experience level of participants 
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(AccExperience), and the occupational experience level of participants (Occupation) 
were considered. The outcomes of Wilks’ Lambda test indicated that the main effects 
of none of the variables were statistically significant.  
Since the participants’ demographic characteristics as a whole did not have a 
significant effect on the participants’ perceptions regarding the indicators of AI 
threat, the researcher decided to move a step forward and determine whether or not 
each individual demographic characteristic has a significant effect on the 
participants’ perceptions regarding the indicators of AI threat. So, four separate 
single-factor MANOVAs for each of EduQualification, ProQualification, 
AccExperience, and Occupation were conducted. The outcomes indicated that none 
of the individual participants’ demographic characteristics had a significant effect on 
their perceptions regarding the indicators of AI threat. The outcomes of 
ProQualification did not support the third proposition of the study, indicating that the 
perceptions of participants with professional qualification are not different from 
those without any professional qualification. 
 
Stage 2 
The analysis of media articles indicated that a majority of them had an economic 
perspective. The analysis of the keywords and publication sources that the researcher 
used to obtain them indicated that financial corruption in the Iranian system was 
highly mentioned in various media sources such as the international channel of BBC. 
The analysis of the scopes and subject matters of media articles indicated that most 
of them discussed Iran’s domestic affairs, wherein the Iranian government was the 
subject of most of them. The analysis showed that the Iranian government is highly 
involved in corrupt practices. The analysis of the wrongdoings’ punishment types 
showed the existence of various punishment types for different wrongdoings, even 
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death sentence, in the country. The analysis of the audit institutions indicated that 
Supreme Audit Court and Iran Audit Organisation were two highly discussed audit 
institutions of the country. This shows the significance of these two organisations in 
the Iranian audit profession, though they are yet to be criticised in their performance. 
However, none of the media articles were directly related to AI. 
The triangulation of financial media analysis against the questionnaire results 
indicated that bribery frequently occurs in Iran, justifying the participants’ 
consideration of bribery as the strongest indicator of AI threat. This justified the 
second proposition of the study. The analysis of the economic impacts of 
wrongdoings indicated that they severely damage the country, causing Iran to lose 
billions of dollars. This justifies the participants’ nomination of Iran’s economic 
condition as a threat to AI. The analysis of the media articles regarding gifts 
indicated that none of them discussed any gift. This supports the participants’ 
opinion to disregard gifts as threats to AI in Iran. 
 
Implications or general conclusions from the research for Iranian regulators 
The Friedman test considered bribery as the strongest indicator of AI threat in Iran 
by a mean of 2.10. The consideration of bribery as the strongest indicator shows its 
effects in today’s business of Iran, encouraging implementation of more vigorous 
plans to combat it. Thirteen out of 49 articles, namely: 6, 12, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 
31, 34, 41, 44, and 45 indicated the existence of bribery. The analysis of the media 
articles acknowledged the effects of bribery on AI and showed the extent of 
discussion regarding financial corruption in Iran.  
The Iranian government may want to introduce advanced strategies to safeguard the 
country against bribery. This will eventually enhance AI in Iran. The high losses 
caused by corrupt practices encourage authorities to concentrate on issues of 
 144 
 
corruption and create some effective plans to minimise it in the country. They need 
to introduce better regulations to address the corruption concerns in Iran.  
The criticism of Supreme Audit Court and Iran Audit Organisation by 8 articles, 
namely: 3, 4, 9, 15, 27, 36, 37, and 41 reveals a deficiency level in the Iranian 
governmental auditing bodies. This may bring regulators’ attention towards the 
governmental agencies and encourage rule-makers to introduce new rules to increase 
their performance level. The higher performance level of IAO results in production 
of a better framework regarding the indicators that may threaten AI. 
The nomination of Iran’s economic condition (comprised of high unemployment rate 
of auditors, low income of auditors, and poor economy of Iran) by 9 participants of 
the study as an indicator of threat shows influence of the economic factors on 
business people’s behaviour. The undesirable economic condition of the country was 
acknowledged, through analysis of the media articles34. This analysis suggests 
implementation of effective ways to improve the economic condition of the country. 
A better economic condition reduces the need for all participants in business activity 
to use illegal or immoral methods to conduct their business, increasing overall health 
of the capital market. The regulatory bodies may need to think of some solutions to 
reduce the unemployment rate of auditors and increase their income level. The audit 
regulations may need to provide some financial safeguards for auditors. The 
provision of more job opportunities to auditors reduces their desire to succumb to 
management pressure, increasing their independence. Similarly, higher levels of 
income increases auditors’ persistence against the management’s corrupt requests. 
The nomination of non-audit-services (NAS) (comprised of management advisory 
services and consultancy services) as indicators of AI threat by 9 participants may 
                                                 
34 Six articles had an economic impact of more than one million dollars, and 24 articles had an 
economic impact of more than a billion dollars. Six articles indicated other types of economic impacts 
such as inflation. 
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encourage the Iranian regulators to place more emphasis on them and introduce new 
rules to restrict their provision by the auditors. Since NAS are widely acknowledged 
as indicators of threat in the international literature, Iran’s new aspiration to join the 
international community may encourage its regulators to introduce similar rules as 
those in IFRS countries to regulate the NAS practices. The consideration of NAS as 
potential threats may improve AI in Iran. Similarly, the participants of this study’s 
consideration of the prospects of reappointment, long-term relationship, non-
existence of audit committee, and auditors’ lack of skill as indicators of threat 
encourages the Iranian regulators to align their audit regulations to those of IFRS 
countries35. The regulators may want to consider this study’s identified indicators of 
AI threat as potential threats to AI. However, disregard of the gifts and presents as 
indicators of threat reminds the regulators of importance of cultural factors in 
business affairs36. The regulators may want to align the audit regulations with the 
cultural perceptions of people. They may need, while aligning the rules, to help the 
country to join the international community, consider its own specific cultural factors 
too.  
 
Recommendations for Iran Audit Organisation (IAO) 
IAO has not ranked in order of priority the 11 identified factors of AI threat, which 
were mentioned in the first chapter as family, personal, or financial relationship 
between auditors and their clients; inclusion of auditors in their clients’ board of 
directors, senior officers, or partners; provision of non-audit services to clients; high 
management pressure on auditors; high audit fees; existence of contingent fees; 
purchasing and accepting gifts and hospitality; ownership of audit firms by those 
                                                 
35 The Friedman test considered the prospects of reappointment by a mean of 2.96, followed by long-
term relationship by 3.21, followed by non-existence of audit committee by 3.33, and followed by 
auditors’ lack of skill by 3.40 as indicators of threat to AI in Iran. 
36 The gifts and presents obtained a mean greater than 3 by 3.28. 
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other than auditors; presence of former audit partners as clients; existence of lawsuits 
between auditors and their clients; and long-term association between auditors and 
their clients (IAO, 2014). Accordingly, this research recommends enhancements to 
the current IAO framework for regulating AI, as follows: 
1. The indicators of bribery and auditors’ lack of competence should be included in 
the IAO’s framework as a priority threat.  
2. The NAS should remain in the framework as a priority.  
3. The long-term association between auditors and their clients (which covers audit 
partner tenure and prospects of reappointment) should remain in the framework 
as a priority.  
4. The high management pressure on auditors (which relates to prospects of 
reappointment), and high audit fees (which is an identified category of the open-
ended question) should remain in the framework as a priority. 
5. The gifts and presents; family, personal, or financial relationship between 
auditors and their clients; inclusion of auditors in their clients’ board of directors, 
senior officers, or partners; existence of contingent fees; ownership of audit firms 
by those other than auditors; presence of former audit partners as clients; and 
existence of lawsuits between auditors and their clients should remain in the 
framework as non-priority threats. 
As the analysis of media articles indicated that IAO is criticised, the organisation 
needs to improve its performance level. It should consider the identified indicators of 
AI threat more seriously and implement some effective policies to safeguard AI 
against these threats. The conduct of extensive research regarding the threats to AI 
increases the organisation’s knowledge regarding them and provides it with a better 
opportunity to reduce the effects of threats. As the participants of this study did not 
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consider gifts as threats to AI, IAO should consider the cultural factors while 
attempting to harmonise the Iranian standards to international standards. 
More serious consideration of the indicators of AI threat by the Iranian audit 
institutions such as IAO may better discipline the behaviours of audit practitioners in 
the country. Further, the Iranian audit profession’s alignment with the international 
community requires the Iranian practitioners to familiarise themselves with 
international issues regarding the profession. The practitioners may limit the extent 
of their offered non-audit services. The punishment of bribery cases by the 
authorities may better reduce the auditors’ desire to give or receive bribe. 
 
Limitations and future research 
This study was subject to potential limitations. Many Iranian audit firms are not 
computerised (Salehi, Rostami, & Mogadam, 2010). So, a paper-based questionnaire 
was used. The capacity to collect data was reduced, and it was time-consuming. 
Further, everything had to be facilitated through an agent in Iran. Forty responses 
were obtained in total, reducing the credibility of the outcomes of the study. Further, 
the obtained data were limited to the city of Tehran only and did not provide any 
information regarding the practitioners’ perceptions in other Iranian cities. Restricted 
by the timeline of the Masters by research programme, the researcher was unable to 
collect more responses on the practitioners' perception on other indicators of AI 
threat which is identified by the IAO. This can be a research opportunity for future 
research. The researcher obtained 49 media articles in total, reducing the capacity to 
triangulate the thematic analysis of media articles against the results of the 
questionnaire data. 
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The nomination of Iran’s economic condition as an indicator of AI threat encourages 
future research regarding its possible effects on other aspects of audit profession in 
Iran. Similarly, the consideration of bribery as the strongest indicator initiates 
investigation of its effects on other professions. Further, future research may want to 
investigate the best possible regulations to address the NAS and determine the 
implementation barriers of those rules in the context of Iran. Further, the likely 
effects of Iranian culture on other areas of business such as banking or finance can be 
researched. 
A wider analysis of media articles may provide a better capacity to triangulate the 
outcomes of the questionnaire of this study. Future research may want to evaluate 
other indicators of AI threat which is identified by IAO and obtain the practitioners’ 
views in other Iranian cities except Tehran. Because of Iran’s aspiration to join the 
international community another future research avenue may be to investigate the 
effects of indicators of AI threat that are identified in the international literature on 
the Iranian audit profession.  
 
Overall conclusion 
The participants of the study considered bribery as the strongest indicator of AI 
threat, followed by the prospects of reappointment, long-term relationship, non-
existence of audit committee, and auditors’ lack of skill. The gifts and presents were 
the only indicators that the participants disregarded as threats to AI in Iran. Further, 
the participants nominated non-audit-services and Iran’s economic condition as other 
indicators of AI threat in Iran. The findings supported the propositions 1A, 1B and 2 
of the study. However, it did not support the third proposition. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter mentioned the objectives of this study and showed how the research was 
designed to achieve them. It explained the main findings of the study and indicated 
how they answered its research question and investigated its propositions. It provided 
some justifications on why Iranian regulators may be interested regarding the 
outcomes of this study. It provided some recommendations for IAO. It 
communicated the limitations of the study, and what could be answered by future 
research. Lastly, it provided an overall conclusion for the study. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 (the questionnaire of the study) 
Section I: Demographic Information 
1. What is your highest qualification level? 
                            Business-related             Non-business-related 
High-school diploma       
Bachelor  
Master  
PhD  
  
 
2. Do you have any professional accounting qualification? 
Yes             No  
If yes: 
Iranian Accounting Association  
Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants  
Iranian Institute of Certified Accountants   
If you have any other qualification indicate it, please: 
………………………………………………………………………………………….
 
3. Do you have any accounting experience?   
Yes             No  
If yes: 
1 - 3 years  
4 - 6 years 
7 - 9 years 
Over 10 years (Indicate the number of years, please):            
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.........................................................................................................................................
 
Describe the type of accounting experience that you have, please: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…….….………………………………………………………………………………...
 
4. What is your current occupation? 
Regulator 
Accountant  
Auditor 
Consultant 
Investor 
Other (Indicate your current occupation, please):        
………………………………………………………………………………………….
 
5. How long have you been in your current occupation? 
1 - 3 years 
4 - 6 years 
7 - 9 years  
Over 10 years (Indicate the number of years, please): 
………………………………………………………………………………………….
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Section II: Experience and Perception on Threats to Auditor 
Independence 
Each of the following presents a scenario of ethical issues. First, please mention 
any experience that you may have had regarding the specified ethical issues in 
your professional life. Then, please rank each scenario on a scale of one (1) as 
low to five (5) as high across the questions. 
1. The Iranian Code of Professional Conduct considers the gifts and presentations as 
serious threats to auditor independence (Term: 21.13). The Code indicates that the auditors 
should refrain from accepting or giving any gifts or presentations that may affect their 
professional judgement (Term: 15.2.E). 
1.1 Have you ever had any experience regarding gifts and presentations in your 
professional life? 
Yes             No  
1.2 How much of monetary value of a gift is more than a reasonable amount in your 
opinion? 
$0 
$50 or less  
$100 or less 
$200 or less  
Higher (Indicate the value, please):              
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
1.3 Gifts and presentations 
are indicators of threat to 
auditor independence in Iran. 
    
1         2         3         4         5 
Gifts and presentations are not 
indicators of threat to auditor 
independence in Iran. 
 
2. Article 49 of the Iranian Constitution requires the Iranian government to confiscate the 
wealth obtained from bribery and return it to its legitimate owner. Further, the Iranian Institute of 
Certified Accountants Code of Professional Conduct considers the moral characteristics of 
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accountants as the most important part of their profession. 
2.1 Have you ever had any experience regarding bribery in your professional life? 
Yes             No  
2.2 Bribery is an indicator 
of threat to auditor 
independence in Iran. 
    
1         2         3         4         5 
Bribery is not an indicator of 
threat to auditor independence 
in Iran. 
 
3. According to the Iranian Code of Professional Conduct a long-term relationship between the 
auditors and their clients may threat auditor independence. In such circumstances, the auditors 
should take the necessary measures to safeguard their independence. 
3.1 What is the longest duration of a relationship between the auditors and their clients that you 
have ever seen in your professional life? 
5 years or less  
7 years or less 
10 years or less  
Other (Indicate the number of years, please): 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………......... 
3.2 Long-term relationship 
is an indicator of threat to 
auditor independence in Iran. 
 
    
1         2         3         4         5 
Long-term relationship is not 
an indicator of threat to auditor 
independence in Iran. 
 
The academic literature suggests that the prospect of reappointment can endanger auditor 
independence, since the auditors may sacrifice their commitments in order to continue receiving 
their audit fees. 
3.3 The prospect of 
reappointment is an indicator of 
threat to auditor independence 
in Iran. 
 
    
1         2         3         4         5 
The prospect of reappointment 
is not an indicator of threat to 
auditor independence in Iran. 
 
4. According to the Tehran Stock Exchange regulations, audit committees assist the Board of 
Directors regarding internal control and risk management, financial reporting, internal audit 
effectiveness, independent audit effectiveness, and compliance with the rules, provisions, and 
requirements. 
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4.1 Have you ever had any experience regarding working with an audit committee in your 
professional life?  
Yes             No            
4.2 The non-existence of 
audit committee is an indicator 
of threat to auditor 
independence in Iran. 
 
   
1         2         3         4         5 
The non-existence of audit 
committee is not an indicator of 
threat to auditor independence 
in Iran. 
 
5. According to the Iranian Code of Professional Conduct the auditors should have the required 
skills to perform their duties. They should consistently maintain their professional knowledge and 
skill of regulations and changes in the profession.  
5.1 The auditor lack of skill 
is an indicator of threat to 
auditor independence in Iran. 
 
  
1         2         3         4         5 
The auditor lack of skill is not 
an indicator of threat to auditor 
independence in Iran. 
 
 
Section III: Additional comments on threats to auditor independence in Iran 
Are there any other factors that are indicators of threat to auditor independence in Iran in 
your opinion? 
Yes             No  
If yes indicate them, please: 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………..... 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………..... 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
